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SUMMARY: Petr argues that the CA improperly required her to 
exhaust state administrative remedies in order to bring a §1983 
action. 
FACTS and DECISIONS BELOW: Petr is employed as a secretary 
at Florida International University, a state institution. She 
brought this §1983 action in SD Fla, alleging that the ~niversity 
? 
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made it a practice to seek out members of minority groups to hire 
and promote and that it segregated its personnel files according 
to race and sex. She alleged that she was denied several 
promotions for which she was qualified, and concluded that the 
University had violated the Equal Protection Clause by 
discriminating against her on the basis of race and sex. She 
asked the DC to order that she be promoted to the next available 
position for which she was qualified, or to award her $50,000 in 
actual and punitive damages. 
Resp, which is responsible for the operation of all state 
universities in Florida, moved to dismiss on a number of grounds. 
v 
The DC (Gonzalez) granted the motion on the ground that petr had 
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. 
A panel of the CA (Godbold, Reavley and Anderson) reversed, 
stating that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a 
prerequisite in §1983 actions. The panel relied upon Ellis v. 
\ Dyson, 421 u.s. 426, 432-33 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 u.s. 
' 
452 (1974); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 u.s. 564 (1973). The panel 
a "person" within the meaning of §1983 and that the 11th -
Amendment barred the suit, since they were not presented to the 
DC. 
The CA granted rehearing en bane, and concluded that 
exhaustion should be required in certain instances. Judge Roney 
- y', ~ . v d wrote for himself and Judges Coleman, Brown, A1nsworth, Godbol , 
~Charles Clark, Gee, Tjoflat, Hill, Fay, Garza, Henderson, 
' II"' 
Reavley, Politz, Anderson, Randall, and Tate. He began by noting 
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that exhaustion of administrative remedies normally is required 
before a federal court will decide a case on the merits. Myers 
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). The 
advantages of exhaustion are particularly great when a federal 
court is asked to review state action, since considerations of 
federalism counsel restraint in such circumstances. The majority 
acknowledged that language in many of this Court's cases states 
that exhaustion of admninistrative remedies is not required in 
§1983 suits. In tracing the origins of this rule, however, the 
~CA concluded that the Court had left room for the development of 
an exhaustion requirement. 
The majority recognized that Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 
(1961), held that state judicial remedies need not be exhausted 
by a §1983 plaintiff. Monroe was followed by McNeese v. Board of 
Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963), which held that plaintiffs 
attempting to challenge racially discriminatory practices in a 
school district were not required to exhaust state administrative 
remedies. The Court cited Monroe for the proposition that 
"relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because 
relief was not first sought under state law which provided a 
remedy." 373 U.S. at 671. It went on to state, however, that 
~he administrative remedy was inadequate. Id. at 674-54. The CA 
stated that the traditional exhaustion requirement is 
inapplicable when the administrative remedy is inadequate. 
Therefore, McNeese does not necessarily support the proposition 
that the traditional rule never should be applied in §1983 cases. 
The CA found further support for its view in Barry v. Barchi, 443 
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u.s. 55 (1979), in which the Court stated that a §1983 plaintiff 
did not have to exhaust state remedies. The basis of the 
plaintiff's challenge was that the administrative remedy provided 
by the state was inadequate. The Court relied upon this factor 
to excuse his failure to exhaust, rather than a blanket no-
exhaustion rule. The CA also relied upon Gibson v. Berryhill, 
411 U.S. 564 (1973) which also stated that exhaustion is not 
required when a §1983 plaintiff challenges the adequacy of the 
administrative remedy itself. 
TheCA admitted that language appears in many of the Court's 
opinions stating a categorical rule that adminsitrative remedies 
need not be eahausted. It distinguished all of these cases, 
however, either by stating that the language was dictum, because 
judicial rather than administrative remedies were at issue, or by 
stating that failure to exhaust would have been excused under the 
traditional exhaustion doctrine because the administrative 
remedies were inadequate. TheCA also cited Justice Rehnquist's 
dissent from denial of certiorari in City of Columbus v. Leonard, 
443 U.S. 905 (1979) (Burger, C.J. and Blackmun, J. concurring), 
which expressed the view that the exhaustion doctrine in §1983 
cases deserved re-examinaton. TheCA concluded that this Court's 
cases left open the question whether exhaustion of administrative 
remedies could be required in §1983 actions 
The Court then considered the purposes of §1983, relying 
upon Monroe v. Pape, which stated that the statute was passed to 
override certain inconsistent state laws, to provide a f~deral 
remedy where state law was inadequate, and to provide a federal 
T 
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remedy where the state remedy was available in theory but not in 
practice. 365 U.S. at 173-74. Requiring exhaustion is 
consistent with the second and third purposes, since it would 
require federal intervention only when state remedies were 
inadequate. Furthermore, state administrative proceedings "carry 
no res judicata or collateral estoppel baggage into federal 
court." Therefore, requiring exhaustion would not preclude 
federal protection of federally created rights. In addition, the 
CA identified five policy considerations favoring an exhaustion 
requirement: 1.) better allocation of judicial resources~ 2.) 
assurance that the action complained of is final, rather than the 
result of a subordinate official's decision~ 3.) incentives for 
states to create adequate administrative remedies for the 
vindication of constitutional rights~ 4.) reliance by litigants 
upon the adminstrative process, which is generally simpler, 
speedier and less expensive~ 5.) considerations of comity and 
federalism. 
The CA then standards which an 
adminstrative remedy must meet before ex aust1on should be 
required. The remedy must include: 1.) an orderly system of 
review or appeal~ 2.) relief that is more or less commensurate 
with the claim~ 3.) relief that is available within a reasonable 
period of time~ 4.) procedures that are fair and unburdensome~ 
5.) the possibility of interim relief in appropriate cases. If 
these standards are met, a court must consider the particular 
administrative scheme, and balance the nature of the interest the 
plaintiff seeks to protect against the values served by the 
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exhaustion doctrine to determine if the plaintiff should be 
required to exhaust. Because the record contained no information 
about the operation of the grievance procedure available to petr, 
the CA remanded the case for the DC to consider the adequacy of 
the remedy. 
Judge Rubin filed a dissent, joined by Judges Vance, Frank 
Johnson, Hatchett and Sam Johnson. He cited 11 cases in which 
the Court has stated that exhaustion of administrative remedies 
in not required in §1983 cases. In particular, he relied upon 
~ilwordin v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (~ curiam). There, 
the Court summarily reversed a CA decision requiring exhaustion 
~of available administrative remedies. Judge Rubin also noted 
that §1983 was enacted because Congress had little faith in the 
remedies available under state law. Therefore, it is incongruous (.LA;(~ 
to argue that it intended that state administrative remedies be 
exhausted. 
Judge Kravitch filed a short dissent, arguing that the 
question of exhaustion was foreclosed by this Court's previous 
opinions. She concluded that the CA was not free to adopt an 
exhaustion requirement on its own. 
Judge Hatchett filed a lengthy dissent, joined by Judges 
Rubin, Vance, Frank Johnson and Thomas Clark. He argued that the 
Court's language regarding exhaustion has been unequivocal. In 
Monroe, the Court's holdin~ on exhaustion of judicial remedies 
was based on a purpose of §1983 not discussed by the CA majority 
_,- I 
-
-- to provide a remedy that is "supplementary to the state 
remedy". 365 u.s. at 183. The majority did not discusss this 
~ 
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separate purpose of §1983. Although the majority cited from 
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in City of Columbus, which suggested 
that Monroe's holding on this point should be re-examined, those 
arguments were simply statements in a dissenting opinion. The 
cases extending Monroe's holding to administrative remedies are 
consistent with this rationale. In Damico v. Califronia, 389 
u.s. 416 (1967) (~ curiam), the Court explicitly stated that 
administrative remedies need not be exhausted. In so doing, it 
rejected Justice Harlan's argument in dissent that McNeese did 
not require this result because the remedy in McNeese was 
inadequate. Judge Hatchett concluded that Damico showed that the 
majority's view of McNeese has been rejected by the Court. 
Subsequent cases have relied upon Damico in holding that 
exhaustion is not required. In particular, Houghton v. Shafer, 
392 U.S. 639 (1968) (~ curiam), refused to require a state 
prisoner filing a §1983 action to exhaust available 
administrative remedies. The Court stated that requiring 
exhaustion might be futile, but stated: "In any event, resort to 
these remedies is unnecessary in light of [Monroe, McNeese, and 
Damico]." Id. at 640. See also King v. Smith, 392 u.s. 309, 312 
n.4 (1968): Wilwording v. Swenson, supra: Carter v. Stanton, 405 
u.s. 669 (1972). Although the majority relied upon Gibson v. 
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), which suggested that a §1983 
plaintiff might be required to exhaust state remedies if the 
state begins an administrative proceeding against him before he 
commences his action, two post-Gibson cases reiterate the no-
exhaustion rule: Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73 
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(1974)~ Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975). Furthermore, the 
Court in Barry v. Bianchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979), did not retreat 
from the flat no-exhaustion rule. 
Judghe Hatchett also argued that the overall purpose of 
§1983 was to create federal protection for federally created 
rights, so that citizens would not be forced to rely upon the 
states for protection. The majority's exhaustion requirement is 
inconsistent with that purpose. Since Congress did not include 
an exhaustion requirement, the court should not supply one. 
There are a number of policy arguments in favor of a no-
exhaustion rule, including the danger of discouraging litigants 
from pursuing their rights by erecting numerous procedural 
barriers, the necessity of time-consuming hearings to determine 
the adequacy of a particular remedy, the unavailability of costs 
and attorney fees in state administrative proceedings, the 
unavailability of class actions, and the friction that may 
develop when federal judges evaluate the adequacy of a state 
remedy. 
CONTENTIONS: Petr, represented by the ACLU Foundation, 
argues that theCA's decision conflicts with the decisions of 
this Court cited in the dissenting opinions, and suggests that 
summary reversal may be in order. She also argues that the 
recent passage of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons 
Act, Pub. L. 96-247 (May 23, 1980), codified in pertinent part at 
42 U.S.C. §1997e, indicates that Congress has approved of the 
Court's refusal to require exhaustion of administrative ~emedies 
in §1983 suits. The Act allows a DC in which a prisoner's §1983 
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suit is pending to continue the case for 90 days while the 
prisoner exhausts available state administrative remedies, if 
those remedies are consistent with standards promulgated by the 
Attorney General. According to petr, the legislative history of 
the Act reveals that Congress believed that legislation was 
necessary to allow DCs to impose an exhaustion requirement in 
§1983 suits. This indicates that Congress was aware of this 
Court's cases in this area and approved of the no-exhaustion 
requirement in all types of cases except prisoner's lawsuits. 
Petr notes that in Jenkins v. Brewer, No. 80-5116 (2/23/81), the 
Court GVR'd for reconsideration in light of the Act after it had 
granted cert to decide whether a prisoner should be required to 
exhaust administrative remedies. She suggests that the Court may 
wish to take the same action here. Although the CA's decision 
was issued after the passage of the Act, there is no indication 
that it was aware of the Act. 
Finally, petr argues that resp bore the burden of showing 
that the administrative remedy was adequate. Since the CA found 
the record to be silent on this point, petr should prevail. In 
any event, the remedy clearly is inadequate, since it provides 
for review ultimately by the state's Director of Personnel and 
its Human Rights Commission. Neither has the authority to order 
resp to grant her relief. The Human Rights Commission may file a 
lawsuit, but is not required to do so. McNeese stated that a 
similar procedure was inadequate. 
Resp states that the case is not ripe for review, because 
.... ---
the DC has not yet decided whether petr will be required to 
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exhaust. In addition, the DC has not addressed its 11th 
Amendment argument, which is dispositive of this case. It argues 
~~--------------------~----
that there is no real conflict with the prior decisions of this 
Court, for the reasons given by theCA's majority. The 1980 
statute is inapplicable, because petr is not a prisoner, and 
Congress was concerned only with prisoners' suits. Resp also 
contends that an adequate remedy exists under Title VII, and that 
there should be no separate cause of action under §1983 in such 
circumstances. Petr should not be allowed to circumvent the 
administrative procedures of Title VII. 
Petr replies that the exhaustion issue is ripe for review. 
If exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required by 
§1983, the CA's remand violates that statute. She points out 
that resp's discussion of the 1980 Act states that Congress 
believed that legislation was necessary to allow DCs to require 
exhaustion in prisoners' cases. Finally, she states that the 
11th Amendment argument was not decided by the CA. Even if the 
Amendment is applicable here, petr seeks injunctive relief. 
Therefore, the suit still may be maintained. Quern v. Jordan, 
440 U.S. 332 (1979); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union 
446 U.S. 719 (1980). Petr states that the Title VII argument was 
not raised below. 
DISCUSSION: Both sides are attempting to press a number of 
red herrings upon the Court. The CA did not decide whether the 
administrative remedy is adequate, and I believe that the Court 
should decline petr's invitation to do so. Similarly, the 11th 
Amendment and Title VII arguments should be addressed by the DC 
,. 
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and CA before this Court steps in. Unlike resp, I believe that 
h v h . . . · f d · · A t · t t t e ex aust1on 1ssue 1s r1pe or ec1s1on. s pe r po1n s ou , 
if exhaustion may never be required, the remand will be a waste 
of time. 
The dissenting opinions demonstrate (and the majority 
admits) that the CA's holding conflicts with a number of this 
Court's statements. If the Court is not interested in re-
examining this issue, it would seem that summary reversal is 
appropriate. On the other hand, the careful and thorough 
consideration of the question by the entire CA may indicate that ~ 
the Court should take a closer look. TheCA, however, does not 
discuss the 1980 legislation. That legislation may indicate that 
~
Congress has considered the Court's statements on exhaustion of 
admninistrative remedies and intends that exhaustion should be 
required only in the cases specified. If so, the dispute is at 
an end. I think it would be a better use of the Court's time for 
the CA to examine this legislation before this Court decides its 
effect upon this case. Therefore, I recommend that the case be 
GVR'd for reconsideration in light of §7 of the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247. 
There is a response, along with a reply. 
8/4/81 Dean Opns in petn 
08/25/81 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Patsy v. Board of Regents, No. 80-1874 CFX 
In your hand-written notes on this cert memo, you asked for I 
my judgment on whether the exhaustion question could properly be e R~~ 
11 ~t>~s ? reached. I believe that it could, but there are tremendous ~'&~ _n./> C \\ 0 obstacles not fully developed in the pool memorandum. For the~~ ~ 
r~ted below, I st"ll rec:m:end a denial. I begin, ~~~ 
however, with the statutory question noted in the original memo~~~~ 
Like the memo writer, I in it iallyreconunended that the  1""')1 ~ 
decision of CAS be remanded for reconsideration in light of the~~~ 
enactment of 42 u.s.c. ~e. That statute explicitly creates~ ~ 
r 
..- 'f. ffi ~ 
an exhaustion requirement for certain actions brought, by the 
It bears on~
the case, if at all, as an indication of congressional intent on~, p~~ 
government, on behalf of institutionalized persons. 
the exhaustion question. :."_ therefore ~vides no Jlar to the ~ ~ 
consideration of that question. The argument for a remand was to~~ 
use the Court's resources most effectively. That concern can of~~ 
course be overridden where there is a powerful reason to want to~,~­
take the case. ~pi!~~ 
After looking at the papers, I find the 11th Amendme t is~;!; // JA.. 
more troublesome. _______.. 
injunctive relief. 
Petitioner asks for ~ monetary and 
~ 
The suit for monetary relief--which would 
apparently come from the State's treasury--is almost certainly 
barred by u nd e r Edelman v. Jordan , 41S U . S • 6 41 { 19 7 4) • { If I 
appear to be hedging slightly, I am. CAS did not reach the /1 :2~ 
--------~- · ~ ·~-~ ...... __ 
issue, so there is no factual record of the University's -
financial relationship with the State.) Edelman does not bar 
suits against named State officials for injunctive relief. But 
petitioner here seems not to have named any State officials. She 
Corporate, for and on behalf of, Florida International 
University." This could well be a pleading error of the first 
importance. In Alabama v. Pugh, 438 u.s. 781, 782 {1978), this 
Court held that the 11th Amendment barred suit against "the 
Alabama Board of Corrections." See id. at 782 {"There can be no 
doubt that suit against the State and its Board of Corrections is 
barred by the 11th Amendment.") 
It is possible, I suppose, to argue that no 11th Amendment 
issue is before the Court, because none was decided by CAS. It 
could be left to the remand to decide the State law question 
whether the defendant Board of Regents ~ an arm of the State for 
11th Amendment purposes. But the question does not seem much in 
1/~~ 
doubt. Also, the quest1on is plainly jurisdictional, and I would 
II 
question the propriety either of ignoring it or of considering it 
after the exhaustion question--another possibility for getting to 
exhaustion, if the Court wants to do so badly enough. 
It is t 
settled that this Court could reach the jurisdictional issue, 
See Edelman v. Jordan, even though it was not considered below. 
~~E~~, 41S u.s. at 667. 
,, T 
Finally, aeother~rob~em should probably be noted. 
Respondent raises a significant question whether this case is not 
subject to the exhaustion requirements of Title VII. Section 
~----------~---------- -- --~ 
~~ 1983 creates no substantive rights. The civil rights asserted by 
plaintiff thus seem to be rights arising under the Civil Rights 
Act. If so, there is a question--not briefed or decided below--
whether she was not obliged to begin her action through the EEOC 
process. This is another jurisdiction~! question. 
In sum, to answer your question: The exhaustion question 
could be reached if the Court were insistent, but there are ~y 
obstacles. I would still recommend that the petition should be 
denied. If petitioner somehow surmounts these obstacles in the 
lower courts, this Court will get another chance at a later date. 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued . . ................ . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 . . . 
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CHAM BER S OF 
JUSTICE w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~up:rttttt "Jcnrl cf flrt ~b ~talt$' 
~rur~ ~. C!f. 2!1,?:'1-~ 
March 8, 1982 
RE: No. 80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents 
Dear Chief: 
Thurgood has agreed to take on the opinion for 






The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
,. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
Dear Chief: 
~rtpTrtttt Q}iffifl' 1ft Oft ~m.ttZt ;!'t1f.U 
'Jlttt$Jringtcn. ;!B. Q):. 2llgtJl.~ 
March 9, 1982 
80-1874 Pat~y v. Board of Regents 
I will be glad to write a dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfpjss 
March 9, 1982 
80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents 
Dear Chief: 
I will be glad to write a dissent in this case. 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.p:rtntt Ofourl of tltt ~b ~taftg 
JJufri:nght~ ~. Of. 2ll~,.~ 
March 8, 1982 
Re: No. 80-1874 - Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida 
Dear Lewis: 
You and I seem to be alone in this case. Will 





Patsy Case / 
Talk to David about obtaining information through 
the Library that will enable a comparison of 1983 cases 
filed with DC's in fiscal 1981 compared to those filed the 
year that Monroe v. Pape was decided and filed the year 
Wilwording was decided. 
Also was it not Justice Holmes who said that the 
"Life of the law is experience"? 
April 13, 1982 
LEVI GINA-POW 
To: David Levi 
From: LFP, JR. 
Subject: 80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents 
No doubt the Court opinion in this case will rely, as 
petitioner argued, on the enactment by Congress of 42 u.s.c. 
§1997 that provides for exhaustion of remedies by state 
prisoners but only where the state adopt$intrusive "minimum 
• 
standards" for administrative review. The Attorney General 
has adopted regulations, as required by the statute. I 
don't have these at hand, but I believe either the statute 
or the regulations permit a prisoner to sue under Section 
1983 if the administrative process extends beyond some 
specified time (~·~· 90 days). 
Section 1997 f requires the Attorney General to report 
to Congress. I suggest that you request the library to 
obtain a copy of any reports made by the AG to the Congress. 
Also, ask the library to inquire - perhaps through the 
administrative office or Justice Department or both -
whether any statistics are available as to the number of 
states that have adopted the standards required by the 
Attorney General, and whether there has been any lessening 
of the filing of 1983 state prisoner petitions. 
It may be too early for any dependable statistics 
(perhaps none at all), but we might check. 
LFP,Jr. 
2 0 
April 13, 1982 
LEVI GINA-POW 
To: David Levi 
From: LFP, JR. 
Subject: 80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents 
No doubt the Court opinion in this case will rely, as 
petitioner argued, on the enactment by Congress of 42 u.s.c. 
§1997 that provides for exhaustion of remedies by state 
prisoners but only where the state adopt intrusive "minimum 
standards" for administrative review. The Attorney General 
has adopted regulations, as required by the statute. I 
don't have these at hand, but I believe either the statute 
or the regulations permit a prisoner to sue unrler Section 
1983 if the administrative process extends beyond some 
specified time <~·~· 90 days). 
Section 1997 f requires the Attorney General to report 
to Congress. I suggest that you request the library to 
obtain a copy of any reports made by the AG to the Congress. 
Also, ask the library to inquire - perhaps through the 
administrative office or Justice Department or both -
whether any statistics are available as to the number of 
states that have adopted the standards required by the 
Attorney General, and whether there has been any lessening 
of the filing of 1983 state prisoner petitions. 
• c 
... 
• • t 
It may be too early for any dependable statistics 




. ,. ·; 
.! 
.~ .... I' 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~ttprttttt "Jourl d fltt ~tb ;§hdtg 
... as!pnghm. :!B. <!f. 2llc?Jl.~ 
May 14, 1982 
Re: No. 80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents 
Dear Thurgood: 
Although I voted for the result which your opinion 
reaches at Conference, I have some difficulty with your 
treatment of the Eleventh Amendment issues in the opinion, 
and will await any separate writing that may be forthcoming. 




Copies to the Conference 
May 1.4, 1982 
80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents 
Dear Thurgood: 
In due time, I will circulate a dissent. 
Justice Marshall 
lfp/ss 





.JUSTICE w .. . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
~ltpt.tntt <!fcnrl cf flrt 'J!UtiUb ~taft,g 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1874 
GEORGIA PATSY, PETITIONER v. BOARD OF RE-
GENTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, ETC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1982] 
JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether exhaustion of 
state administrative remedies is a prerequisite to an action 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Petitioner Georgia Patsy filed this 
action, alleging that her employer, Florida International U ni-
versity (FlU), had denied her employment opportunities 
solely on the basis of her race and sex. By a divided vote, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
found that petitioner was required to exhaust "adequate and 
appropriate" administrative remedies, and remanded the 
case to the District Court to consider the adequacy of the ad-
ministrative procedures. Patsy v. Florida International 
University, 634 F. 2d 900 (CA5 1981) (en bane). We reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
I 
Petitioner alleges that even though she is well-qualified 
and has received uniformly excellent performance evalua-
tions from her supervisors, she has been rejected for more 
than thirteen positions at FlU. 1 She further claims that 
'Because this case is here on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the 
factual allegations in petitioner's amended complaint. In her initial com-
plaint, petitioner named FlU as the defendant. Relying on Byron v. Uni-
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FlU has unlawfully filled positions through intentional 
discrimination on the basis of race and sex. She seeks de-
claratory and injunctive relief or, in the alternative, 
damages. 2 
The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida granted respondent Board of Regents' motion to 
dismiss because petitioner had not exhausted available ad-
ministrative remedies. On appeal, a panel of the Court of 
Appeals reversed, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Patsy v. Florida International University, 612 
F. 2d 946 (CA5 1980). The full court then granted respond-
ent's petition for rehearing and vacated the panel decision. 
The Court of Appeals reviewed numerous opinions of this 
Court holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies 
was not required, and concluded that these cases did not pre-
clude the application of a "flexible" exhaustion rule. 634 
F. 2d, at 908. After canvassing the policy arguments in fa-
vor of an exhaustion requirement, the Court of Appeals de-
cided that a § 1983 plaintiff could be required to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies if the following minimum conditions 
are met: (1) an orderly system of review or appeal is provided 
by statute or agency rule; (2) the agency can grant relief 
more or less commensurate with the claim; (3) relief is avail-
versity of Florida, 403 F . Supp. 49 (ND Fla. 1975), the District Court 
granted FlU's motion to dismiss, holding that the Board of Regents and 
not the individual university had the capacity to sue and be sued under 
Florida law. The District Court granted petitioner leave to amend her 
complaint. 
2 Petitioner requested the District Court to "[r lequire Defendants to 
remedy the discrimination practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the 
next available position consistent with those previously applied for and for 
which she is qualified or in the alternative, to require the Defendants to 
pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary damages." 
Record 47. Petitioner also requested that the District Court "order fur-
ther equitable and injunctive relief as it deems appropriate and necessary 
to correct the conditions of discrimination complained of herein." Record 
48. 
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able within a reasonable period of time; (4) the procedures 
are fair, are not unduly burdensome, and are not used to ha-
rass or discourage those with legitimate claims; and (5) in-
terim relief is available, in appropriate cases, to prevent ir-
reparable injury and to preserve the plaintiff's rights during 
the administrative process. Where these minimum stand-
ards are met, a court must further consider the particular ad-
ministrative scheme, the nature of the plaintiff's interest, and 
the values served by the exhaustion doctrine in order to de-
termine whether exhaustion should be required. I d., at 
912-913. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the 
District Court to determine whether exhaustion would be ap-
propriate in this case. 
II 
At the outset, we address the contention that the Eleventh 
Amendment bars even the injunctive and declaratory feiief 
sought Tn this complaint. 3 Respondent Board of Regents 
3 The Eleventh Amendment defense was not raised in the District 
Court; it was briefed to the panel on appeal, but was not included in the 
brief on rehearing en bane. In this Court, the defense was not briefed, 
but respondent asserted it in its response in opposition to the petition for 
certiorari. At oral argument, the state attorney general stated that this 
Court should affirm the Court of Appeals solely on the exhaustion holding. 
However, he also stated that the Eleventh Amendment was still an issue in 
this case, and he admitted that even if we affirmed the Court of Appeals, 
the case would be remanded for consideration of the adequacy of the ad-
ministrative procedures, thus subjecting respondent to further proceed-
ings in the District Court. 
We have held that "the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently par-
takes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar" that it may be raised at any point 
in the proceedings, and that waiver of this defense will not be lightly in-
ferred from the State's litigation strategy. Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U. S. 
651, 678 (1974). See Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 
(1945). We have never addressed the question whether the Eleventh 
Amendment defense can be raised, neglected, and then reargued at the 
whim of the person raising this defense. Certainly, permitting this prac-
tice would greatly increase the uncertainty and potential for wasted litiga-
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suggests that, as a state corporation, it should be viewed as 
the State itself for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. It 
relies on Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978), where this 
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit brought 
directly against the State and its Board of Corrections, even 
when only declaratory and injunctive relief is requested. 4 j 
However, it is well-settled that the Eleventh Amendment 
does not bar actions against state officials or state corpora-
tions when the plaintiff is not seeking monetary relief that 
must be paid from public fundSTnth~ry. Hop-
kins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911); 
Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). 5 
In Hopkins, supra, this Court squarely decided that a -
tion already inherent in the rule that the defense can be raised at any time. 
In any event, our Eleventh Amendment precedents are clear, and a re-
mand is not required to determine unanswered questions of fact or state 
law, at least with respect to the injunctive and declaratory relief re-
quested. Thus, we need not address the procedural question posed by re-
spondent's perplexing litigation strategy. 
'The issue decided in Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978)-whether 
a state agent is the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment and 
thus cannot be brought into court for any reason absent a waiver of sover-
eign immunity-is distinct from the question addressed in Edelman v. Jor-
dan, 415 U. S. 651, 662-669 (1974)-whether the Eleventh Amendment 
forbids a suit against a state agent because the suit seeks to impose a dam-
age award that must be paid out of funds in the state treasury. See also 
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979). Here, we decide the first ques-
tion, and hold that respondent is not the State in the sense intended in Ala-
bama v. Pugh. 
5 Consistent with this theory, we have heard numerous suits requesting 
injunctive or declaratory relief against state universities or boards of re-
gents or trustees, without discussing a possible Eleventh Amendment bar. 
See e. g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478 (1978) (§ 1983 ac-
tion); University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 
287 (1978) (POWELL, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) ("decisions 
based on race or ethnic origin by faculties and administrations of state uni-
versities are reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment") (citing 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950), Sweatt v. 
Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950), Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 
(1948), and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938)); 
r 
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state corporate body such as respondent was not entitled to 
the full immunity accorded the State by the Eleventh 
Amendment. 6 There, the petitioner sued the state college, 
claiming that the college and its board of trustees had com-
mitted both a tort and an unconstitutional taking of his prop-
erty. The respondent college argued that the Eleventh 
Amendment barred the suit. Framing the issue as "whether 
a public corporation can avail itself of the State's immunity 
from suit," 221 U. S., at 642, the Court rejected this defense 
with respect to the college and its board of trustees, estab-
lished by the State as a "body corporate." 7 
The Court recognized that "[ w ]ith the exception named in 
the Constitution, every State has absolute immunity from 
suit," and cannot be sued in any court without its consent. 
Ibid. The Court also noted that even when the State is not 
named as the party defendent, the Eleventh Amendment ap-
plies when the suit is, in reality, one against the State. The 
Court then reasoned: 
"But immunity from suit is a high attribute of sover-
eignty-a perogative of the State itself-which cannot 
be availed of by public agents when sued for their own 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972) (§ 1983 action). 
6 The Courts of Appeals have been virtually unanimous in allowing suits 
for declaratory or injunctive relief against state universities or their 
boards. See, e. g., Gay Student Services v. Texas A & M University, 612 
F. 2d 160 (CA5 1980); New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. Uni-
versity of Colorado, 592 F. 2d 1196 (CAl 1979). Cf. Skehan v. Board of 
Trustees, 590 F. 2d 470 (CA3 1978). However, they have divided on 
whether monetary relief can be awarded against these entities, depending 
on whether they have funds independent of the state treasury or on 
whether the State has waived its immunity. Compare SON! v. Board of 
Trustees, 513 F. 2d 347 (CA61975) and Goss v. Jacinto Junior College, 588 
F . 2d 96 (CA5 1979), with Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F. 2d 1166 (CA5 1976). 
7 The state charter establishing the college and its board of trustees is in 
relevant part remarkably similar to that of the Board of Regents in this 
case, see note 9, infra. See Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 
221 u. s. 637, 638-639 (1911). 
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torts. The Eleventh Amendment was not intended to 
afford them freedom from liability in any case where, 
under color of their office, they have injured one of the 
State's citizens. To grant them such immunity would be 
to create a privileged class free from liability for wrongs 
inflicted or injuries threatened. . . . The whole frame 
and scheme of the political institutions of this country, 
state and Federal, protest against extending to any 
agent the sovereign's exemption from legal process." 
I d., at 642-642. 
Mter discussing cases in which the Court had uniformly 
denied Eleventh Amendment immunity to public officials, 8 
the Court considered whether public corporations should re-
ceive similar treatment: 
It is said, however, that, in the cases referred to, the of-
ficers were held liable to suit because in the transaction 
complained of, the statute being unconstitutional, they 
could not be treated as agents of the State. And it is 
argued that these authorities have no application to suits 
against those public corporations which exist, and can 
act, in no other capacity than as governmental agencies, 
or political subdivisions of the State itself. But neither 
public corporations nor political subdivisions are clothed 
with that immunity from suit which belongs to the State 
alone by virtue of its sovereignty. In County of Lincoln 
v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 530, the Court ... held that 
the Eleventh Amendment was limited to those cases in 
which the State is the real party, or party on the record, 
but that counties were corporations which might be 
sued .... 
Corporate agents or individual officers of the State 
8 The cases cited and discussed by the Court included Ex Parte Young, 
209 U. S. 123 (1908), Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897); and United 
States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882). 
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stand in no better position than officers of the General 
Government .... " I d., at 644-645 (citations omitted). 
The Court went on to recognize that agents of the State, 
whether corporate or individual, might have defenses not 
available to private corporations or individuals, but these de-
fenses serve to prevent ultimate liability or recovery, and are 
not barriers to initiating the litigation. The Hopkins Court 
thus approached the application of the Eleventh Amendment 
to a state university and board of trustees, established as a 
"body corporate" of the State, in the same manner it had ap-
proached this defense in cases involving other state officials 
or corporations: the Eleventh Amendment was not a bar to 
the suit as long as the suit did not seek damages that must be 
paid out of public funds in the state treasury and did not seek 
to restrain the state agent from obeying a constitutional com-
mand of the State. I d., at 644. 
This approach is consistent with that taken in our more re-
cent cases. For example, in Monell v. New York City Dept. 
ofSocial Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), this Court addressed 
whether muncipal corporations were "persons" within the 
meaning of § 1983. In holding that they were, the Court 
found it significant that the Congress which enacted the 
predecessor to § 1983 recognized that "there was no distinc-
tion of constitutional magnitude between officers and 
agents-including corporate agents-of the State." Id., at 
682. See also Mount Healthy City School District Board of 
Education v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280-281 (1977) (local 
school board, like a municipal corporation, not entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity). Cf. Lake Country Es-
tates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 
391, 400-401 (1979) (agency created by a compact between 
two States with congressional approval not necessarily enti-
tled to the same immunity as the States themselves). 
Here, as in Hopkins, respondent Board of Regents is a 
"body corporate with all the powers of a body corporate." 
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Fla. Stat. § 240.205. 9 Furthermore, under Fla. Stat. 
§ 20.15, respondent Board of Regents is designated as "the 
director of the Division of Universities," one of five divisions 
of the Department of Education, while the directors of the 
other divisions are appointed by the Commissioner of Educa-
tion. As a result, the Board of Regents stands in the same 
position as a state official, not only because it is a corporate 
agent by virtue of its status as a "body corporate," but also 
because the corporate body itself is designated as the director 
of a subdivision of the Department of Education, a position 
generally held by an individual official. 
Finding that respondent is entitled to no more immunity 
than a state official means only that it may be sued for uncon-
stitutional or unauthorized actions, as long as the plaintiff is 
not seeking monetary relief that must be paid out of the state 
treasury. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). 
As we noted earlier, petitioner' sought injunctive and declara-
tory relief, and only requested damages in the alternative. 
See note 2, supra. Clearly, the Eleventh Amendment does 
not bar this suit with respect to the injunctive and declara-
tory relief. 
• Section 240.205 provides in full: 
"The Board of Regents is hereby created as a body corporate with all the 
powers of a body corporate for all the purposes created by, or that may 
exist under, the provisions of this chapter or laws amendatory hereof and 
shall: 
(1) Have a corporate seal. 
(2) Elect a corporate secretary. 
(3) Have and employ a staff attorney and other authorized personnel. 
(4) Have power to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued, 
and to plead and be impleaded in all courts of law and equity. 
(5) Receive donations. 
(6) Make purchases of real and personal property and contract for the 
sale and disposal of same, but the title to all real property, however ac-
quired, shall be vested in the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improve-
ment Trust Fund and shall be transferred and conveyed by it." 
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It is inappropriate to consider at this time whether an 
award of monetary relief would be permissible under 
Edelman, since there are unresolved questions of fact and 
state law with respect to this issue. It is unclear whether 
the State has waived its sovereign immunity with respect to 
actions against respondent. 10 If the State has not waived 
such immunity, it is unclear whether a judgment against the 
Board must be paid out of the State treasury. 11 These unset-
tled questions should be decided by the District Court on re-
mand should it find that petitioner is entitled to recover, and 
should it further consider awarding monetary relief. The 
question whether the Eleventh Amendment bars a damage 
award is one of ultimate relief not of jurisdiction, once it is 
established that respondent may be sued at least with re-
spect to the request for injunctive relief. See Hopkins v. 
Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S., at 648. 
III 
The question whether exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies should ever be required in a § 1983 action has prompted 
vigorous debate and disagreement. See, e. g., Turner, 
When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Cases 
in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610 (1979); Note, 8 
Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975); Note, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 537 (1974). 
Our resolution of this issue, however, is made much easier 
10 See, e. g., Fla. Stat. § 240.205(4) (respondent authorized "to sue and be 
sued, and to plead and be impleaded in all courts of law and equity"); Fla. 
Stat. § 240.213 (respondent may secure liability insurance, and immunity is 
waived to the extent of the insurance); Fla. Stat. § 240.215 (respondent 
may pay costs of civil actions against board members or employees and 
may procure insurance to cover such losses or expenses). The application 
of these provisions to actions in federal courts and to actions not involving 
tort liability is unclear. 
11 The Board has certain funds not derived from the State that are ex-
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because we are not writing on a clean slate. This Court has 
addressed this issue, as well as related issues, on several 
prior occasions. 
Respondent suggests that our prior precedents do not con-
trol our decision today, arguing that these cases can be dis-
tinguished on their facts or that this Court did not "fully" con-
sider the question whether exhaustion should be required. 
This contention need not detain us long. Beginning with 
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671-673 
(1963), we have on numerous occasions rejected the argu-
ment that a § 1983 action should be dismissed where the 
plaintiff has not exhausted state administrative remedies. 
See Barry v. Bachi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v. 
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574 (1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405 
U. S. 669, 671 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249; 
251 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968); 
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 312 n. 4 (1968); Damico v. 
California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967). Cf. Fair Assessment in 
Real Estate Association v. McNary,-- U.S.--,--
(1981); id., at -- (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 473 (1974) 
("[w]hen federal claims are premised on[§ 1983]-as they are 
here-we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or 
administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount role 
Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect con-
stitutional rights"). Respondent may be correct in arguing 
that several of these decisions could have been based on tra-
ditional exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. N everthe-
less, this Court has stated categorically that exhaustion is not 
a prerequiste to an action under § 1983, and we have not devi-
ated from that position in the 19 years since McNeese. 
Therefore, we do 2& &&& ££ QU€btlb:trpresented in this 
case as one of first impression. 
IV 
Respondent argues that we should reconsider these deci-
sions and adopt the Court of Appeals' exhaustion rule, which 
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was based on McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185 (1969). 
This Court has never announced a definitive formula for 
determining whether prior decisions should be overruled or 
reconsidered. However, in Monell v. New York City Dept. 
of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 69&-701 (1978), we articu-
lated four factors that should be considered. Two of these 
factors-whether the decisions in question misconstrued the 
meaning of the statute as revealed in its legislative history 
and whether overruling these decisions would be inconsistent 
with more recent expressions of congressional intent-are 
particularly relevant to our decision today. 12 Both concern 
legislative purpose, which is of paramount importance in the 
exhaustion context because Congress is vested with the 
power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which 
claims may be heard in federal courts. Of course, courts 
play an important role in determining the parameters of an 
exhaustion requirement and may impose such a requirement 
even where Congress has not expressly so provided. How-
ever, the initial question whether exhaustion is required 
should be answered by reference to congressional intent; and 
a court should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a 
federal statute unless it is consistent with that intent. 13 
· 
12 The other factors discussed in M onell-whether the decisions in ques-
tion constituted a departure from prior decisions and whether overruling 
these decisions would frustrate legitimate reliance on their holdings--do 
not support overruling these decisions. MeN eese was not a departure 
from prior decisions-this Court had not previously addressed the applica-
tion of the exhaustion rule to § 1983 actions. Overruling these decisions 
might injure those § 1983 plaintiffs who had foregone or waived their state 
administrative remedies in reliance on these decisions. 
1
" Congressional intent is important in determining the application of the 
exhaustion doctrine to cases in which federal administrative remedies are 
available, as well as to those in which state remedies are available. Of 
course, exhaustion is required where Congress provides that certain ad-
ministrative remedies shall be exclusive. See Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938). Even where the statutory require-
ment of exhaustion is not explicit, courts are guided by congressional 
intent in determining whether application of the doctrine would be consist-
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Therefore, in deciding whether we should reconsider our 
prior decisions and require exhaustion of state administrative 
remedies, we look to congressional intent as reflected in the 
legislative history of the predecessor to § 1983 and in recent 
congressional activity in this area. 
A 
In determining whether our prior decisions misconstrued 
the meaning of § 1983, we begin with a review of the legisla-
tive history to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, 
the precursor to § 1983. 14 Although we recognize that the 
1871 Congress did not expressly contemplate the exhaustion 
question, we believe that the tenor of the debates over § 1 
supports our conclusion that exhaustion of administrative 
remedies in § 1983 actions should not be judicially imposed. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, along with the Fourteenth 
Amendment it was enacted to enforce, were crucial ingredi-
ents in the basic alteration of our federal system accom-
plished during the Reconstruction era. During that time, 
the Federal Government was clearly established as a guaran-
tor of the basic federal rights of individuals against incursions 
by state power. As we recognized in Mitchum v. Foster, 
407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 
ent with the statutory scheme. In determining whether exhaustion of fed-
eral administrative remedies is required, courts generally focus on the role 
Congress has assigned to the particular federal agency, and tailor the ex-
haustion rule to fit the particular administrative scheme created by Con-
gress. See McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193-195 (1969). 
With state administrative remedies, the focus is not so much on the role 
assigned to the state agency, but the role of the state agency becomes im-
portant once a court finds that deferring its exercise of jurisdiction is con-
sistent with statutory intent. 
" Some of the debates relating to § 2, which created certain federal 
crimes in addition to those defined in § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 
Stat. 27, aimed primarily at the Ku Klux Klan, are also relevant to our dis-
cussion of § 1. 
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U. S. 339, 346 (1879)), "[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to 
interpose the federal courts between the States and the peo-
ple, as guardians of the people's federal rights--to protect 
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state 
law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or 
judicial.'" 
At least three recurring themes in the debates over§ 1 cast 
serious doubt on the suggestion that requiring exhaustion of 
state administrative remedies would be consistent with the 
intent of the 1871 Congress. First, in passing § 1, Congress 
assigned to the federal courts a paramount role in protecting 
constitutional rights. Representative Dawes expressed this 
view as follows: 
"The first remedy proposed by this bill is a resort to the 
courts of the United States. Is that a proper place in 
which to find redress for any such wrongs? If there be 
power to call into courts of the United States an offender 
against these rights, privileges, and immunities, and 
hold him to an account there, either civilly or criminally, 
for their infringement, I submit to the calm and candid 
judgment of every member of this House that there is no 
tribunal so fitted, where equal and exact justice would 
be more likely to be meted out in temper, in moderation, 
in severity, if need be, but always according to the law 
and the fact, as that great tribunal of the Constitution." 
Gong. Globe, 42d Gong., 1st Sess. 476 (1871) (hereinafter 
Globe). 
See also id., at 332 (Rep. Hoar); id., at 375 (Rep. Lowe); id., 
at 448-449 (Rep. Butler); id., at 459 (Rep. Coburn). 15 
15 Opponents of the bill also recognized this purpose and complained that 
the bill would usurp the States' power, centralize the government and per-
haps ultimately destroy the States. See, e. g., Globe 337, 338 (Rep. 
Whitthorne); id., at 352 (Rep. Beck); id. , at 361 (Rep. Swann); id., at 365 
(Rep. Arthur); id., at 385 (Rep. Lewis); id., at 429, 431 (Rep. McHenry); 
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The 1871 Congress intended § 1 to "throw open the doors of 
the United States courts" to individuals who were threatened 
with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitutional 
rights, Globe 376 (Rep. Lowe), and to provide these individ-
uals immediate access to the federal courts notwithstanding 
any provision of state law to the contrary. For example, 
Senator Edmunds, who introduced the bill in the Senate, 
stated in his closing remarks that the bill was similar in prin-
ciple to an earlier act upheld by this Court in Prigg v. Penn-
sylvania, 16 Pet. 539 (1842): 
"[T]he Supreme Court decided ... that it was the sol-
emn duty of Congress under the Constitution to secure 
to the individual, in spite of the State, or with its aid, as 
the case might be, precisely the rights that the Constitu-
tion gave him, and that there should be no intermediate 
authority to arrest or oppose the direct performance of 
this duty by Congress." Globe 692 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, Representative Elliott viewed the issue as 
whether "the Government of the United States [has] the 
right, under the Constitution, to protect a citizen in the exer-
cise of his vested rights as an American citizen by ... the as-
sertion of immediate jurisdiction through its courts, without 
the appeal or agency of the State in which the citizen is domi-
ciled." !d., at 389 (emphasis added). See, e. g., id., at 459 
(Rep. Coburn); id., at 807 (Rep. Garfield); id., at 609 (Sen. 
Pool); Globe App. 141 (Rep. Shanks). 16 
id., at 454 (Rep. Cox); id., at 510, 511 (Rep. Eldridge); Cong. Globe, 42d 
Cong., 1st Sess., App. 46 (Rep. Kerr) (hereinafter Globe App.); id., at 216 
(Sen. Thurman); id., at 243 (Sen. Bayard). 
'"Opponents criticized this provision on this very ground. For exam-
ple, Rep. Storm lamented: 
"[Section one] does not even give the State courts a chance to try ques-
tions, or to show whether they will try the questions that might come be-
fore them under the first section of the fourteenth amendment, fairly or 
not. It takes the whole question away from them in the beginning." 
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A second theme in the debates further suggests that the 
1871 Congress would not have wanted to impose an exhaus-
tion requirement. A major factor motivating the expansion 
of federal court jurisdiction through §§ 1 and 2 of the bill was 
the belief of the 1871 Congress that the state authorities had 
been unable or unwilling to protect the constitutional rights 
of individuals or to punish those who violated these rights. 
See, e. g., Globe 321 (Rep. Strough ton) ("[t]he State authori-
ties and local courts are unable or unwilling to check the evil 
or punish the criminals"); id., at 374 (Rep. Lowe) ("the local 
administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to 
apply the proper corrective"); id., at 459 (Rep. Coburn); id., 
at 609 (Sen. Pool); id., at 687 (Sen. Shurz); id., at 691 (Sen. 
Edmunds); Globe App. 185 (Rep. Platt). 17 Of primary impor-
tance to the exhaustion question was the mistrust that the 
1871 Congress held for the fact-finding processes of state in-
stitutions. See, e. g., Globe 320 (Testimony of Hon. Thomas 
Settle, Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, before 
the House Judiciary Committee) ("[t]he defect lies not so 
much with the courts as with the juries"); id., at 394 (Rep. 
Rainey); Globe App. 311 (Rep. Maynard). This Congress 
Globe App. 86. 
See also Globe 416 (Rep. Biggs) ("for the violation of the rights, privileges, 
and immunities of the citizen a civil remedy is to be had by proceedings in 
the Federal courts, State authorization in the premises to the contrary not-
withstanding"); id., at 337 (Rep. Whitthorne); id., at 373 (Rep. Archer); 
Globe App. 216 (Sen. Thurman). 
17 This view was expressed in the Presidential message urging the pass-
ing of corrective legislation. See Globe 244 ("That the power to correct 
these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt.") (Mes-
sage of Pres. Grant). The inability of state authorities to protect constitu-
tional rights was also expressed in the findings of the House Judiciary 
Committee, which had been directed to investigate the situation. See id., 
at 320. The resolution introduced by Senator Sherman instructing the 
Senate Judiciary Committee to report a bill expressed a similar view. See 
Globe App. 210 (state "courts are rendered utterly powerless by organized 
perjury to punish crime"). 
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believed that federal courts would be less susceptible to local 
prejudice and to the existing defects in the fact-finding pro-
cesses of the state courts. See, e. g., Globe 322 (Rep. 
Stoughton); id., at 459 (Rep. Coburn). 18 This perceived de-
fect in the States' fact-finding processes is particularly rele-
vant to the question of exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies: exhaustion rules are often applied in deference to the 
superior fact-finding ability of the relevant administrative 
agency. See, e. g., McKart v. United States, 395 U. S., at 
192-196. 
A third feature of the debates relevant to the exhaustion 
question is the fact that many legislators interpreted the bill 
to provide dual or concurrent forums in the state and federal 
system, enabling the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to 
seek relief. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961) 
("[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, 
and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the 
federal one is invoked"). For example, Senator Thurman 
noted: 
"I object to [§ 1], first, because of the centralizing ten-
dency of transferring all mere private suits, as well as 
the punishment of offenses, from the State into the Fed-
eral courts. I do not say that this section gives to the 
Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. I do not suppose 
that it is so understood. It leaves it, I presume, in the 
option of the person who imagines himself to be injured 
to sue in the State court or in the Federal court, an op-
tion that he who has been the least injured, but who has 
some malice to gratify, will be the most likely to avail 
himself of." Globe App. 216. 
18 Opponents viewed the bill as a declaration of mistrust for state tribu-
nals. See, e. g., Globe 360 (Rep. Swann); id., at 397 (Rep. Rice); id., at 
454 (Rep. Cox); Globe App. 216 (Sen. Thurman). Representative Mc-
Henry found particularly offensive the removal of the fact-finding function 
from the local institutions. See Globe 429. 
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See also Globe 578, 694-695 (Sen. Edmunds); id., at 334 
(Rep. Hoar); id., at 514 (Rep. Farnworth); Globe App. 85 
(Rep. Bingham) ("[a]dmitting that the States have concur-
rent power to enforce the Constitution of the United States 
within their respective limits, must we wait for their 
action?"). 
This legislative history supports the conclusion that our 
prior decisions, holding that exhaustion of state adminis-
trative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under 
§ 1983, did not misperceive the statutory intent: it seems fair 
to infer that the 1871 Congress did not intend that an individ-
ual be compelled in every case to exhaust state adminis-
trative remedies before filing an action under § 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act. We recognize, however, that drawing such a 
conclusion from this history alone is somewhat precarious: 
the 1871 Congress was not presented with the question of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies, nor was it aware of the 
potential role of state administrative agencies. Therefore, 
we do not rely exclusively on this legislative history in decid-
ing the question presented here. Congress addressed the 
question of exhaustion under § 1983 when it recently enacted 
42 U. S. C. § 1997e (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The legislative his-
tory to § 1997e provides strong evidence of congressional in-
tent on this issue. 
B 
The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 
U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV), was enacted pri-
marily to ensure that the United States Attorney General 
has "legal standing to enforce existing constitutional rights 
and Federal statutory rights of institutionalized persons." 
Conf. Rep. No. 96--897, 96th Gong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980) (Conf. 
Rep.). In § 1997e, Congress also created a specific, limited 
exhaustion requirement for adult prisoners bringing actions 
pursuant to § 1983. Section 1997e and its legislative history 
demonstrate that Congress understood that exhaustion is not 
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generally required in § 1983 actions, and that it decided to 
carve out only a narrow exception to this rUle. A judicially 
imposed exhaustion requirement would be inconsistent with 
Congress' decision to adopt § 1997e and would usurp policy 
judgments that Congress has reserved for itself. 
In considering whether an exhaustion requirement should 
be incorporated into the bill, Congress clearly expressed its 
belief that a decision to require exhaustion for certain § 1983 
actions would work a change in the law. Witnesses testify-
ing before the subcommittee that drafted the bill discussed 
the decisions of this Court holding that exhaustion was not 
required. See, e. g., Hearings on H.R. 2439 and H.R. 5791 
before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Ad-
ministration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977) (1977 Hearings); id., at 47; id., 
at 69, 77; id., at 323; Hearings on H.R. 10 before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminstration 
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. 48 (1979) (1979 Hearings). During these hearings, 
Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of this subcommit-
tee, stated: 
"Another thing that I think requires some discussion 
within the committee, and is a point of argument, ... is 
whether there ought to be an exhaustion of remedies 
requirement . 
. . . In fact, I think it has been pointed out that if [we] 
were to require it, particularly in 1983, that would con-
stitute regression from the current state of the law. It 
would set the law back, because presently it is clearly 
held, that is the Supreme Court has held, that in 1983 
civil rights suits the litigant need not necessarily fully 
exhaust State remedies." 1977 Hearings, at 57-58. 
See also id., at 272 (Rep. Drinan) (Rep. Railsback "grounds 
his bill on doing something which the Supreme Court has con-
sistently refused to do, namely require exhaustion of reme-
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dies"); 1979 Hearings 26 (Rep. Kastenmeier) (adopting 
§ 1997e "was resisted as a possible encroachment on civil lib-
erties; that is to say, in the free, unimpeded resort to 1983"). 
The debates over adopting an exhaustion requirement also 
reflect this understanding. See, e. g., 124 Cong. Rec. H3370 
(May 1, 1978) (Rep. Volkmer and Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at 
H4624 (May 25, 1978) (Rep. Ertel); id., at H7481 (July 28, 
1978) (Rep. Wiggins) ("it is settled law that an exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is not required as a precondition of 
maintaining a 1983 action"); 125 Cong. Rec. H3641 (May 23, 
1979) (Rep. Butler) ("[u]nder existing law ther is no require-
ment that a complainant first ask the State prison system to 
help him"). With the understanding that exhaustion gener-
ally is not required, Congress decided to adopt the limited ex-
haustion requirement of§ 1997e in order to relieve the bur-
den on the federal courts by diverting certain prisoner 
petitions back through state and local institutions, and also to 
encourage the States to develop appropriate grievance proce-
dures. See, e. g. Conf. Rep. 9; 124 Cong. Rec. H3358 (May 
1, 1978) (Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at H3358, H3365 (Rep. 
Railsback); id., at H4621 (May 25, 1978) (Rep. Kastenmeier); 
id., at H4624 (Rep. Ertel); id., at H7477 (July 28, 1978) (Rep. 
Kastenmeier); id., at H7480-H7481 (Rep. Butler); id., at 
H7481 (Rep. Ertel). Implicit in this decision is Congress' 
conclusion that the no-exhaustion rule should be left standing 
with respect to other § 1983 suits. 
A judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would also be 
inconsistent with the extraordinarily detailed exhaustion 
scheme embodied in§ 1997e. Section 1997e carves out a nar-
row exception to the general no-exhaustion rule to govern 
certain prisoner claims, and establishes a procedure to ensure 
that the administrative remedies are adequate and effective. 
The exhaustion requirement is expressly limited to § 1983 ac-
tions brought by an adult convicted of a crime. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1997e(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). 19 Section 1997e(b)(1) in-
19 Representative Kastenmeier explains why juveniles were not included 
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structs the Attorney General to "promulgate minimum stand-
ards for the development and implementation of a plain, 
speedy, and effective system" of administrative remedies, 
and § 1997e(b)(2) specifies certain minimum standards that 
must be included. 20 A court may require exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies only if "the Attorney General has cer-
tified or the court has determined that such administrative 
remedies are in substantial compliance with the minimum ac-
ceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b)." 
§ 1997e(a)(2). Before exhaustion may be required, the court 
must further conclude that it "would be appropriate and in 
the interests of justice." § 1997e(a)(1). 21 Finally, in those 
in § 1997e: 
"I think very candidly we should admit that the first reluctance to resort to 
this mechanism embodied in[§ 1997e] was resisted as a possible encroach-
ment on civil liberties; that is to say, in the free, unimpeded resort to 1983; 
because it does deflect 1983 petitions back into-temporarily in any 
event-back into the State system. Therefore, to the extent that it is 
even so viewed, notwithstanding the limited form of [§ 1997e], that it 
should also extend to juveniles was rejected." 1979 Hearings 26. 
20 Section 1997e(b)(2) provides: 
The minimum standards shall provide-
(A) for an advisory role for employees and inmates of any jail, prison, or 
other correctional institution (at the most decentralized level as is reason-
ably possible), in the formulation, implementation, and operation of the 
system; 
(B) specific maximum time limits for written replies to grievances with 
reasons thereto at each decision level within the system; 
(C) for priority processing of grievances which are of an emergency na-
ture, including matters in which delay would subject the grievant to sub-
stantial risk of personal injury or other damages; 
(D) for safeguards to avoid reprisals against any grievant or participant 
in the resolution of a grievance; and 
(E) for independent review of the disposition of grievances, including al-
leged reprisals, by a person or other entity not under the direct supervision 
or direct control of the institution." 
21 The Committee Reports state that Congress did not intend that every 
§ 1983 action brought by an adult prisoner in institutions with appropriate 
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§ 1983 actions meeting all the statutory requirements for ex-
haustion, the district court may not dismiss the case, but may 
only "continue such case for a period of not to exceed ninety 
days in order to require exhaustion." Ibid. This detailed 
scheme is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc 
basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases. 
Congress hoped that § 1997e would improve prison condi-
tions by stimulating the development of successful grievance 
mechanisms. See, e. g., Conf. Rep. 9; H.R. Rep. No. 96--80, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979); 1979 Hearings 4 (Rep. Rails-
back); 124 Cong. Rec. H3354 (May 1, 1978) (Rep. Railsback); 
125 Cong. Rec. H3637 (May 23 1979) (Rep. Drinan); 126 
Cong. Rec. H3497 . (May 12, 1980) (Rep. Kastenmeier). To 
further this purpose, Congress yielded primary jurisdiction 
over certain § 1983 claims to state prisons only on the condi-
tion that these prisons develop adequate procedures. This 
purpose would be frustrated by judicial discretion to impose 
exhaustion generally: the States would have no incentive to 
adopt grievance procedures capable of certification, because 
prisoner § 1983 cases could be diverted to state adminis-
trative remedies in any event. 
In sum, the exhaustion provisions of the Act make sense, 
and are not superfluous, only if exhaustion could not be re-
quired before its enactment and if Congress intended to 
carve out a narrow exception to this no-exhaustion rule. 
grievance procedures be delayed pending exhaustion: 
"It is the intent of the Congress that the court not find such a requirement 
appropriate in those situations in which the action brought pursuant to 
[§ 1983] raises issues which cannot, in reasonable probability, be resolved 
by the grievance resolution system, including cases where imminent dan-
ger to life is alleged. Allegations unrelated to conditions of confinement, 
such as those which center on events outside of the institution, would not 
appropriately be continued for resolution by the grievance resolution sys-
tem." Conf. Rep. 15. 
See also H.R. Rep. No. 9{Hl0, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1979); S. Rep. No. 
96-416, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1979). 
.... 
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The legislative history to§ 1997e demonstrates that Congress 
has taken the approach of carving out specific exceptions to 
the general rule that federal courts cannot require exhaustion 
under § 1983. It is not our province to alter the balance 
struck by Congress in establishing the procedural framework 
for bringing actions under § 1983. 
c 
Respondent and the Court of Appeals argue that exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies should be required because it 
would further various policies. They argue that an exhaus-
tion requirement would lessen the perceived burden that 
§ 1983 actions impose on federal courts;22 would further the 
goal of comity and improve federal-state relations by post-
poning federal court review until after the state adminis-
trative agency had passed on the issue;23 and would enable 
the agency, which presumably has expertise in the area at 
issue, to enlighten the federal court's ultimate decision. 
As we noted earlier, policy considerations alone cannot jus-
tify judicially imposed exhaustion unless exhaustion is con-
sistent with congressional intent. See , supra. 
Furthermore, as the debates over incorporating the exhaus-
tion requirement in § 1997e demonstrate, the relevant policy 
considerations do not invariably point in one direction, and 
there is vehement disagreement over the validity of the as-
22 Of course, this burden alone is not sufficient to justify a judicial deci-
sion to alter congressionally imposed jurisdiction. See Thermtron Prod-
ucts, Inc . v. Hermansdorjer, 423 U. S. 336, 344 (1976); United Steelwork-
ers v. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 145, 150-151 (1965). In any event, it is by no 
means clear that judicial discretion to impose an exhaustion requirement in 
§ 1983 actions would lessen the case-load of the federal courts, at least in 
the short run. See - and n. 27, infra. 
23 The application of these federalism principles to actions brought pursu-
ant to § 1983 has prompted criticism by several commentators. See, e. g., 
Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity: Two for the Federalism Seesaw, 25 
Loyola L. Rev. 659 (1979); Note, 39 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 838 (1964) . 
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sumptions underlying many of them. 24 The very difficulty of 
these policy considerations, and Congress' superior institu-
tional competence to pursue this debate, suggest that legisla-
tive not judicial solutions are preferable. Cf. Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 317 (1980); United Steelworkers 
v. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 146, 150, 153 (1965). 
Beyond these difficult policy issues that must be resolved 
in deciding whether to require exhaustion, there are equally 
difficult questions concerning the design and scope of an ex-
haustion requirement. These questions include how to de-
fine those categories of § 1983 claims in which exhaustion 
might be desirable; how to unify and centralize the standards 
for judging the kinds of administrative procedures that 
should be exhausted;25 what tolling requirements and time 
2
' For example, there is serious disagreement over whether judicial or 
administrative procedures offer § 1983 plaintiffs the swiftest, least costly, 
and most reliable remedy. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 263-264; id., at 
232-233; Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1207 (1968). Similarly, there is 
debate over whether the specialization of federal courts in constitutional 
law is more important than the specialization of administrative agencies in 
their areas of expertise, and over whether the symbolic and institutional 
function of federal courts in defining, legitimizing, and enforcing constitu-
tional claims outweighs the educational function that state and local agen-
cies can serve. See, e. g., Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L. 
Rev. 5, 23 (1980); Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1208 (1968). Fjnally, it is 
uncertain whether the present "free market" system, under which litigants 
are free to pursue administrative remedies if they truly appear to be 
cheaper, more efficient, and more effective, is more likely to induce the 
creation of adequate remedies than a M cKart-type standard under which 
plaintiffs have no initial choice. See, e. g., Note, 8 Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975). 
Cf. 1977 Hearings 21, 34, 51; Hearings on S.1393 before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 442 (1977). 
25 Section 1997e resolved this problem by directing the Attorney General 
to promulgate minimum standards and to establish a procedure by which 
prison administrative remedies could be reviewed and certified. 
§ 1997e(b) & (c). If a procedure has not been certified, the court is di-
rected to compare the procedure with the Attorney General's standards 
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limitations should be adopted;26 what is the res judicata and 
collateral estoppel effect of particular administrative deter-
minations; what consequences should attach to the failure to 
comply with procedural requirements of administrative pro-
ceedings; and whether federal courts could grant necessary 
interim injunctive relief and hold the action pending exhaus-
tion, or proceed to judgment without requiring exhaustion 
even though exhaustion might otherwise be required, where 
the relevant administrative agency is either powerless or not 
inclined to grant such interim relief. These and similar 
questions might be answered swiftly and surely by legisla-
tion, but would create costly, remedy-delaying, and court-
burdening litigation if answered incrementally by the judi-
ciary in the context of diverse constitutional claims relating 
to thousands of different state agencies. 27 
and to continue the case pending exhaustion only if the procedure is in sub-
stantial compliance with the standards of the Attorney General. 
§ 1997e(a)(2). 
26 Unless the doctrine that statutes of limitations are not tolled pending 
exhaustion, see Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478 (1980), were 
overruled, a judicially imposed exhaustion requirement might result in the 
effective repeal of§ 1983. Congress avoided this problem in § 1997e by di-
recting the court to merely continue the case for a period not to exceed 90 
days. 
27 The initial bill proposing to include an exhaustion requirement in 
§ 1997e provided: 
"Relief shall not be granted by a district court in an action brought pursu-
ant to [§ 1983] by an individual involuntarily confined in any State institu-
tion . . . , unless it appears that the individual has exhausted such plain, 
speedy, and efficient State administrative remedy as is available." H.R. 
5791, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
Congress declined to adopt this McKart-type standard after witnesses tes-
tified that this procedure would bog down the courts in massive procedural 
litigation thereby frustrating the purpose of relieving the caseloads of the 
federal courts, that state procedures are often not effective and take too 
much time, and that the court would have to judge a myriad of state proce-
dures without much guidance. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 34-35, 51, 
164-165, 169-170, 263-264, 323; 1979 Hearings 48-49. 
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The very variety of claims, claimants, and state agencies 
involved in § 1983 cases argues for congressional consider-
ation of the myriad of policy considerations, and may explain 
why Congress, in deciding whether to require exhaustion in 
certain § 1983 actions brought by adult prisoners, carved out 
such a narrow, detailed exception to the no-exhaustion rule. 
After full debate and consideration of the various policy argu-
ments, Congress adopted § 1997, taking the largest class of 
§ 1983 actions and constructing an exhaustion requirement 
that differs substantially from the M cKart-type standard 
urged by respondents and adopted by the Court of Appeals. 
See note 27, supra. It is not for us to say whether Congress 
will or should create a similar scheme for other categories of 
§ 1983 claims or whether Congress will or should adopt an al-
together different exhaustion requirement for nonprisoner 
§ 1983 claims. 
v 
Based on the legislative histories of both § 1983 and 
§ 1997e, we conclude that exhaustion of state administrative 
remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing 
an action pursuant to § 1983. We decline to overturn our 
prior decisions holding that such exhaustion is not required. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and re-
manded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1874 
GEORGIA PATSY, PETITIONER v. BOARD OF 
REGENTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, ETC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1982] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether exhaustion of 
state administrative remedies is a prerequisite to an action 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Petitioner Georgia Patsy filed this 
action, alleging that her employer, Florida International Uni-
versity (FlU), had denied her employment opportunities 
solely on the basis of her race and sex. By a divided vote, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
found that petitioner was required to exhaust "adequate and 
appropriate" administrative remedies, and remanded the 
case to the District Court to consider the adequacy of the ad-
ministrative procedures. Patsy v. Florida International 
University, 634 F. 2d 900 (CA5 1981) (en bane). We reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
I 
Petitioner alleges that even though she is well-qualified 
and has received uniformly excellent performance evalua-
tions from her supervisors, she has been rejected for more 
than thirteen positions at FlU. 1 She further claims that 
' Because this case is here on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the 
factual allegations in petitioner's amended complaint. In her initial com-
plaint, petitioner named FlU as the defendant. Relying on Byron v. Uni-
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FlU has unlawfully filled positions through intentional dis-
crimination on the basis of race and sex. She seeks declara-
tory and injunctive relief or, in the alternative, damages. 2 
The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida granted respondent Board of Regents' motion to 
dismiss because petitioner had not exhausted available ad-
ministrative remedies. On appeal, a panel of the Court of 
Appeals reversed, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Patsy v. Florida International University, 612 
F. 2d 946 (CA5 1980). The full court then granted respond-
ent's petition for rehearing and vacated the panel decision. 
The Court of Appeals reviewed numerous opinions of this 
Court holcling that exhaustion of administrative remedies 
was not required, and concluded that these cases did not pre-
clude the application of a "flexible" exhaustion rule. 634 
F. 2d, at 908. After canvassing the policy arguments in fa-
vor of an exhaustion requirement, the Court of Appeals de-
cided that a § 1983 plaintiff could be required to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies if the following minimum conditions 
are met: (1) an orderly system of review or appeal is provided 
by statute or agency rule; (2) the agency can grant relief 
more or less commensurate with the claim; (3) relief is avail-
versity of Florida, 403 F. Supp. 49 (ND Fla. 1975), the District Court 
granted FlU's motion to dismiss, holding that the Board of Regents and 
not the individual university had the capacity to sue and be sued under 
Florida law. The District Court granted petitioner leave to amend, and ' 
she amended her complaint to name the Board of Regents "on behalf of' 
FlU. 
2 Petitioner requested the District Court to "[r ]equire Defendants to 
remedy the discrimination practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the 
next available position consistent with those previously applied for and for 
which she is qualified or in the alternative, to require the Defendants to 
pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary damages." 
Record 47. Petitioner also requested that the District Court "order fur-
ther equitable and injunctive relief as it deems appropriate and necessary 
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able within a reasonable period of time; (4) the procedures 
are fair, are not unduly burdensome, and are not used to ha-
rass or discourage those with legitimate claims; and (5) in-
terim relief is available, in appropriate cases, to prevent ir-
reparable injury and to preserve the plaintiffs rights during 
the administrative process. Where these minimum stand-
ards are met, a court must further consider the particular ad-
ministrative scheme, the nature of the plaintiffs interest, and 
the values served by the exhaustion doctrine in order to de-
termine whether exhaustion should be required. !d., at 
912-913. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the 
District Court to determine whether exhaustion would be ap-
propriate in this case. 
II 
At the outset, we address the contention that the Eleventh 
Amendment bars even the injunctive and declaratory relief 
sought in this complaint. 3 Because this case is here on a mo- l 
3 The Eleventh Amendment defense was not raised in the District 
Court; it was briefed to the panel on appeal, but was not included in the 
brief on rehearing en bane. In this Court, the defense was not briefed, 
but respondent asserted it in its response in opposition to the petition for 
certiorari. At oral argument, the state attorney general stated that this 
Court should affirm the Court of Appeals solely on the exhaustion holding. 
However, he also stated that the Eleventh Amendment was still an issue in 
this case, and he admitted that even if we affirmed the Court of Appeals, 
the case would be remanded for consideration of the adequacy of the ad-
ministrative procedures, thus subjecting respondent to further proceed-
ings in the District Court. 
We have held that "the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently par-
takes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar" that it may be raised at any point 
in the proceedings, and that waiver of this defense will not be lightly in-
ferred from the State's litigation strategy. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 
651, 678 (1974). See Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 
(1945). We have never addressed the question whether the Eleventh 
Amendment defense can be raised, neglected, and then reargued at the 
whim of the person raising this defense. Certainly, permitting this prac-
tice would greatly increase the uncertainty and potential for wasted litiga-
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tion to dismiss, we are reviewing the Eleventh Amendment 
isuse in a most unique posture. The merits of peitioner's 
allegations have not even been adjudicated, and, of course, 
no court has considered what form of relief, either injunctive, 
declaratory, or monetary, might be awarded. Petitioner's 
request for relief is broad enough to encompass equitable re-
lief which is prospective only in its application. As a result, 
we adress onl the question whether the Boar f Regents 
shou d e v1ew a t e e so tnat it cannot be held 
accounta le in federal court for any of its actions, and we ex-
press no opinion on whether the Eleventh Amendment bars 
certain forms of the relief requested by petitioner. 
Respondent Board of Regents suggests that, as a state cor-
porate body, it should be viewed as the State itself for pur-
poses of the Eleventh Amendment. It relies on Alabama v. 
Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978), where this Court held that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars a suit brought directly against 
the State and its Board of Corrections, even when only de-
claratory and injunctive relief is requested. 4 However, it is 
well-settled that the Eleventh Amendment does not neces-
sarily bar actions against state officials or state bodies corpo- \ 
-==-- j'-' 
tion already inherent in the rule that the defense can be raised at any time. 
In any event, our Eleventh Amendment precedents are clear, and a re-
mand is not required to determine unanswered questions of fact or state 
law, at least with respect to th re ie prospective 'requested. Thus, we 
need not address the procedural question pose y respondent's perplexing 
litigation strategy. 
• The issue decided in Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978)-whether 
a state agent is the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment and 
thus cannot be brought into court for any reason absent a waiver of sover-
eign immunity- is distinct from the question addressed in Edelnwn v. Jor-
dan, 415 U. S. 651, 662-669 (1974)-whether the Eleventh Amendment 
forbids a suit against a state agent because the suit seeks to impose a retro- \ 
active award that must be paid out of funds in the state treasury. See also 
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979). Here, we decide the first ques-
tion, and hold that respondent is not the State in the sense intended in Ala-
bama v. Pugh. 
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rate and politic when the plaintiff is not seeking retroactive ~ 
relief that must be paid from public funds in the state treas- ? ~ 
ury. See, e. g., Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 • 
U. S. 274 (1977); County of Lincoln v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529 
(1890); Hopkins v. Clentson Ag1'icultuml College, 221 U. S. 
636 (1911); Ex Pa1·te Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). 6 
In Hopkins, supm, this Court decided that a state corpo-
rate body such as respondent was not entitled to the full sov-
ereign immunity accorded the State. 6• There, the petitioner 
• Consistent with this theory, we have heard numerous suits requesting 
injunctive or declaratory relief against slate universities or boards of re-
gents or trustees, without discussing a possible Eleventh Amendment bar. 
See e. g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478 (1978) (§ 1983 ac-
tion); University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 
287 (1978) (POWELL, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) ("decisions 
based on r-ace or ethnic origin by faculties and administrations of state uni-
versities are reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment") (citing 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950), Sweatt v. 
Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950), Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 
(1948), and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938)); 
Boa1·d of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972) (§ 1983 action). Of course, I 
the fact that other state officials may have been named in some of these 
suits is irrelevant to the federal court's ability to award even prospective 
relief against the State itself. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978). 
6 The dissent's attempt to distinguish 4opk~ns on the ground that the 
Court there inaccurately treated the State s sovereign immunity defense as 
an Eleventh Amendment issue when the action had been initiated in state 
and not federal court is unpersuasive. The Hopkins Court addressed the 
sovereign immunity issue as though it had been raised in federal court 
under the Eleventh Amendment, and persuasively explained why a state 
college and its board of regents, established as a body corporate, was not 7 
shielded by the full immunity accorded to the State. The fact that the 
State's defense in that case is more accurately viewed as a "pure" sover-
eign immunity question, and not one arising under the Eleventh Amend- , 
ment, does not make the decision a "non-precedent" nor does it invalidate 
the analysis. We have often relied on cases discussing the sovereign im· 
munity of the Federal Government when deciding Eleventh Amendment 
issues. See, e. g., Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204, 213 (1897); Flo1-ida 
Dept. of State v. Treasw·e Salvors, Inc.,-- U. S. - -, -- n.20 (1982). 
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sued the state college, claiming that the college and its board 
of trustees had committed both a tort and an unconstitutional 
taking of his property. The respondent college argued that \ 
the State's sovereign immunity barred the suit. Framing 
the issue as "whether a public corporation can avail itself of 
the State's immunity from suit," 221 U. S., at 642, the Court 
rejected this defense with respect to the college and its board 
of trustees, established by the State as a "body corporate." 7 
The Court recognized that "[ w ]ith the exception named in 
the Constitution, every State has absolute immunity from 
suit," and cannot be sued in any court without its consent. 
Ibid. The Court also noted that even when the State is not 
named as the party defendent, the Eleventh Amendment ap-
plies when the suit is, in reality, one against the State. The 
Court then reasoned: 
"But immunity from suit is a high attribute of sover-
Similarly, the analysis employed by the Hopkins Court should be viewed 
as strong precedent for Eleventh Amendment cases presentin reci ly 
the same issue. Several recent lower courts have cite or re Jed on Hop-
kvns wFien addressing the application of the Eleventh Amendment to 
boards ofregents. See, e. g., New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. 
v. Unive1·sity of Colorado, 592 F. 2d 1196 (CA11979); Rutledge v. Arizona 
BoaTd of Regents, 660 F. 2d 1345 (CA9 1981). 
The dissent's further claim that Hopkins was overruled sub silentio by 
Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147 
(1981), is misplaced. Florida Dept of Health was an unargued summary 
reversal, which did not even cite or discuss the Hopkins decision. Fur-
thermore, Florida Dept of Health addressed only the question whether a 
plaintiff could recover retroactive relief from the petitioner-an issue we 
do not decide with respect to the Board of Regents in this case. The pro-
spective relief awarded by the Court of Appeals in that case was not even 
considered by this Court. See note 13, infra. 
'The state charter establishing the college and its board of trustees is in 
relevant part remarkably similar to that of the Board of Regents in this 
case, see note 10, infra. See Hopkins v. Clem,son Agricultural College, 
221 u. s. 637, 638-639 (1911). 
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eignty-a perogative of the State itself-which cannot 
be availed of by public agents when sued for their own 
torts. The Eleventh Amendment was not intended to 
afford them freedom from liability in any case where, 
under color of their office, they have injured one of the 
State's citizens. To grant them such immunity would be 
to create a privileged class free from liability for wrongs 
inflicted or injuries threatened. Public agents must be \ 
liable to the law, unless they are to be put above the law. 
. . . 'The whole frame and scheme of the political insti-
tutions of this country, state and Federal, protest' 
against extending to any agent the sovereign's exemp-
tion from legal process." Id., at 642-:-643 (quoting 
Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270, 191 (1885)). 
After discussing cases in which the Court had uniformly 
denied Eleventh Amendment immunity to public officials, 8 
the Court considered whether public corporations should re-
ceive similar treatment: 
It is said, however, that, in the cases referred to, the of-
ficers were held liable to suit because in the transaction 
complained of, the statute being unconstitutional, they 
could not be treated as agents of the State. And it is 
argued that these authorities have no application to suits 
against those public corporations which exist, and can 
act, in no other capacity than as governmental agencies, 
or political subdivisions of the State itself. But neither 
public corporations nor political subdivisions are clothed 
with that immunity from suit which belongs to the State 
alone by virtue of its sovereignty. In County of Lincoln 
v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 530, the Court ... held that 
8 The cases cited and discussed by the Court included Ex Parte Young, 
209 U. S. 123 (1908), Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897); and United 
States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882). 
8 
80-1874-0PINION 
PATSY v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS 
the Eleventh Amendment was limited to those cases in 
which the State is the real party, or party on the record, 
but that counties were corporations which might be 
sued .... 
Corporate agents or individual officers of the State 
stand in no better position than officers of the General 
Government .... " I d., at 644-645 (citations omitted). 
The Court went on to recognize that agents of the State, 
whether corporate or individual, might have defenses not 
available to private corporations or individuals, but these de-
fenses serve to prevent ultimate liability or recovery, and are 
not barriers to initiating the litigation. I d., at 645-646. 
The Hopkins Court thus approached the application of the 
Eleventh Amendment to a state university and board of 
trustees, established as a "body corporate" of the State, in 
the same manner it had approached this defense in cases in-
volving other state officials or corporations: the Eleventh 
Amendment was not a bar to the suit as long as the suit did \ 
not seek to impose a retroactive award against the State it-
self and did not seek to restrain the state agent from obeying 
a constitutional command of the State. I d., at 644. 
This approach is consistent with that taken in our more re-
cent cases. 9 For example, in Monell v. New York City 
• The Courts of Appeals have been virtually unanimous in allow~ suits 
for declaratory or injunctive relief again~t state tr'iiversities (2l? their 
boards. See, e. g., Lee v. Boa1·d of Regents of State Colleges, 441 F. 2d 
1257 (CA7 1971); Gay Student Services v. Texas A & M University, 612 F. 
2d 160 (CA5 1980); New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. Univer-
sity of Colm·ado, 592 F. 2d 1196 (CAl 1979). Cf. Skehan v. Bom·d of 
Tntstees, 590 F. 2d 470 (CA3 1978). Rutledge v. An:zona Board of Re-
gents, 660 F. 2d 1345 (CA9 1981) and Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F. 2d 1071 
(CA9 1981), cited by the dissent to the contrary, post, at-, n. 4, are 
distinguishable. Each of these cases involved requests for monetary re-
lief, and the courts addressed only the question whether Edelman v. Jor-
dan, supra, precluded such relief. The Courts of Appeals have divided 
on whether monetary relief can be awarded, depending on whethe'r they 
7 ., 
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Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978), this Court ad-
dressed whether muncipal corporations were "persons" 
within the meaning of§ 1983. In holding that they were, the 
Court found it significant that the Congress which enacted 
the predecessor to § 1983 recognized that "there was no dis-
tinction of constitutional magnitude between officers and 
agents-including corporate agents-of the State." I d., at 
682. See also Mount Healthy City School District Board of 
Education v. Doyle, supra, (local school board, like a munici-
pal corporation, not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity). Cf. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 400-401 (1979) (agency cre-
ated by a compact between two States with congressional ap-
proval not necessarily entitled to the same immunity as the 
States themselves). 
Here, as in Hopkins, respondent Board of Regents is a 
"body corporate with all the powers of a body corporate." 
Fla. Stat. § 240.205. 10 The State has thus established the \ 
have funds independent of the state treasury or on whether the State has \ 
waived its immunity. Compare SON! v. Board of Trustees, 513 F. 2d 347 
(CA6 1978) and Goss v. Jacinto Junior College, 588 F. 2d 96 (CA5 1979) 
with Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F. 2d 1166 (CA5 1976). 
'
0 Section 240.205 provides in full: 
"The Board of Regents is hereby created as a body corporate with all the 
powers of a body corporate for all the purposes created by, or that may 
exist under, the provisions of this chapter or laws amendatory hereof and 
shall: 
(1) Have a corporate seal. 
(2) Elect a corporate secretary. 
(3) Have and employ a staff attorney and other authorized personnel. 
(4) Have power to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued, 
and to plead and be impleaded in all courts of law and equity. 
(5) Receive donations. 
(6) Make purchases of real and personal property and contract for the 
sale and disposal of same, but the title to all real property, however ac-
quired, shall be vested in the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improve-
ment Trust Fund and shall be transferred and conveyed by it." 
' . 
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Board of Regents as a ££_rnora~ agent, a juristic p~son, with 
the capacity to "sue and be sued, and to pleadand be im-
pleaded, in all courts oflaw and equity," ibid., and with cor-
porate powers not bestowed on other de )artments diViSiOns, 
or agencies o e State. This separate corporate an juris-
tic status se'ts1'Ile BO'ard of Regents apart from the supervis-
ing boards of the other divisions of the State Department of 
Education, none of which en.i9y a similar status. See, e. g., 
Fla. Stat. §240.305;1'2"4~.33T; .. §229.8g; s~.545; §233.07. 
Although the Board of Regents performs many supervising 
functions over the Division of Universities similar to those 
performed by boards in other subdivisions of the Department 
of Education, it has the privilege of engaging in corporate ac-
tivities and is responsible for numerous employment and 
other decisions, which have no counterpart in the other divi-
sions of the Det artment of' Education. il """The Board of Re-
gen1'8,""a'na not t e local universities, is the legal entity which 
the State has authorized to sue and be sued. See Byron v. 
University of Florida, 403 F. Supp. 49, 54 (ND Fla 1975). 
11 For example the Board of Regents performs functions performed by 
local school boards, established as bodies corporate, within the Divisions of 
Public Schools and Vocational Education. See, e. g., Fla. Stat. § 230.21; 
§ 235.02; § 235.05; § 237.071; § 237.081. Similarly, Board of Regents per-
forms functions performed by the individual community colleges and their 
boards of trustees, established as bodies corporate, within the Division of 
Community Colleges. See, e. g., Fla. Stat. § 240.313; § 240.315; § 240.319. 
Furthermore, the power granted to the Board of Regents "to sue and be 
sued, and to plead and be impleaded, in all courts of law and equity," Fla. 
Stat. § 240.205(4), is unparallelled in its breadth when compared to other 
provisions relating to the Department of Education, including those relat-
ing to local school boards and boards of the community colleges. See, e. 
g., Fla. Stat. § 230.21; § 240.315; § 242.331. It is also broader than 
§ 402.34, which we found insufficient to waive immunity with respect to 
retroactive relief in Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home 
Assn, 450 U. S. 141 (1981). Of course, we express no opinion whether 
§ 240.205(4) is broad enough to encompass a waiver of immunity from ret-
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As a result of its unique status, the Board of Regents has 
often appeared in federal court, as both a plaintiff and de-
fendant ·without raising any Eleventh Amendment objection. 
See, e. g., Board of Regents v. Califano, 586 F. 2d 451 (CA5 
1978); Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F. 2d 1073 (CA5 1976); 
She1man v. Board of Regents, 451 F. 2d 572 (CA5 1971). 
~Of course, the State could have structured this particular di-
vision of the Department of Education in a manner similar to 
that chosen for its other divisions, thus entitling the Board of 
Regents to claim that the State's Eleventh Amendment im-
munity enabled it to avoid all accountability in federal court. 
For example, in the Community Colleges division, the Com-
munity College Coordinating Board performs only those 
supervising and coordinating functions performed by the 
Board of Regents-it does not enjoy separate corporate sta-
tus and has not been granted many of the privileges be-
stowed upon the Board of Regents, including the power to 
sue and be sued in all courts of law and equity. See Fla. 
Stat. § 240.305; § 240.311. Each individual college within I 
that division is "an independent, separate, legal entity," 
§ 240.313, with its own local board of trustees, which is estab-
lished as a "body corporate" and retains autonomous status 
and responsibilities. With the Division of Universities, how-
ever, the State has chosen not to endow the individual local 
universities with separate corporate existence or with the au-
thority to sue and be sued with respect to the type of issue 
presented here, vesting that authority in the separate 
jurisitic, corporate body which is the Board of Regents. 
See, e. g. Byron v. University of Florida, supra, at 54. It 
was this very structure chosen by the State which led peti-
tioner to name the Board of Regents in this suit. Initially,-
petitioner named FlU, the individual university by whom she 
was employed, as the defendant in this action. Because the 
State had provided that the Board of Regents was the appro-
priate legal entity with the capacity to litigate, the District 
Court dismissed the individual university, and the Board of 
1 
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Regents was named as the defendant "on the behalf of' FlU. 
See note 1, supra. 
Another aspect of State law sets the Board of Regents I 
apart from the boards governing"' ot'FierOiVis'ions ()f"tne De-
pa;fmenf o"'tEOucatTcin. Under Fla. Stat. § 20.15, respond-
ent Board of Regents is designated as "the director of the Di-
VISIOn of Universities," one of five divisions of the 
Department of Education, while the directors of the other di-
visions are appointed by the Commissioner of Education. 
As a result, the Board of Re ents stands in the same osition 
as a state official, no on y ecause it is a corporate agent by 
virfii"e ofi'G' status as a "body corporate," but also because 
the corpor.ate body itself is designated as the director of a 
subdivision of the Department of Education, a position gener-
ally held by an individual official. 
The dissent argues that allowing this Board of Regents to 
be sued· for prospective injunctive relief under the analysis 
employed to allow suits against state officials when sued in 
their official capacity announces "a new doctrine" with wide-
ranging implications. 12 The dissent asserts two primary 
12 None of the cases cited by the dissent have held or even implied that 
the Eleventh Ame,1dment forbids a federal court from awardin ros ec-
tive equit ble elief against a sta e cor ora e o y, crea e as a juristic en-
tity WI the au onty to sue and be sued in all courts of law and equity. 
G1·eat Northern Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944), involved a suit 
brought against the Insurance Commissioner seeking the recovery of in-
sw·ance taxes; Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of TreasU17J, 323 U. S. 459 (1944), 
and Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 327 U. S. 573 (1946) involved 
suits brought against the department of treasury or the tax commission, 
and state officials in their official capacity, seeking a tax refund; and 
Pa1·den v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964), where the Eleventh 
Amendment was found not to prohibit the action, was a personal-injury 
damage action brought against a state-owned railroad. Similarly mis-
placed is the dissent's reliance on Bmgg v. Board of Public Instruction, 36 
So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1948), which held only that the fact that a state agent is a 
corporate body does not necessarily waive the State's immunity from tort 
liability. We express no opinion on whether the State has waived its im-
munity from retroactive liabiity with respect to the Board of Regents. 
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complaints: that this decision exposes all "instrumentalities of 
the State itself to suit in federal court," post, at 11, and that 
they "may be sued for damages on the fiction that their seg-
regated assets are not the State's," id., at 12. Although 
these concerns would be legitimate if presented by this deci-
sion, such is simply not the case. The dissent premises its 
arguments on the assumption that this particular board is in-
distinguishable from any "state welfare board, highway de-
partment or any other agency, board or department of a 
state." Post, at 9. As we noted earlier, however, the 
Board of Regents is accorded a ~tatus under Florida 
law, which distinguishes it from the supervising boards of the 
other divisions of the Department of Education, from most 
state agencies, and, of course, from the state departments 
and their divisions. It is established as a body corporate, a 
separate juristic entity, ·with the capacity to sue and be sued 
in all courts of law and equity. In so establishing the Board 
of Regents, the State has displaced a large portion f the liti-
gating ca acit that might o erw1se e enJoye by the mdi-
Vl ua umver~es~_m_ e sa e s~ em. s a resu t, 
when a p"FF1'eSS&, an effi'i5I<5Yee7"or a student has a complaint 
against an individual university, the State has designated the 
Board of Regents as the appropriate party to be named "on 
behalf of' the individual university. Similarly, if an individ-
ual university or a division of a university desires to litigate a 
claim, the Board of Regents brings the action "on behalf of' 
that entity, and may do so in federal court. See, e. g., Board 
of Regents v. Califano, supra. The dissent proffers no prin-
cipled reason for treating this particular corporate agent of 
the State, which acts as the director of the Division of Uni-
versities, differently than the individual directors of the 
other divisions would be treated when sued in their official 
capacity. 
Furthermore, nothing in our decision today implies that \ 
See infra, at - and notes 14 & 15. However, it is clear that some im- \ 
munity from tort liability has been waived by virlue of Fla. Stat. § 240.213. 
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this Board of Regents, much less some other agency or sta.te 
department, may be held liable for damages in federal court. 
In finding that the Board of Re ents should be tre ted as a 
state official when sued in his o ficial capacity for purposes of 
tlie E lev enth Amendment, we hold only that it may be sued 
for unconstitutional or unauthorized actions insofar as the 
plaintiff seeks prospective relief as a remedy. The dissent's 
fears that this holding opens the door for awarding damages 
that must be paid from state funds is misplaced. As is dem-
onstrated by our numerous decisions which consider whether 
certain forms of relief may be awarded against a state official 
when sued in his official capacity, the fact that a state agent 
may be held accountable in federal court for unconstitutional 
or unauthorized actions does not answer the question 
whether retroactive relief may be awarded. See, e. g., 
E delnwn v. J o1·dan, supra. 13 
Because this case is here on a motion to dismiss, it is inap-
propriate to consider at this time whether anything other 
than an award for prospective relief is permissible. There 
13 For this reason, the dissent's reliance on Florida Dept. of Health v. Flor-
ida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 141 (1981) (per curiam, summary re-
versal) is also misplaced. In that case, we addressed only that portion of 
the ruling of the Court of Appeals which held that retroactive relief could 
be awarded against the state agency because it was a "body corporate ... 
[with] the power to sue and be sued in action ex contractu but not in torts," 
Fla. Stat. § 402.34, and because it had "agreed to recognize and abide by all 
State and Federal Laws, Regulations, and Guidelines applicable to partici-
pation in, and administration of, the Title XIX Medicaid Program," 450 
U. S., at 149. In addition to awarding retroactive relief, the Court of Ap-
peals opinion had invalidated an agency regulation because it was inconsis-
tent with federal law, and had rejected the agency's argument that the 
Eleventh Amendment prohibited the district court from directing the state 
agency to submit a plan for reimbursing the plaintiff in accordance with the 
requirements of the Medicaid statute. See Florida Nursing Home Assn 
v. Page, 616 F. 2d 1355, 1361-1362 (CA5 1980). That portion of the Court 
of Appeals decision was not even considered by this Court. See 450 U. S., 
at 149, n. 2. 
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are unresolved questions of fact and state law with repect to 
whether the Eleventh Amendment serves to bar other forms 
of relief under the rationale of Edelman. It is unclear 
whether the State has wmved its sovereign immunity with 
respect to ~damage awards against respondent. 14 If 
the State has not waived such immunity, it is unclear 
whether a judgment against the Board must be paid out of 
the State treasury. 15 These unsettled questions should be 
decided by the District Court on remand should it find that 
petitioner is entitled to recover, and should it further con-
sider awarding retroactive monetary relief. The question 
whether the Eleventh Amendment bars such an award is one 
of ultimate relief not of jurisdiction, once it is established that 
respondent may be sued at least with respect to the request 
for injunctive relief. See Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultuml 
College, 221 U. S., at 648. 
III 
The question whether exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies should ever be required in a § 1983 action has prompted 
vigorous debate and disagreement. See, e. g., Turner, 
When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Cases 
in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610 (1979); Note, 8 
Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975); Note, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 537 (1974). 
"See, e. g., Fla. Stat. § 240.205(4) (respondent authorized "to sue and be 
sued, and to plead and be impleaded in all courts of law and equity"); Fla. 
Stat. § 240.213 (respondent may secure liability insurance, and immunity is 
waived to the extent of the insurance); Fla. Stat. § 240.215 (respondent 
may pay costs of civil actions against board members or employees and 
may procure insurance to cover such losses or expenses). Whether these 
provisions waive the State's immunity from damage awards in actions not \ 
involving tort liability is unclear, and should be decided by the lower courts 
in the first instance. 
15 The Board has certain funds not derived from the State that are ex-
empt from deposit with the state treasury. See Fla. Stat. §§ 240.277, 
240.781. 
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Our resolution of this issue, however, is made much easier 
because we are not writing on a clean slate. This Court has 
addressed this issue, as well as related issues, on several . . 
prwr occaswns. 
Respondent suggests that our prior precedents do not con-
trol our decision today, arguing that these cases can be dis-
tinguished on their facts or that this Court did not "fully" con-
sider the question whether exhaustion should be required. 
This contention need not detain us long. Beginning with 
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671-673 
(1963), we have on numerous occasions rejected the argu-
ment that a § 1983 action should be dismissed where the 
plaintiff has not exhausted state administrative remedies. 
See Barry v. Bachi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v. 
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574 (1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405 
U. S. 669, 671 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 
251 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968); 
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 312 n. 4 (1968); Damico v. 
California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967). Cf. Fair Assessment in 
Real Estate Association v. McNary,-- U.S.--,--
(1981); id., at-- (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 473 (1974) 
("[w]hen federal claims are premised on[§ 1983]-as they are 
here-we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or 
administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount role 
Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect con-
stitutional rights"). Respondent may be correct in arguing 
that several of these decisions could have been based on tra-
ditional exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. N everthe-
less, this Court has stated categorically that exhaustion is not 
a prerequiste to an action under § 1983, and we have not devi-
ated from that position in the 19 years since McNeese. 
Therefore, we do not address the question presented in this 
case as one of first impression. 
IV 
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Respondent argues that we should reconsider these deci-
sions and adopt the Court of Appeals' exhaustion rule, which 
was based on McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185 (1969). 
This Court has never announced a definitive formula for 
determining whether prior decisions should be overruled or 
reconsidered. However, in Monell v. New York City Dept. 
of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 695-701 (1978), we articu-
lated four factors that should be considered. Two of these 
factors-whether the decisions in question misconstrued the 
meaning of the statute as revealed in its legislative history 
and whether overruling these decisions would be inconsistent 
with more recent expressions of congressional intent-are 
particularly relevant to our decision today. 16 Both concern 
legislative purpose, which is of paramount importance in the 
exhaustion context because Congress is vested with the 
power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which 
claims may be heard in federal courts. Of course, courts 
play an important role in determining the parameters of an 
exhaustion requirement and may impose such a requirement 
even where Congress has not expressly so provided. How-
ever, the initial question whether exhaustion is required 
should be answered by reference to congressional intent; and 
a court should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a 
federal statute unless it is consistent with that intent. 17 
'
6 The other factors discussed in Monell--whether the decisions in ques-
tion constituted a departure from prior decisions and whether overruling 
these decisions would frustrate legitimate reliance on their holdings-do 
not support overruling these decisions. McNeese was not a departure 
from prior decisions-this Court had not previously addressed the applica-
tion of the exhaustion rule to § 1983 actions. Overruling these decisions 
might injure those§ 1983 plaintiffs who had foregone or waived their state 
administrative remedies in reliance on these decisions. 
17 Congressional intent is important in determining the application of the 
exhaustion doctrine to cases in which federal administrative remedies are 
available, as well as to those in which state remedies are available. Of 
course, exhaustion is required where Congress provides that certain ad-
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Therefore, in deciding whether we should reconsider our 
prior decisions and require exhaustion of state administrative 
remedies, we look to congressional intent as reflected in the 
legislative history of the predecessor to § 1983 and in recent 
congressional activity in this area. 
A 
In determining whether our prior decisions misconstrued 
the meaning of § 1983, we begin with a review of the legisla-
tive history to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, 
the precursor to § 1983. 18 Although we recognize that the 
1871 Congress did not expressly contemplate the exhaustion 
question, we believe that the tenor of the debates over § 1 
supports our conclusion that exhaustion of administrative 
remedies in § 1983 actions should not be judicially imposed. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, along with the Fourteenth 
Amendment it was enacted to enforce, were crucial ingredi-
ents in the basic alteration of our federal system accom-
plished during the Reconstruction era. During that time, 
the Federal Government was clearly established as a guaran-
tor of the basic federal rights of individuals against incursions 
ministrative remedies shall be exclusive. See Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938). Even where the statutory require-
ment of exhaustion is not explicit, courts are guided by congressional 
intent in determining whether application of the doctrine would be consist-
ent with the statutory scheme. In determining whether exhaustion of fed-
eral administrative remedies is required, courts generally focus on the role 
Congress has assigned to the particular federal agency, and tailor the ex-
haustion rule to fit the particular administrative scheme created by Con-
gress. See McKa1-t v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193-195 (1969). 
With state administrative remedies, the focus is not so much on the role 
assigned to the state agency, but the role of the state agency becomes im-
portant once a court finds that deferring its exercise of jurisdiction is con-
sistent with statutory intent. 
' ~ Some of the debates relating to § 2, which created certain federal 
crimes in addition to those defined in § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 
Stat. 27, aimed primarily at the Ku Klux Klan, are also relevant to our dis-
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by state power. As we recognized in Mitchum v. Foster, 
407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 
U. S. 339, 346 (1879)), "[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to 
interpose the federal courts between the States and the peo-
ple, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect 
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state 
law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or 
judicial.'" 
At least three recurring themes in the debates over § 1 cast 
serious doubt on the suggestion that requiring exhaustion of 
state administrative remedies would be consistent with the 
intent of the 1871 CongTess. First, in passing § 1, Congress 
assigned to the federal courts a paramount role in protecting 
constitutional rights. Representative Dawes expressed this 
view as follows: 
"Th~ first remedy proposed by this bill is a resort to the 
courts of the United States. Is that a proper place in 
which to find redress for any such wrongs? If there be 
power to call into courts of the United States an offender 
against these rights, privileges, and immunities, and 
hold him to an account there, either civilly or criminally, 
for their infringement, I submit to the calm and candid 
judgment of every member of this House that there is no 
tribunal so fitted, where equal and exact justice would 
be more likely to be meted out in temper, in moderation, 
in severity, if need be, but always according to the law 
and the fact, as that great tribunal of the Constitution." 
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 76 (1871) (hereinafter 
Globe). 
See also id., at 332 ( remarks of Rep. Hoar); id., at 375 (re-
marks of Rep. Lowe); id., at 448-449 (remarks of Rep. But-
ler); id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn). 19 
'"Opponents of the bill also recognized this purpose and complained that 
the bill would usurp the States' power, centralize the government and per-
haps ultimately destroy the States. See, e. g., Globe 337, 338 (remarks of 
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The 1871 Congress intended § 1 to "throw open the doors of 
the United States courts" to individuals who were threatened 
with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitutional 
rights, Globe 376 (remarks of Rep. Lowe), and to provide 
these individuals immediate access to the federal courts not-
withstanding any provision of state law to the contrary. For 
example, Senator Edmunds, who introduced the bill in the 
Senate, stated in his closing remarks that the bill was similar 
in principle to an earlier act upheld by this Court in Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539 (1842): 
"[T]he Supreme Court decided ... that it was the sol-
emn duty of Congress under the Constitution to secure 
to the individual, in spite of the State, or with its aid, as 
the case might be, precisely the rights that the Constitu-
tion gave him, and that there should be no intermediate 
auth91-ity to an·est or oppose the di1·ect performance of 
this duty by Congress." Globe 692 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, Representative Elliott viewed the issue as 
whether "the Government of the United States [has] the 
right, under the Constitution, to protect a citizen in the exer-
cise of his vested rights as an American citizen by ... the as-
sertion of in1-mediate jurisdiction through its courts, without 
the appeal or agency of the State in which the citizen is domi-
ciled." Id., at 389 (emphasis added). See, e. g., id., at 459 
(remarks of Rep. Coburn); id., at 807 (remarks of Rep. Gar-
field); id., at 609 (remarks of Sen. Pool); Globe App. 141 (re-
marks of Rep. Shanks). 20 
Rep. Whitthorne); id., at 352 (remarks of Rep. Beck); id., at 361 (remarks 
of Rep. Swann); id., at 365 (remarks of Rep. Arthur); id., at 385 (remarks 
of Rep. Lewis); id., at 429, 431 (remarks of Rep. McHenry); id., at 454 (re-
marks of Rep. Cox); id., at 510, 511 (remarks of Rep. Eldridge); Cong. 
Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 46 (remarks of Rep. Kerr) (hereinafter 
Globe App.); id., at 216 (remarks of Sen. Thurman); id., at 243 (remarks of 
Sen. Bayard). 
20 Opponents criticized this provision on this very ground. For exam-
--
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A second theme in the debates further suggests that the 
1871 Congress would not have wanted to impose an exhaus-
tion requirement. A major factor motivating the expansion 
of federal court jurisdiction through §§ 1 and 2 of the bill was 
the belief of the 1871 Congress that the state authorities had 
been unable or unwilling to protect the constitutional rights 
of individuals or to punish those who violated these rights. 
See, e. g., Globe 321 (remarks of Rep. Stroughton) ("[t]he 
State authorities and local courts are unable or unwilling to 
check the evil or punish the criminals"); id., at 37 4 (remarks 
of Rep. Lowe) ("the local administrations have been found in-
adequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective"); id., at 
459 (rema1~ks of Rep. Coburn); id., at 609 (remarks of Sen. 
Pool); id., at 687 (remarks of Sen. Shurz); id., at 691 (remarks 
of Sen. Edmunds); Globe App. 185 (remarks of Rep. Platt). 21 
Of primary importance to the exhaustion question was the 
pie, Rep. Storm lamented: 
"[Section one] does not even give the State courts a chance to try ques-
tions, or to show whether they will try the questions that might come be-
fore them under the first section of the fourteenth amendment, fairly or 
not. It takes the whole question away from them in the beginning." 
Globe App. 86. · 
See also Globe 416 (remarks of Rep. Biggs) ("for the violation of the rights, 
privileges, and immunities of the citizen a civil remedy is to be had by pro-
ceedings in the Federal courts, State authorization in the premises to the 
contrary notwithstanding"); id., at 337 (remarks of Rep. Whitthorne); id., 
at 373 (remarks of Rep. Archer); Globe App. 216 (remarks of Sen. 
Thurman). 
2
' This view was expressed in the Presidential message urging the pass-
ing of corrective legislation. See Globe 244 ("That the power to correct 
these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt.") (Mes-
sage of Pres. Grant). The inability of state authorities to protect constitu-
tional rights was also expressed in the findings of the House Judiciary 
Committee, which had been directed to investigate the situation. See id., 
at 320. The resolution introduced by Senator Sherman instructing the 
Senate Judiciary Committee to report a bill expressed a similar view. See 
Globe App. 210 (state "courts are rendered utterly powerless by organized 
perjury to punish crime"). 
. . 
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mistrust that the 1871 Congress held for the fact-finding pro-
cesses of state institutions. See, e. g., Globe 320 (Testimony 
of Hon. Thomas Settle, Justice of the North Carolina Su-
preme Court, before the House Judiciary Committee) ("[t]he 
defect lies not so much with the courts as with the juries"); 
id., at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey); Globe App. 311 (re-
marks of Rep. Maynard). This Congress believed that fed-
eral courts would be less susceptible to local prejudice and to 
the existing defects in the fact-finding processes of the state 
courts. See, e. g., Globe 322 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton); 
id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn). 22 This perceived de-
fect in the States' fact-finding processes is particularly rele-
vant to the question of exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies: exhaustion rules are often applied in deference to the 
superior fact-finding ability of the relevant administrative 
agency. See, e. g., McKart v. United States, 395 U. S., at 
192-196. ' 
A third feature of the debates relevant to the exhaustion 
question is the fact that many legislators interpreted the bill 
to provide dual or concurrent forums in the state and federal 
system, enabling the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to 
seek relief. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961) 
("[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, 
and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the 
federal one is invoked"). For example, Senator Thurman 
noted: 
"I object to [§ 1], first, because of the centralizing ten-
dency of transferring all mere private suits, as well as 
the punishment of offenses, from the State into the Fed-
eral courts. I do not say that this section gives to the 
22 Opponents viewed the bill as a declaration of mistrust for state tribu-
nals. See, e. g., Globe 360 (remarks of Rep. Swann); id., at 397 (remarks 
of Rep. Rice); id., at 454 (remarks of Rep. Cox); Globe App. 216 (remarks 
of Sen. Thurman). Representative McHenry found particularly offensive 
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Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. I do not suppose 
that it is so understood. It leaves it, I presume, in the 
option of the person who imagines himself to be injured 
to sue in the State court or in the Federal court, an op-
tion that he who has been the least injured, but who has 
some malice to gratify, will be the most likely to avail 
himself of." Globe App. 216. 
See also Globe 578, 694-695 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id., 
at 334 (remarks of Rep. Hoar); id., at 514 (remarks of Rep. 
Farnworth); Globe App. 85 (remarks of Rep. Bingham) 
("[a]dmitting that the States have concurrent power to en-
force the Constitution of the United States within their re-
spective limits, must we wait for their action?"). 
This legislative history supports the conclusion that our 
prior decisions, holding that exhaustion of state adminis-
trative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under 
§ 1983, did not misperceive the statutory intent: it seems fair 
to infer that the 1871 Congress did not intend that an individ-
ual be compelled in every case to exhaust state adminis-
trative remedies before filing an action under § 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act. We recognize, however, that drawing such a 
conclusion from this history alone is somewhat precarious: 
the 1871 Congress was not presented with the question of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies, nor was it aware of the 
potential role of state administrative agencies. Therefore, 
we do not rely exclusively on this legislative history in decid-
ing the question presented here. Congress addressed the 
question of exhaustion under § 1983 when it recently enacted 
42 U. S. C. § 1997e (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The legislative his-
tory to § 1997e provides strong evidence of congressional in-
tent on this issue. 
B 
The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 
U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV), was enacted pri-
marily to ensure that the United States Attorney General 
,. 
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has "legal standing to enforce existing constitutional rights 
and Federal statutory rights of institutionalized persons." 
Conf. Rep. No. 96-897, 96th Gong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980) (Conf. 
Rep.). In § 1997e, Congress also created a specific, limited 
exhaustion requirement for adult prisoners bringing actions 
pursuant to § 1983. Section 1997e and its legislative history 
demonstrate that Congress understood that exhaustion is not 
genera11y required in § 1983 actions, and that it decided to 
carve out only a narrow exception to this rule. A judicia11y 
imposed exhaustion requirement would be inconsistent with 
CongTess' decision to adopt § 1997e and would usurp policy 
judgments that Congress has reserved for itself. 
In considering whether an exhaustion requirement should 
be incorporated into the bill, Congress clearly expressed its 
belief that a decision to require exhaustion for certain § 1983 
actions would work a change in the law. Witnesses testify-
ing befoi·e the subcommittee that drafted the bill discussed 
the decisions of this Court holding that exhaustion was not 
required. See, e. g., Hearings on H.R. 2439 and H.R. 5791 
before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Ad-
ministration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
95th Gong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977) (1977 Hearings); id., at 47; id., 
at 69, 77; id., at 323; Hearings on H.R. 10 before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminstration 
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Gong., 
1st Sess. 48 (1979) (1979 Hearings). During these hearings, 
Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of this subcommit-
tee, stated: 
"Another thing that I think requires some discussion 
within the committee, and is a point of argument, . .. is 
whether there ought to be an exhaustion of remedies 
requirement . 
. . . In fact, I think it has been pointed out that if [we] 
were to require it, particularly in 1983, that would con-
stitute regression from the current state of the law. It 
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would set the law back, because presently it is clearly 
held, that is the Supreme Court has held, that in 1983 
civil rights suits the litigant need not necessarily fully 
exhaust State remedies." 1977 Hearings, at 57-58. 
See also id., at 272 (remarks of Rep. Drinan) (Rep. Railsback 
"grounds his bill on doing something which the Supreme 
Court has consistently refused to do, namely require exhaus-
tion of remedies"); 1979 Hearings 26 (remarks of Rep. Kas-
tenmeier) (adopting § 1997e "was resisted as a possible en-
croachment on civil liberties; that is to say, in the free, 
unimpeded resort to 1983"). 
The debates over adopting an exhaustion requirement also 
reflect this·understanding. See, e. g., 124 Gong. Rec. H3370 
(May 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Volkmer and Rep. Kasten-
meier); id., at H4624 (May 25, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ertel); 
id., at H7481 (July 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Wiggins) ("it is 
settled law that an exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
not required as a precondition of maintaining a 1983 action"); 
125 Gong. Rec. H3641 (May 23, 1979) (remarks of Rep. But-
ler) ("[u]nder existing law ther is no requirement that a com-
plainant first ask the State prison system to help him"). 
With the understanding that exhaustion generally is not re-
quired, Congress decided to adopt the limited exhaustion re-
quirement of § 1997e in order to relieve the burden on the 
federal courts by diverting certain prisoner petitions back 
through state and local institutions, and also to encourage the 
States to develop appropriate grievance procedures. See, e. 
g. Conf. Rep. 9; 124 Gong. Rec. H3358 (May 1, 1978) (re-
marks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at H3358, H3365 (remarks 
of Rep. Railsback); id., at H4621 (May 25, 1978) (remarks of 
Rep. Kastenmeier); id ., at H4624 (remarks of Rep. Ertel); 
id., at H7477 (July 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); 
id., at H7480-H7481 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id., at H7481 
(remarks of Rep. Ertel). Implicit in this decision is Con-
gress' conclusion that the no-exhaustion rule should be left 
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standing with respect to other § 1983 suits. 
A judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would also be 
inconsistent with the extraordinarily detailed exhaustion 
scheme embodied in§ 1997e. Section 1997e carves out a nar-
row exception to the general no-exhaustion rule to govern 
certain prisoner claims, and establishes a procedure to ensure 
that the administrative remedies are adequate and effective. 
The exhaustion requirement is expressly limited to § 1983 ac-
tions brought by an adult convicted of a crime. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1997e(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). 22 Section 1997e(b)(1) in-
structs the Attorney General to "promulgate minimum stand-
ards for the development and implementation of a plain, 
speedy, and effective system" of administrative remedies, 
and § 1997e(b)(2) specifies certain minimum standards that 
must be included. 24 A court may require exhaustion of ad-
23 Representative Kasten meier explains why juveniles were not included 
in§ 1997e: 
"I think very candidly we should admit that the first reluctance to resort to 
this mechanism embodied in [§ 1997e] was resisted as a possible encroach-
ment on civil liberties; that is to say, in the free, unimpeded resort to 1983; 
because it does deflect 1983 petitions back into-temporarily in any 
event-back into the State system. Therefore, to the extent that it is 
even so viewed, notwithstanding the limited form of [§ 1997e], that it 
should also extend to juveniles was rejected." 1979 Hearings 26. 
24 Section 1997e(b)(2) provides: 
The minimum standards shall provide-
(A) for an advisory role for employees and inmates of any jail, prison, or 
other correctional institution (at the most decentralized level as is reason-
ably possible), in the formulation, implementation, and operation of the 
system; 
(B) specific maximum time limits for written replies to grievances with 
reasons thereto at each decision level within the system; 
(C) for priority processing of grievances which are of an emergency na-
ture, including matters in which delay would subject the grievant to sub-
stantial risk of personal injury or other damages; 
(D) for safeguards to avoid reprisals against any grievant or participant 
in the resolution of a grievance; and 
(E) for independent review of the disposition of grievances, including a!-
·"' 
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ministrative remedies only if "the Attorney General has cer-
tified or the court has determined that such administrative 
remedies are in substantial compliance with the minimum ac-
ceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b)." 
§ 1997e(a)(2). Before exhaustion may be required, the court 
must further conclude that it "would be appropriate and in 
the interests of justice." § 1997e(a)(l). 25 Finally, in those 
§ 1983 actions meeting all the statutory requirements for ex-
haustion, the district court may not dismiss the case, but may 
only "continue such case for a period of not to exceed ninety 
days in order to require exhaustion." Ibid. This detailed 
scheme is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc 
basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases. 
Congress hoped that § 1997e would improve prison condi-
tions by stimulating the development of successful grievance 
mechanisms. See, e. g., Conf. Rep. 9; H.R. Rep. No. 96-80, 
96th Co.ng., 1st Sess. 4 (1979); 1979 Hearings 4 (remarks of 
Rep. Railsback); 124 Cong. Rec. H3354 (May 1, 1978) (re-
marks of Rep. Railsback); 125 Cong. Rec. H3637 (May 23 
1979) (remarks of Rep. Drinan); 126 Cong. Rec. H3497 (May 
12, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). To further this 
leged reprisals, by a person or other entity not under the direct supervision 
or direct control of the institution." 
25 The Committee Reports state that Congress did not intend that every 
§ 1983 action brought by an adult prisoner in institutions with appropriate 
grievance procedures be delayed pending exhaustion: 
"It is the intent of the Congress that the court not find such a requirement 
appropriate in those situations in which the action brought pursuant to 
[§ 1983] raises issues which cannot, in reasonable probability, be resolved 
by the grievance resolution system, including cases " ·here imminent dan-
ger to life is alleged. Allegations unrelated to conditions of confinement, 
such as those which center on events outside of the institution, would not 
appropriately be continued for resolution by the grievance resolution 
system." Conf. Rep. 15. 
See also H.R. Rep. No. 96-80, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1979); S. Rep. No. 
96-416, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1979). 
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purpose, Congress yielded primary jurisdiction over certain 
§ 1983 claims to state prisons only on the condition that these 
prisons develop adequate procedures. This purpose wou1d 
be frustrated by judicial discretion to impose exhaustion gen-
erally: the States would have no incentive to adopt grievance 
procedures capable of certification, because prisoner § 1983 
cases could be diverted to state administrative remedies in 
any event. 
In sum, the exhaustion provisions of the Act make sense, 
and are not superfluous, only if exhaustion could not be re-
quired before its enactment and if Congress intended to 
carve out a narrow exception to this no-exhaustion rule. 
The legislative history to§ 1997e demonstrates that Congress 
has taken the approach of carving out specific exceptions to 
the general rule that federal courts cannot require exhaustion 
under §_1983. It is not our province to alter the balance 
struck by Congress in establishing the procedural framework 
for bringing actions under § 1983. 
c 
Respondent and the Court of Appeals argue that exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies should be required because it 
would further various policies. They argue that an exhaus-
tion requirement would lessen the perceived burden that 
§ 1983 actions impose on federal courts/6 would further the 
goal of comity and improve federal-state relations by post-
poning federal court review until after the state adminis-
trative agency had passed on the issue/7 and would enable 
2G Of course, this burden alone is not sufficient to justify a judicial deci-
sion to alter congressionally imposed jurisdiction. See Thenntron P1·od-
ucts, Inc. v. Hennansd01ier, 423 U. S. 336, 344 (1976); United Steelwork-
ers v. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 145, 150-151 (1965). In any event, it is by no 
means clear that judicial discretion to impose an exhaustion requirement in 
§ 1983 actions would lessen the case-load of the federal courts, at least in 
the short run. See- and n. 31, infra. 
27 The application of these federalism principles to actions brought pursu-
ant to§ 1983 has prompted criticism by several commentators. See, e. g., 
80-1874-0PINION 
PATSY v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS 29 
the agency, which presumably has expertise in the area at 
issue, to enlighten the federal court's ultimate decision. 
As we noted earlier, policy considerations alone cannot jus-
tify judicially imposed exhaustion unless exhaustion is con-
sistent with congressional intent. See , supra. 
Furthermore, as the debates over incorporating the exhaus-
tion requirement in § 1997e demonstrate, the relevant policy 
considerations do not invariably point in one direction, and 
there is vehement disagreement over the validity of the as-
sumptions underlying many of them. 28 The very difficulty of 
these policy considerations, and Congress' superior institu-
tional competence to pursue this debate, suggest that legisla-
tive not judicial solutions are preferable. Cf. Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 317 (1980); United Steelworkers 
v. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 146, 150, 153 (1965). 
Beyond the policy issues that must be resolved in deciding \ 
whether· to require exhaustion, there are equally difficult 
questions concerning the design and scope of an exhaustion 
Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity: Two for the Federalism Seesaw, 25 
Loyola L. Rev. 659 (1979); Note, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 838 (1964). 
:?> For example, there is serious disagreement over whether judicial or 
administrative procedures offer § 1983 plaintiffs the swiftest, least costly, 
and most reliable remedy. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 263-264; id., at 
232-233; Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1207 (1968). Similarly, there is 
debate over whether the specialization of federal courts in constitutional 
law is more important than the specialization of administrative agencies in 
their areas of expertise, and over whether the symbolic and institutional 
function of federal courts in defining, legitimizing, and enforcing constitu-
tional claims outweighs the educational function that state and local agen-
cies can serve. See, e. g., Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L. 
Rev. 5, 23 (1980); Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1208 (1968). Finally, it is 
uncertain whether the present "free market" system, under which litigants 
are free to pursue administrative remedies if they truly appear to be 
cheaper, more efficient, and more effective, is more likely to induce the 
creation of adequate remedies than a McKart-type standard under which 
plaintiffs have no initial choice. See, e. g., Note, 8 Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975). 
Cf. 1977 Hearings 21, 34, 51; Hearings on S.1393 before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Con g., 1st 
Sess. 442 (1977). 
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requirement. These questions include how to define those 
categories of § 1983 claims in which exhaustion might be de-
sirable; how to unify and centralize the standards for judging 
the kinds of administrative procedures that should be ex-
hausted;29 what tolling requirements and time limitations 
should be adopted/0 what is the res judicata and collateral es-
toppel effect of particular administrative determinations; 
what consequences should attach to the failure to comply 
with procedural requirements of administrative proceedings; 
and whether federal courts could grant necessary interim in-
junctive relief and hold the action pending exhaustion, or pro-
ceed to judgment without requiring exhaustion even though 
exhaustion might otherwise be required, where the relevant 
administrative agency is either powerless or not inclined to 
grant such interim relief. These and similar questions might 
be answered swiftly and surely by legislation, but would cre-
ate costly, remedy-delaying, and court-burdening litigation if 
answered incrementally by the judiciary in the context of di-
verse constitutional claims relating to thousands of different 
state agencies. 31 
The very variety of claims, claimants, and state agencies 
29 Section 1997e resolved this problem by directing the Attorney General 
to promulgate minimum standards and to establish a procedure by which 
p1ison administrative remedies could be reviewed and certified. 
§ 1997e(b) & (c). If a procedure has not been certified, the court is di-
rected to compare the procedure with the Attorney General's standards 
and to continue the case pending exhaustion only if the procedure is in sub-
stantial compliance with the standards of the Attorney General. 
§ 1997e(a)(2). 
30 Unless the doctrine that statutes of limitations are not tolled pending 
exhaustion were overruled, see Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 
478 (1980), a judicially imposed exhaustion requirement might result in the 
effective repeal of§ 1983. Congress avoided this problem in § 1997e by di-
recting the court to merely continue the case for a period not to exceed 90 
days. 
31 The initial bill proposing to include an exhaustion requirement in 
§ 1997e provided: 
"Relief shall not be granted by a district court in an action brought pursu-
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involved in § 1983 cases argues for congressional consider-
ation of the myriad of policy considerations, and may explain 
why Congress, in deciding whether to require exhaustion in 
certain § 1983 actions brought by adult prisoners, carved out 
such a narrow, detailed exception to the no-exhaustion rule. 
After full debate and consideration of the various policy argu-
ments, Congress adopted § 1997, taking the largest class of 
§ 1983 actions and constructing an exhaustion requirement 
that differs substantially from the M cKart-type standard 
urged by respondents and adopted by the Court of Appeals. 
See note 31, supra. It is not for us to say whether Congress 
will or should create a similar scheme for other categories of 
§ 1983 claims or whether Congress will or should adopt an al-
together different exhaustion requirement for nonprisoner 
§ 1983 claims. 
v 
Based on the legislative histories of both § 1983 and 
§ 1997e, we conclude that exhaustion of state administrative 
remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing 
an action pursuant to § 1983. We decline to overturn our 
prior decisions holding that such exhaustion is not required. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and re-
manded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so oTdeTed. 
ant to [§ 1983] by an individual involuntarily confined in any State institu-
tion ... , unless it appears that the individual has exhausted such plain, 
speedy, and efficient State administrative remedy as is available." H.R. 
5791, 95th Con g., 1st Sess. (1977). 
Congress declined to adopt this McKa1-t-type standard after witnesses tes-
tified that this procedure would bog down the courts in massive procedural 
litigation thereby frustrating the purpose of relieving the caseloads of the 
federal courts, that state procedures are often not effective and take too 
much time, and that the court would have to judge a myriad of state proce-
dures without much guidance. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 34-35, 51, 
164-165, 169-170, 263-264, 323; 1979 Hearings 48-49. 
c~~~ 
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APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether exhaustion of 
state administrative remedies is a prerequisite to an action 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Petitioner Georgia Patsy filed this 
action, alleging that her employer, Florida International Uni-
versity (FlU), had denied her employment opportunities 
solely on the basis of her race and sex. By a divided vote, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
found that petitioner was required to exhaust "adequate and 
appropriate" administrative remedies, and remanded the 
case to the District Court to consider the adequacy of the ad-
ministrative procedures. Patsy v. Florida International 
University, 634 F. 2d 900 (CA5 1981) (en bane). We reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
I 
Petitioner alleges that even though she is well-qualified 
and has received uniformly excellent performance evalua-
tions from her supervisors, she has been rejected for more 
than thirteen positions at FlU. 1 She further claims that 
' Because this case is here on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the 
factual allegations in petitioner's amended complaint. In her initial com-
plaint, petitioner named FlU as the defendant. Relying on Byron v. Uni-
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FlU has unlawfully filled positions through intentional dis-
crimination on the basis of race and sex. She seeks declara-
tory and injunctive relief or, in the alternative, damages. 2 
The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida granted respondent Board of Regents' motion to 
dismiss because petitioner had not exhausted available ad-
ministrative remedies. On appeal, a panel of the Court of 
Appeals reversed, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Patsy v. Flo1·ida International Univasity, 612 
F. 2d 946 (CA5 1980). The full court then granted respond-
ent's petition for rehearing and vacated the panel decision. 
The Court of Appeals reviewed numerous opinions of this 
Court holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies 
was not required, and concluded that these cases did not pre-
clude the application of a "flexible" exhaustion rule. 634 
F. 2d, at 908. After canvassing the policy arguments in fa-
vor of an exhaustion requirement, the Court of Appeals de-
cided that a § 1983 plaintiff could be required to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies if the following minimum conditions 
are met: (1) an orderly system of review or appeal is provided 
by statute or agency rule; (2) the agency can grant relief 
more or less commensurate with the claim; (3) relief is avail-
versity of Florida, 403 F. Supp. 49 (ND Fla. 1975), the District Court 
granted FlU's motion to dismiss, holding that the Board of Regents and 
not the indiYiclual uniYersity had the capacity to sue and be sued under 
Florida Jaw. The District Court granted petitioner leave to amend, and 
she amended her complaint to name the Board of Regents "on behalf of' 
FlU. 
~ Petitioner requested the District Court to "[r)equire Defendants to 
remedy the discrimination practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the 
next aYailable position consistent with those previously applied for and for 
which she is qualified or in the alternative, to require the Defendants to 
pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary damages." 
Record 47. Petitioner also requested that the District Court "order fur-
ther equitable and injunctive relief as it deems appropriate and necessary 
to correct the conditions of discrimination complained of herein." Record 
48. 
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able within a reasonable period of time; (4) the procedures 
are fair, are not unduly burdensome, and are not used to ha-
rass or discourage those with legitimate claims; and (5) in-
terim relief is available, in appropriate cases, to prevent ir-
reparable injury and to preserve the plaintiffs rights during 
the administrative process. Where these minimum stand-
ards are met, a court must further consider the particular ad-
ministrative scheme, the nature of the plaintiffs interest, and 
the values served by the exhaustion doctrine in order to de-
termine whether exhaustion should be required. I d., at 
912-913. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the 
District Court to determine whether exhaustion would be ap-
propriate in this case. 
II 
The question whether exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies should ever be required in a § 1983 action has prompted 
vigorous debate and disagreement. See, e. g., Turner, 
When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Cases 
in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610 (1979); Note, 8 
Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975); Note, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 537 (1974). 
Our resolution of this issue, however, is made much easier 
because we are not writing on a clean slate. This Court has 
addressed this issue, as well as related issues, on several 
prior occasions. 
Respondent suggests that our prior precedents do not con-
trol our decision today, arguing that these cases can be dis-
tinguished on their facts or that this Court did not "fully" con-
sider the question whe+her exhaustion should be required. 
This contention need not detain us long. Beginning with 
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671-673 
(1963), we have on numerous occasions rejected the argu-
ment that a § 1983 action should be dismissed where the 
plaintiff has not exhausted state administrative remedies. 
See Barty v. Baclzi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v. 
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574 (1973); Carte1· v. Stanton, 405 
I 
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U. S. 669, 671 (1972); Wilwo1·ding v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 
251 (1971); Houghton v. Shafe1·, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968); 
King v. SnLith, 392 U. S. 309, 312 n. 4 (1968); Damico v. 
California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967). Cf. Fai1· Assessnwnt in 
Real Estate Association v. McNary, -- U. S. --, --
(1981); id., at-- (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 473 (1974) 
("[w]hen federal claims are premised on[§ 1983]-as they are 
here-we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or 
administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount role 
Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect con-
stitutional rights"). Respondent may be correct in arguing 
that several of these decisions could have been based on tra-
ditional exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. N everthe-
less, this Court has stated categorically that exhaustion is not 
a prerequiste to an action under§ 1983, and we have not devi-
ated from that position in the 19 years since McNeese. 
Therefore, we do not address the question presented in this 
case as one of first impression. 
III 
Respondent argues that we should reconsider these deci-
sions and adopt the Court of Appeals' exhaustion rule, which 
was based on McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185 (1969). 
This Court has never announced a definitive formula for 
determining whether prior decisions should be overruled or 
reconsidered. However, in Monell v. New Y01·k City Dept. 
of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 695-701 (1978), we articu-
lated four factors that should be considered. Two of these 
factors-whether the decisions in question misconstrued the 
meaning of the statute as revealed in its legislative history 
and whether overruling these decisions would be inconsistent 
with more recent expressions of congressional intent-are 
particularly relevant to our decision today. 3 Both concern 
3 The other factors discussed in Mo11ell-whether the decisions in ques-
I 
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legislative purpose, which is of paramount importance in the 
exhaustion context because Congress is vested with the 
power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which 
claims may be heard in federal courts. Of course, courts 
play an important role in determining the parameters of an 
exhaustion requirement and may impose such a requirement 
even where Congress has not expressly so provided. How-
ever, the initial question whether exhaustion is required 
should be answered by reference to congressional intent; and 
a court should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a 
federal statute unless it is consistent with that intent. 4 
Therefore, in deciding whether we should reconsider our 
prior decisions and require exhaustion of state administrative 
tion constituted a departure from prior decisions and whether overruling 
these decisions would frustrate legitimate reliance on their holdings-do 
not support overruling these decisions. McNeese was not a departure 
from prior decisions-this Court had not previously addressed the applica-
tion of the exhaustion rule to § 1983 actions. Overruling these decisions 
might injure those § 1983 plaintiffs who had foregone or waived their state 
administrative remedies in reliance on these decisions. 
'Congressional intent is important in determining the application of the 
exhaustion doctrine to cases in which federal administrative remedies are 
available, as well as to those in which state remedies are available. Of 
course, exhaustion is required where Congress provides that certain ad-
ministrative remedies shall be exclusive. See Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Co1·p ., 303 U. S. 41 (1938). Even where the statutory require-
ment of exhaustion is not explicit, courts are guided by congressional 
intent in determining whether application of the doctrine would be consist-
ent with the statutory scheme. In determining whether exhaustion of fed-
eral administrative remedies is required, courts generally focus on the role 
Congress has assigned to the particular federal agency, and tailor the ex-
haustion rule to fit the particular administrative scheme created by Con-
gress. See McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 19~195 (1969). 
With state administrative remedies, the focus is not so much on the role 
assigned to the state agency, but the role of the state agency becomes im-
portant once a court finds that defen·ing its exercise of jurisdiction is con-
sistent with statutory intent. 
.., 
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remedies, we look to congressional intent as reflected in the 
legislative history of the predecessor to § 1983 and in recent 
congressional activity in this area. 
A 
In determining whether our prior decisions misconstrued 
the meaning of § 1983, we begin with a review of the legisla-
tive history to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, 
the precursor to § 1983. 5 Although we recognize that the 
1871 Congress did not expressly contemplate the exhaustion 
question, we believe that the tenor of the debates over § 1 
supports our conclusion that exhaustion of administrative 
remedies in § 1983 actions should not be judicially imposed. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, along with the Fourteenth 
Amendment it was enacted to enforce, were crucial ingredi-
ents in the basic alteration of our federal system accom-
plished during the Reconstruction era. During that time, 
the Federal Government was clearly established as a guaran-
tor of the basic federal rights of individuals against incursions 
by state power. As we recognized in Mitchum v. FosteT, 
407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex Pmie Virginia, 100 
U. S. 339, 346 (1879)), "[t]he very purpose of§ 1983 was to 
interpose the federal courts between the States and the peo-
ple, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect 
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state 
law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or 
judicial.'" 
At least three recurring themes in the debates over § 1 cast 
serious doubt on the suggestion that requiring exhaustion of 
state administrative remedies would be consistent with the 
intent of the 1871 Congress. First, in passing § 1, Congress 
6 Some of the debates relating to § 2, which created certain federal 
crimes in addition to those defined in § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 
Stat. 27, aimed primarily at the Ku Klux Klan, are also relevant to our dis-
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assigned to the federal courts a paramount role in protecting 
constitutional rights. Representative Dawes expressed this 
view as follows: 
"The first remedy proposed by this bill is a resort to the 
courts of the United States. Is that a proper place in 
which to find redress for any such wrongs? If there be 
power to call into courts of the United States an offender 
against these rights, privileges, and immunities, and 
hold him to an account there, either civilly or criminally, 
for their infringement, I submit to the calm and candid 
judgment of every member of this House that there is no 
tribunal so fitted, where equal and exact justice would 
be more likely to be meted out in temper, in moderation, 
in severity, if need be, but always according to the law 
and the fact, as that great tribunal of the Constitution." 
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1871) (hereinafter 
Globe). 
See also id., at 332 ( remarks of Rep. Hoar); id., at 375 (re-
marks of Rep. Lowe); id., at 448-449 (remarks of Rep. But-
ler); id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn). 6 
The 1871 Congress intended § 1 to "throw open the doors of 
the United States courts" to individuals who were threatened 
with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitutional 
rights, Globe 376 (remarks of Rep. Lowe), and to provide 
these individuals immediate access to the federal courts not-
6 Opponents of the bill also recognized this purpose and complained that 
the bill would usurp the States' power, centralize the government and per-
haps ultimately destroy the States. See, e. g., Globe 337, 338 (remarks of 
Rep. Whitthorne); id ., at 352 (remarks of Rep. Beck); id., at 361 (remarks 
of Rep. Swann); id., at 365 (remarks of Rep. Arthur); id ., at 385 (remarks 
of Rep. Lewis); id., at 429, 431 (remarks of Rep. McHenry); id., at 454 (re-
marks of Rep. Cox); id., at 510, 511 (remarks of Rep. Eldridge); Cong. 
Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 46 (remarks of Rep. Ken-) (hereinafter 
Globe App. ); id ., at 216 (remarks of Sen. Thurman); id., at 243 (remarks of 
Sen. Bayard). 
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withstanding any provision of state law to the contrary. For 
example, Senator Edmunds, who introduced the bill in the 
Senate, stated in his closing remarks that the bill was similar 
in principle to an earlier act upheld by this Court in Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539 (1842): 
"[T]he Supreme Court decided ... that it was the sol-
emn duty of Congress under the Constitution to secure 
to the individual, in spite of the State, or \Vith its aid, as 
the case might be, precisely the rights that the Constitu-
tion gave him, and that there should be no intermediate 
autho1-ity to arrest or oppose the direct pe1:{onnance of 
this duty by Cong1·ess." Globe 692 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, Representative Elliott viewed the issue as 
whether "the Government of the United States [has] the 
right, under the Constitution, to protect a citizen in the exer-
cise of his vested rights as an American citizen by ... the as-
sertion of imntediate jurisdiction th1·ough its courts, without 
the appeal or agency of the State in which the citizen is domi-
ciled." ld., at 389 (emphasis added). See, e. g., id., at 459 
(remarks of Rep. Coburn); id., at 807 (remarks of Rep. Gar-
field); id., at 609 (remarks of Sen. Pool); Globe App. 141 (re-
marks of Rep. Shanks). 7 
7 Opponents criticized this provision on this very ground. For exam-
ple, Rep. Storm lamented: 
"[Section one] does not even give the State courts a chance to try ques-
tions, or to show whether they will try the questions that might come be-
fore them under the first section of the fourteenth amendment, fairly or 
not . It takes the whole question away from them in the beginning." 
Globe App. 86. 
See also Globe 416 (remarks of Rep. Biggs) ("for the violation of the rights, 
privileges, and immunities of the citizen a civil remedy is to be had by pro-
ceedings in the Federal courts, State authorization in the premises to the 
contrary not\dthstanding"); id., at 337 (remarks of Rep. Whitthorne); id., 
at 373 (remarks of Rep. Archer); Globe App. 216 (remarks of Sen. 
Thurman). 
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A second theme in the debates further suggests that the 
1871 Congress would not have wanted to impose an exhaus-
tion requirement. A major factor motivating the expansion 
of federal court jurisdiction through §§ 1 and 2 of the bill was 
the belief of the 1871 Congress that the state authorities had 
been unable or unwilling to protect the constitutional rights 
of individuals or to punish those who violated these rights. 
See, e. g., Globe 321 (remarks of Rep. Stroughton) ("[t]he 
State authorities and local courts are unable or unwilling to 
check the evil or punish the criminals"); id., at 374 (remarks 
of Rep. Lowe) ("the local administrations have been found in-
adequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective"); id., at 
459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn); id., at 609 (remarks of Sen. 
Pool); id., at 687 (remarks of Sen. Shurz); id., at 691 (remarks 
of Sen. Edmunds); Globe App. 185 (remarks of Rep. Platt). • 
Of primary importance to the exhaustion question was the 
mistrust that the 1871 Congress held for the fact-finding pro-
cesses of state institutions. See, e. g., Globe 320 (Testimony 
of Hon. Thomas Settle, Justice of the North Carolina Su-
preme Court, before the House Judiciary Committee) ("[t]he 
defect lies not so much with the courts as with the juries"); 
id., at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey); Globe App. 311 (re-
marks of Rep. Maynard). This Congress believed that fed-
eral courts would be less susceptible to local prejudice and to 
the existing defects in the fact-finding processes of the state 
courts. See, e. g., Globe 322 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton); 
' This view was expressed in the Presidential message urging the pass-
ing of corrective legislation. See Globe 244 ("That the power to correct 
these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt.") (Mes-
sage of Pres. Grant). The inability of state authorities to protect constitu-
tional rights was also expressed in the findings of the House Judiciary 
Committee, which had been directed to investigate the situation. See id., 
at 320. The resolution introduced by Senator Sherman instructing the 
Senate Judiciary Committee to report a bill expressed a similar view. See 
Globe App. 210 (state "courts are rendered utterly powerless by organized 
perjury to punish crime"). 
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id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn). ~ This perceived de-
fect in the States' fact-finding processes is particularly rele-
vant to the question of exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies: exhaustion rules are often applied in deference to the 
superior fact-finding ability of the relevant administrative 
agency. See, e. g., McKart v. United States, 395 U. S., at 
192-196. 
A third feature of the debates relevant to the exhaustion 
question is the fact that many legislators interpreted the bill 
to provide dual or concurrent forums in the state and federal 
system, enabling the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to 
seek relief. Cf. Monme v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961) 
("[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, 
and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the 
federal one is invoked"). For example, Senator Thurman 
noted: 
"I object to [§ 1], first, because of the centralizing ten-
dency of transferring all mere private suits, as well as 
the punishment of offenses, from the State into the Fed-
eral courts. I do not say that this section gives to the 
Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. I do not suppose 
that it is so understood. It leaves it, I presume, in the 
option of the person who imagines himself to be injured 
to sue in the State court or in the Federal court, an op-
tion that he who has been the least injured, but who has 
some malice to gratify, will be the most likely to avail 
himself of." Globe App. 216. 
See also Globe 578, 694-695 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id., 
at 334 (remarks of Rep. Hoar); id., at 514 (remarks of Rep. 
' Opponents viewed the bill as a declaration of mistrust for state tribu-
nals. See, e. g., Globe 360 (remarks of Rep. Swann); id. , at 397 (remarks 
of Rep. Rice); id., at 454 (remarks of Rep. Cox); Globe App. 216 (remarks 
of Sen. Thurman). RepresentatiYe McHenry found particularly offensive 
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Farnworth); Globe App. 85 (remarks of Rep. Bingham) 
("[a]dmitting that the States have concurrent power to en-
force the Constitution of the United States within their re-
spective limits, must we wait for their action?"). 
This legislative history supports the conclusion that our 
prior decisions, holding that exhaustion of state adminis-
trative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under 
§ 1983, did not misperceive the statutory intent: it seems fair 
to infer that the 1871 Congress did not intend that an individ-
ual be compelled in every case to exhaust state adminis-
trative remedies before filing an action under § 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act. We recognize, however, that drawing such a 
conclusion from this history alone is somewhat precarious: 
the 1871 Congress was not presented with the question of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies, nor was it aware of the 
potential role of state administrative agencies. Therefore, 
we do not rely exclusively on this legislative history in decid-
ing the question presented here. Congress addressed the 
question of exhaustion under § 1983 when it recently enacted 
42 U. S. C. § 1997e (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The legislative his-
tory to § 1997e provides strong evidence of congressional in-
tent on this issue. 
B 
The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 
U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV), was enacted pri-
marily to ensure that the United States Attorney General 
has "legal standing to enforce existing constitutional rights 
and Federal statutory rights of institutionalized persons." 
Conf. Rep. No. 96-897, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980) (Conf. 
Rep.). In § 1997e, Congress also created a specific, limited 
exhaustion requirement for adult prisoners bringing actions 
pursuant to § 1983. Section 1997e and its legislative history 
demonstrate that Congress understood that exhaustion is not 
generally required in § 1983 actions, and that it decided to 
carve out only a narrow exception to this rule. A judicially 
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imposed exhaustion requirement would be inconsistent with 
Congress' decision to adopt § 1997e and would usurp policy 
judgments that Congress has reserved for itself. 
In considering whether an exhaustion requirement should 
be incorporated into the bill, Congress clearly expressed its 
belief that a decision to require exhaustion for certain § 1983 
actions would work a change in the law. Witnesses testify-
ing before the subcommittee that drafted the bill discussed 
the decisions of this Court holding that exhaustion was not 
required. See, e. g., Hearings on H.R. 2439 and H.R. 5791 
before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Ad-
ministration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977) (1977 Hearings); id., at 47; id., 
at 69, 77; id., at 323; Hearings on H.R. 10 before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminstration 
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. 48 (1979) (1979 Hearings). During these hearings, 
Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of this subcommit-
tee, stated: 
"Another thing that I think requires some discussion 
within the committee, and is a point of argument, ... is 
whether there ought to be an exhaustion of remedies 
requirement . 
. . . In fact, I think it has been pointed out that if [we] 
were to require it, particularly in 1983, that would con-
stitute regression from the current state of the law. It 
would set the law back, because presently it is clearly 
held, that is the Supreme Court has held, that in 1983 
civil rights suits the litigant need not necessarily fully 
exhaust State remedies." 1977 Hearings, at 57-58. 
See also id., at 272 (remarks of Rep. Drinan) (Rep. Railsback 
"grounds his bill on doing something which the Supreme 
Court has consistently refused to do, namely require exhaus-
tion of remedies"); 1979 Hearings 26 (remarks of Rep. Kas-
tenmeier) (adopting § 1997e "was resisted as a possible en-
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croachment on civil liberties; that is to say, in the free, 
unimpeded resort to 1983"). 
The debates over adopting an exhaustion requirement also 
reflect this understanding. See, e. g., 124 Gong. Rec. H3370 
(May 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Volkmer and Rep. Kasten-
meier); id., at H4624 (May 25, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ertel); 
id., at H7 481 (July 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Wiggins) ("it is 
settled law that an exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
not required as a precondition of maintaining a 1983 action"); 
125 Gong. Rec. H3641 (May 23, 1979) (remarks of Rep. But-
ler) ("[u]nder existing law ther is no requirement that a com-
plainant first ask the State prison system to help him"). 
With the understanding that exhaustion generally is not re-
quired, Congress decided to adopt the limited exhaustion re-
quirement of § 1997e in order to relieve the burden on the 
federal courts by diverting certain prisoner petitions back 
through state and local institutions, and also to encourage the 
States to develop appropriate grievance procedures. See, e. 
g. Conf. Rep. 9; 124 Gong. Rec. H3358 (May 1, 1978) (re-
marks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at H3358, H3365 (remarks 
of Rep. Railsback); id., at H4621 (May 25, 1978) (remarks of 
Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at H4624 (remarks of Rep. Ertel); 
id., at H7477 (July 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); 
id., at H7480-H7481 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id., at H7481 
(remarks of Rep. Ertel). Implicit in this decision is Con-
gress' conclusion that the no-exhaustion rule should be left 
standing with respect to other § 1983 suits. 
A judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would also be 
inconsistent with the extraordinarily detailed exhaustion 
scheme embodied in§ 1997e. Section 1997e carves out a nar-
row exception to the general no-exhaustion rule to govern 
certain prisoner claims, and establishes a procedure to ensure 
that the administrative remedies are adequate and effective. 
The exhaustion requirement is expressly limited to § 1983 ac-
. ' 
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tions brought by an adult convicted of a crime. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1997e(a)(l) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). 10 Section 1997e(b)(l) in-
structs the Attorney General to "promulgate minimum stand-
ards for the development and implementation of a plain, 
speedy, and effective system" of administrative remedies, 
and § 1997e(b)(2) specifies certain minimum standards that 
must be included. 11 A court may require exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies only if "the Attorney General has cer-
tified or the court has determined that such administrative 
remedies are in substantial compliance with the minimum ac-
ceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b)." 
§ 1997e(a)(2). Before exhaustion may be required, the court 
must further conclude that it "would be appropriate and in 
the interests of justice." § 1997e(a)(l)Y Finally, in those 
10 Representative Kastenmeier explains why juYeniles were not included 
in § 1997e: 
"I think very candidly we should admit that the first reluctance to resort to 
this mechanism embodied in [§ 1997e] was resisted as a possible encroach-
ment on civil liberties; that is to sa~·. in the free, unimpeded resort to 1983; 
because it does deflect 1983 petitions back into-temporarily in any 
event-back into the State system. Therefore, to the extent that it is 
even so viewed, not\\ithstanding the limited form of [§ 1997e], that it 
should also extend to juveniles was rejected." 1979 Hearings 26. 
11 Section 1997e(b)(2) provides: 
The minimum standards shall provide-
(A) for an advisory role for employees and inmates of any jail, prison, or 
other correctional institution (at the most decentralized level as is reason-
ably possible), in the formulation, implementation, and operation of the 
system; 
(B) specific maximum time limits for written replies to grieYances with 
reasons thereto at each decision level within the system; 
(C) for priority processing of grievances which are of an emergency na-
ture, including matters in which delay would subject the grieYant to sub-
stantial risk of personal injury or other damages; 
(D) for safeguards to avoid reprisals against any grievant or participant 
in the resolution of a grievance; and 
(E) for independent review of the disposition of grieYances, including al-
leged reprisals, by a person or other entity not under the direct supervision 
or direct control of the institution." 
12 The Committee Reports state that Congress did not intend that every 
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§ 1983 actions meeting all the statutory requirements for ex-
haustion, the district court may not dismiss the case, but may 
only "continue such case for a period of not to exceed ninety 
days in order to require exhaustion." Ibid. This detailed 
scheme is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc 
basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases. 
Congress hoped that § 1997e would improve prison condi-
tions by stimulating the development of successful grievance 
mechanisms. See, e. g., Conf. Rep. 9; H.R. Rep. No. 96-80, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979); 1979 Hearings 4 (remarks of 
Rep. Railsback); 124 Cong. Rec. H3354 (May 1, 1978) (re-
marks of Rep. Railsback); 125 Cong. Rec. H3637 (May 23 
1979) (remarks of Rep. Drinan); 126 Cong. Rec. H3497 (May 
12, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). To further this 
purpose, Congress yielded primary jurisdiction over certain 
§ 1983 claims to state prisons only on the condition that these 
prisons develop adequate procedures. This purpose would 
be frustrated by judicial discretion to impose exhaustion gen-
erally: the States would have no incentive to adopt grievance 
procedures capable of certification, because prisoner § 1983 
cases could be diverted to state administrative remedies in 
any event. 
In sum, the exhaustion provisions of the Act make sense, 
and are not superfluous, only if exhaustion could not be re-
quired before its enactment and if Congress intended to 
§ 1983 action brought by an adult prisoner in institutions with appropriate 
grieYance procedures be delayed pending exhaustion: 
"It is the intent of the Congress that the court not find such a requirement 
appropriate in those situations in which the action brought pursuant to 
[§ 1983] raises issues which cannot, in reasonable probability, be resolved 
by the grievance resolution system, including cases where imminent dan-
ger to life is alleged. Allegations unrelated to conditions of confinement, 
such as those which center on events outside of the institution, would not 
appropriately be continued for resolution by the grievance resolution 
system." Conf. Rep. 15. 
See also H. R. Rep. No. 96-80, 96th Con g., 1st Sess. 25 (1979); S. Rep. No. 
96--416, 96th Con g., 1st Sess. 34 (1979). 
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carve out a narrow exception to this no-exhaustion rule. 
The legislative history to§ 1997e demonstrates that Congress 
has taken the approach of carving out specific exceptions to 
the general rule that federal courts cannot require exhaustion 
under § 1983. It is not our province to alter the balance 
struck by Congress in establishing the procedural framework 
for bringing actions under § 1983. 
c 
Respondent and the Court of Appeals argue that exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies should be required because it 
would further various policies. They argue that an exhaus-
tion requirement would lessen the perceived burden that 
§ 1983 actions impose on federal courts;13 would further the 
goal of comity and improve federal-state relations by post-
poning federal court review until after the state adminis-
trative agency had passed on the issue; 1~ and would enable 
the agency, which presumably has expertise in the area at 
issue, to enlighten the federal court's ultimate decision. 
As we noted earlier, policy considerations alone cannot jus-
tify judicially imposed exhaustion unless exhaustion is con-
sistent with congressional intent. See , supra. 
Furthermore, as the debates over incorporating the exhaus-
tion requirement in § 1997e demonstrate, the relevant policy 
considerations do not invariably point in one direction, and 
11 Of course, this burden alone is not sufficient to justify a judicial deci-
sion to alter congressionally imposed jurisdiction. See Thetmiron Prod-
ucts, Inc. Y. Hamansdm:fer, 423 U. S. 336, 344 (1976); United Steelwork-
ers Y. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 145, 150-151 (1965). In any event, it is by no 
means clear that judicial discretion to impose an exhaustion requirement in 
~ 1983 actions would lessen the case load of the federal courts, at least in the \ 
short run. See-- and n. 18, infra. 
"The application of these federalism principles to actions brought pursu-
ant to § 1983 has prompted criticism by several commentators. See, e. g .. 
Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity: Two for the Federalism Seesaw, 25 
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there is vehement disagreement over the validity of the as-
sumptions underlying many of them. 15 The very difficulty of 
these policy considerations, and Congress' superior institu-
tional competence to pursue this debate, suggest that legisla-
tive not judicial solutions are preferable. Cf. Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 317 (1980); United Steelwo1·kers 
v. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 146, 150, 153 (1965). 
Beyond the policy issues that must be resolved in deciding 
whethe1· to require exhaustion, there are equally difficult 
questions concerning the design and scope of an exhaustion 
requirement. These questions include how to define those 
categories of § 1983 claims in which exhaustion might be de-
sirable; how to unify and centralize the standards for judging 
the kinds of administrative procedures that should be ex-
hausted;16 what tolling requirements and time limitations 
16 For example, there is serious disagreement over whether judicial or 
administrative procedures offer § 1983 plaintiffs the swiftest, least costly, 
and most reliable remedy. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 263-264; id., at 
232-233; Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1207 (1968). Similarly, there is 
debate over whether the specialization of federal courts in constitutional 
law is more important than the specialization of administrative agencies in 
their areas of expertise, and over whether the symbolic and institutional 
function of federal courts in defining, legitimizing, and enforcing constitu-
tional claims outweighs the educational function that state and local agen-
cies can serve. See, e. g., Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L. 
Rev. 5, 23 (1980); Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1208 (1968). Finally, it is 
uncertain whether the present "free market" system, under which litigants 
are free to pursue administrative remedies if they truly appear to be 
cheaper, more efficient, and more effective, is more likely to induce the 
creation of adequate remedies than a McKart-type standard under which 
plaintiffs have no initial choice. See, e. g. , Note, 8 Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975). 
Cf. 1977 Hearings 21, 34, 51; Hearings on S.l393 before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Con g., 1st 
Sess. 442 (1977). 
16 Section 1997e resolved this problem by directing the Attorney General 
to promulgate minimum standards and to establish a procedure by which 
prison administrative remedies could be reviewed and certified. 
§ 1997e(b) & (c). If a procedure has not been certified, the court is di-
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should be adopted; 17 what is the res judicata and collateral es-
toppel effect of particular administrative determinations; 
what consequences should attach to the failure to comply 
with procedural requirements of administrative proceedings; 
and whether federal courts could grant necessary interim in-
junctive relief and hold the action pending exhaustion, or pro-
ceed to judgment without requiring exhaustion even though 
exhaustion might otherwise be required, where the relevant 
administrative agency is either powerless or not inclined to 
grant such interim relief. These and similar questions might 
be answered swiftly and surely by legislation, but would cre-
ate costly, remedy-delaying, and court-burdening litigation if 
answered incrementally by the judiciary in the context of di-
verse constitutional claims relating to thousands of different 
state agencies. 1' 
rected to compare the procedure with the Attorney General's standards 
and to continue the case pending exhaustion only if the procedure is in sub-
stantial compliance with the standards of the Attorney General. 
§ 1997e(a)(2). 
"Unless the doctrine that statutes of limitations are not tolled pending 
exhaustion were ove1Tuled, see Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 
478 (1980), a judicially imposed exhaustion requirement might result in the 
effective repeal of§ 1983. Congress avoided this problem in§ 1997e by di-
recting the court to merely continue the case for a period not to exceed 90 
days. 
'' The initial bill proposing to include an exhaustion requirement in 
§ 1997e provided: 
"Relief shall not be granted by a district court in an action brought pursu-
ant to [§ 1983] by an individual involuntarily confined in any State institu-
tion ... , unless it appears that the individual has exhausted such plain, 
speedy, and efficient State administrative remedy as is available." H. R. 
5791, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
Congress declined to adopt this McKart-type standard after witnesses tes-
tified that this procedure would bog down the courts in massive procedural 
litigation thereby frustrating the purpose of relieving the caseloads of the 
federal courts, that state procedures are often not effective and take too 
much time, and that the court would have to judge a myriad of state proce-
dures without much guidance. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 34-35, 51, 
,, 
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The very variety of claims, claimants, and state agencies 
involved in § 1983 cases argues for congressional consider-
ation of the myriad of policy considerations, and may explain 
why Congress, in deciding whether to require exhaustion in 
certain § 1983 actions brought by adult prisoners, carved out 
such a narrow, detailed exception to the no-exhaustion rule. 
After full debate and consideration of the various policy argu-
ments, Congress adopted § 1997, taking the largest class of 
§ 1983 actions and constructing an exhaustion requirement 
that differs substantially from the M cKart-type standard 
urged by respondents and adopted by the Court of Appeals. 
See note 18, supm. It is not for us to say whether Congress 
will or should create a similar scheme for other categories of 
§ 1983 claims or whether Congress will or should adopt anal-
together different exhaustion requirement for nonprisoner 
§ 1983 claims. 19 
164-165, 169-170, 263-264, 323; 1979 Hearings 48-49. 
'"The question was posed from the bench at oral argument whether the 
Eleventh Amendment might bar this suit on the ground that the Board of 
Regents is an arm of the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Cf. Alabama\'. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978). Com-
pare Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911) with 
Florida Dept of Health \'. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147 
(1981). The District Court dismissed this action on the pleadings, and no 
Eleventh Amendment issue had been raised. The Board of Regents first 
raised this issue in its brief to the original panel on appeal, but did not 
argue it in its brief on rehearing en bane. Neither the original panel nor 
the en bane court addressed this issue. Although the State mentioned a 
possible Eleventh Amendment defense in its response in opposition to the 
petition for certiorari, it did not brief the issue or press it at oral argument. 
Indeed, the state attorney general urged that we affirm the Court of Ap-
peals solely on its exhaustion holding. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24, 27. 
We have noted that "the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently par-
takes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar" that it may be raised by the 
State for the first time on appeal. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 
(1974). However, because of the importance of state Jaw in analyzing 
Eleventh Amendment questions and because the State may, under certain 
circumstances, waive this defense, we have never held that it is jurisdic-
80-1874-0PINION 
20 PATSY v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS 
IV \ 
Based on the legislative histories of both § 1983 and 
§ 1997e, we conclude that exhaustion of state administrative 
remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing 
an action pursuant to § 1983. We decline to overturn our 
prior decisions holding that such exhaustion is not required. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and re-
manded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
tiona! in the sense that it must be raised and decided by this Court on its 
own motion. Cf. Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 279 
(1977). Where, as here, the Board of Regents expressly requested that 
we address the exhaustion question and not pass on its potential Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, and, as a consequence, the parties have not briefed 
the issue, we deem it appropriate to address the issue that was raised and 
decided below and vigorously pressed in this Court. Nothing in this opin-
ion precludes the Board of Regents from raising its Eleventh Amendment 
claim on remand. The District Court is in the best position to address in 
the first instance the competing questions of fact and state-law necessary 
to resolve the Eleventh Amendment issue, and at this stage it has the dis-
cretion to permit amendments to the pleadings that might cure any poten-
tial Eleventh Amendment problems. 
• 
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APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether exhaustion of 
state administrative remedies is a prerequisite to an action 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Petitioner Georgia Patsy filed this 
action, alleging that her employer, Florida International Uni-
versity (FlU), had denied her employment opportunities 
solely on the basis of her race and sex. By a divided vote, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
found that petitioner was required to exhaust "adequate and 
appropriate" administrative remedies, and remanded the 
case to the District Court to consider the adequacy of the ad-
ministrative procedures. Patsy v. Florida International 
University, 634 F . 2d 900 (CA5 1981) (en bane). We reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
I 
Petitioner alleges that even though she is well-qualified 
and has received uniformly excellent performance evalua-
tions from her supervisors, she has been rejected for more 
than thirteen positions at FlU.' She further claims that 
' Because this case is here on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the 
factual allegations in petitioner's amended complaint. In her initial com-
plaint, petitioner named FlU as the defendant. Relying on Byron v. Uni-
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FlU has unlawfully filled positions through intentional dis-
crimination on the basis of race and sex. She seeks declara-
tory and injunctive relief or, in the alternative, damages. 2 
The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida granted respondent Board of Regents' motion to 
dismiss because petitioner had not exhausted available ad-
ministrative remedies. On appeal, a panel of the Court of 
Appeals reversed, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Patsy v. Florida International University, 612 
F. 2d 946 (CA5 1980). The full court then granted respond-
ent's petition for rehearing and vacated the panel decision. 
The Court of Appeals reviewed numerous opinions of this 
Court holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies 
was not required, and concluded that these cases did not pre-
clude the application of a "flexible" exhaustion rule. 634 
F. 2d, at 908. After canvassing the policy arguments in fa-
vor of an exhaustion requirement, the Court of Appeals de-
cided that a § 1983 plaintiff could be required to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies if the following minimum conditions 
are met: (1) an orderly system of review or appeal is provided 
by statute or agency rule; (2) the agency can grant relief 
more or less commensurate with the claim; (3) relief is avail-
versity of Florida, 403 F. Supp. 49 (ND Fla. 1975), the District Court 
granted FlU's motion to dismiss, holding that the Board of Regents and 
not the individual university had the capacity to sue and be sued under 
Florida law. The District Court granted petitioner leave to amend, and 
she amended her complaint to name the Board of Regents "on behalf of' 
FlU. 
2 Petitioner requested the District Court to "[r lequire Defendants to 
remedy the discrimination practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the 
next available position consistent with those previously applied for and for 
which she is qualified or in the alternative, to require the Defendants to 
pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary damages." 
Record 47. Petitioner also requested that the District Court "order fur-
ther equitable and injunctive relief as it deems appropriate and necessary 
to correct the conditions of discrimination complained of herein." Record 
48. 
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able within a reasonable period of time; (4) the procedures 
are fair, are not unduly burdensome, and are not used to ha-
rass or discourage those with legitimate claims; and (5) in-
terim relief is available, in appropriate cases, to prevent ir-
reparable injury and to preserve the plaintiffs rights during 
the administrative process. Where these minimum stand-
ards are met, a court must further consider the particular ad-
ministrative scheme, the nature of the plaintiffs interest, and 
the values served by the exhaustion doctrine in order to de-
termine whether exhaustion should be required. I d., at 
912--913. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the 
District Court to determine whether exhaustion would be ap-
propriate in this case. 
II 
The question whether exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies should ever be required in a § 1983 action has prompted 
vigorous debate and disagreement. See, e. g., Turner, 
When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Cases 
in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610 (1979); Note, 8 
Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975); Note, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 537 (1974). 
Our resolution of this issue, however, is made much easier 
because we are not writing on a clean slate. This Court has 
addressed this issue, as well as related issues, on several 
prior occasions. 
Respondent suggests that our prior precedents do not con-
trol our decision today, arguing that these cases can be dis-
tinguished on their facts or that this Court did not "fully" con-
sider the question whether exhaustion should be required. 
This contention need not detain us long. Beginning with 
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671-673 
(1963), we have on numerous occasions rejected the argu-
ment that a § 1983 action should be dismissed where the 
plaintiff has not exhausted state administrative remedies. 
See Barry v. Bachi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v. 
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574 (1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405 
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U. S. 669, 671 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 
251 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968); 
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 312 n. 4 (1968); Damico v. 
California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967). Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 
415 U. S. 452, 473 (1974) ("[w]hen federal claims are 
premised on [§ 1983]-as they are here-we have not re-
quired exhaustion of state judicial or administrative reme-
dies, recognizing the paramount role Congress has assigned 
to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights"). Re-
spondent may be correct in arguing that several of these deci-
sions could have been based on traditional exceptions to the 
exhaustion doctrine. Nevertheless, this Court has stated 
categorically that exhaustion is not a prerequiste to an action 
under § 1983, and we have not deviated from that position in 
the 19 years since McNeese. Therefore, we do not address 
the question presented in this case as one of first impression. 
III 
Respondent argues that we should reconsider these deci-
sions and adopt the Court of Appeals' exhaustion rule, which 
was based on McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185 (1969). 
This Court has never announced a definitive formula for 
determining whether prior decisions should be overruled or 
reconsidered. However, in Monell v. New York City Dept. 
of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 695-701 (1978), we articu-
lated four factors that should be considered. Two of these 
factors-whether the decisions in question misconstrued the 
meaning of the statute as revealed in its legislative history 
and whether overruling these decisions would be inconsistent 
with more recent expressions of congressional intent-are 
particularly relevant to our decision today. 3 Both concern 
3 The other factors discussed in M onell-whether the decisions in ques-
tion constituted a departure from prior decisions and whether overruling 
these decisions would frustrate legitimate reliance on their holdings-do 
not support overruling these decisions. MeN eese was not a departure 
from prior decisions-this Court had not previously addressed the applica-
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legislative purpose, which is of paramount importance in the 
exhaustion context because Congress is vested with the 
power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which 
claims may be heard in federal courts. Of course, courts 
play an important role in determining the limits of an exhaus-
tion requirement and may impose such a requirement even 
where Congress has not expressly so provided. However, 
the initial question whether exhaustion is required should be 
answered by reference to congressional intent; and a court 
should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a federal 
statute unless it is consistent with that intent. 4 Therefore, 
in deciding whether we should reconsider our prior decisions 
and require exhaustion of state administrative remedies, we 
look to congressional intent as reflected in the legislative his-
tory of the predecessor to § 1983 and in recent congressional 
activity in this area. 
A 
In determining whether our prior decisions misconstrued 
tion of the exhaustion rule to § 1983 actions. Overruling these decisions 
might injure those § 1983 plaintiffs who had foregone or waived their state 
administrative remedies in reliance on these decisions. 
' Congressional intent is important in determining the application of the 
exhaustion doctrine to cases in which federal administrative remedies are 
available, as well as to those in which state remedies are available. Of 
course, exhaustion is required where Congress provides that certain ad-
ministrative remedies shall be exclusive. See Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938). Even where the statutory require-
ment of exhaustion is not explicit, courts are guided by congressional 
intent in determining whether application of the doctrine would be consist-
ent with the statutory scheme. In determining whether exhaustion of fed-
eral administrative remedies is required, courts generally focus on the role 
Congress has assigned to the relevant federal agency, and tailor the ex-
haustion rule to fit the particular administrative scheme created by Con-
gress. See McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193-195 (1969). 
With state administrative remedies, the focus is not so much on the role 
assigned to the state agency, but the role of the state agency becomes im-
portant once a court finds that deferring its exercise of jurisdiction is con-
sistent with statutory intent. 
• h 
80-187~0PINION 
6 PATSY v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS 
the meaning of § 1983, we begin with a review of the legisla-
tive history to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, 
the precursor to § 1983.5 Although we recognize that the 
1871 Congress did not expressly contemplate the exhaustion 
question, we believe that the tenor of the debates over § 1 
supports our conclusion that exhaustion of administrative 
remedies in § 1983 actions should not be judicially imposed. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, along with the Fourteenth 
Amendment it was enacted to enforce, were crucial ingredi-
ents in the basic alteration of our federal system accom-
plished during the Reconstruction era. During that time, 
the Federal Government was clearly established as a guaran-
tor of the basic federal rights of individuals against incursions 
by state power. As we recognized in Mitchum v. Foster, 
407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 
U. S. 339, 346 (1879)), "[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to 
interpose the federal courts between the States and the peo-
ple, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect 
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state 
law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or 
judicial.'" 
At least three recurring themes in the debates over § 1 cast 
serious doubt on the suggestion that requiring exhaustion of 
state administrative remedies would be consistent with the 
intent of the 1871 Congress. First, in passing § 1, Congress 
assigned to the federal courts a paramount role in protecting 
constitutional rights. Representative Dawes expressed this 
view as follows: 
"The first remedy proposed by this bill is a resort to the 
courts of the United States. Is that a proper place in 
which to find redress for any such wrongs? If there be 
5 Some of the debates relating to § 2, which created certain federal 
crimes in addition to those defined in § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 
Stat. 27, aimed primarily at the Ku Klux Klan, are also relevant to our dis-
cussion of § 1. 
I • 
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power to call into courts of the United States an offender 
against these rights, privileges, and immunities, and 
·hold him to an account there, either civilly or criminally, 
·for their infringement, I submit to the calm and candid 
judgment of every member of this House that there is no 
tribunal so fitted, where equal and exact justice would 
be more likely to be meted out in temper, in moderation, 
in severity, if need be, but always according to the law 
and the fact, as that great tribunal of the Constitution." 
Gong. Globe, 42d Gong., 1st Sess. 476 (1871) (hereinafter 
Globe). 
See also id., at 332 (remarks of Rep. Hoar); id., at 375 (re-
marks of Rep. Lowe); id., at 448-449 (remarks of Rep. But-
ler); id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn). 6 
The 1871 Congress intended § 1 to "throw open the doors of 
the United States courts" to individuals who were threatened 
with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitutional 
rights, Globe 376 (remarks of Rep. Lowe), and to provide 
these individuals immediate access to the federal courts not-
withstanding any provision of state law to the contrary. For 
example, Senator Edmunds, who introduced the bill in the 
Senate, stated in his closing remarks that the bill was similar 
in principle to an earlier act upheld by this Court in Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539 (1842): 
"[T]he Supreme Court decided . . . that it was the sol-
6 Opponents of the bill also recognized this purpose and complained that 
the bill would usurp the States' power, centralize the government and per-
haps ultimately destroy the States. See, e. g., Globe 337, 338 (remarks of 
Rep. Whitthorne); id., at 352 (remarks of Rep. Beck); id., at 361 (remarks 
of Rep. Swann); id., at 365 (remarks of Rep. Arthur); id., at 385 (remarks 
of Rep. Lewis); id., at 429, 431 (remarks of Rep. McHenry); id., at 454 (re-
marks of Rep. Cox); id., at 510, 511 (remarks of Rep. Eldridge); Cong. 
Globe, 42d Con g., 1st Sess., App. 46 (remarks of Rep. Kerr) (hereinafter 
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emn duty of Congress under the Constitution to secure 
to the individual, in spite of the State, or with its aid, as 
the case might be, precisely the rights that the Constitu-
tion gave him, and that there should be no intermediate 
authority to arrest or oppose the direct performance of 
this duty by Congress." Globe 692 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, Representative Elliott viewed the issue as 
whether "the Government of the United States [has] the 
right, under the Constitution, to protect a citizen in the exer-
cise of his vested rights as an American citizen by . . . the as-
sertion of immediate jurisdiction through its courts, without 
the appeal or agency of the State in which the citizen is domi-
ciled." ld., at 389 (emphasis added). See, e. g., id., at 459 
(remarks of Rep. Coburn); id., at 807 (remarks of Rep. Gar-
field); id., at 609 (remarks of Sen. Pool); Globe App. 141 (re-
marks of Rep. Shanks). 7 
A second theme in the debates further suggests that the 
1871 Congress would not have wanted to impose an exhaus-
tion requirement. A major factor motivating the expansion 
of federal court jurisdiction through §§ 1 and 2 of the bill was 
the belief of the 1871 Congress that the state authorities had 
been unable or unwilling to protect the constitutional rights 
of individuals or to punish those who violated these rights. 
7 Opponents criticized this provision on this very ground. For exam-
ple, Rep. Storm lamented: 
"[Section one] does not even give the State courts a chance to try ques-
tions, or to show whether they will try the questions that might come be-
fore them under the first section of the fourteenth amendment, fairly or 
not. It takes the whole question away from them in the beginning." 
Globe App. 86. 
See also Globe 416 (remarks of Rep. Biggs) ("for the violation of the rights, 
privileges, and immunities of the citizen a civil remedy is to be had by pro-
ceedings in the Federal courts, State authorization in the premises to the 
contrary notwithstanding''); id., at 337 (remarks of Rep. Whitthorne); id., 
at 373 (remarks of Rep. Archer); Globe App. 216 (remarks of Sen. 
Thurman). 
80-1874-0PINION 
PATSY v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS 9 
See, e. g., Globe 321 (remarks of Rep. Stroughton) ("[t]he 
State authorities and local courts are unable or unwilling to 
check the evil or punish the criminals"); id., at 374 (remarks 
of Rep. Lowe) ("the local administrations have been found in-
adequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective"); id., at 
459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn); id., at 609 (remarks of Sen. 
Pool); id., at 687 (remarks of Sen. Shurz); id., at 691 (remarks 
of Sen. Edmunds); Globe App. 185 (remarks of Rep. Platt). 8 
Of primary importance to the exhaustion question was the 
mistrust that the 1871 Congress held for the fact-finding pro-
cesses of state institutions. See, e. g., Globe 320 (Testimony 
of Hon. Thomas Settle, Justice of the North Carolina Su-
preme Court, before the House Judiciary Committee) ("[t]he 
defect lies not so much with the courts as with the juries"); 
id., at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey); Globe App. 311 (re-
marks of Rep. Maynard). This Congress believed that fed-
eral courts would be less susceptible to local prejudice and to 
the existing defects in the fact-finding processes of the state 
courts. See, e. g., Globe 322 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton); 
id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn). 9 This perceived de-
fect in the States' fact-finding processes is particularly rele-
8 This view was expressed in the Presidential message urging the pass-
ing of corrective legislation. See Globe 244 ("That the power to correct 
these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt.") (Mes-
sage of Pres. Grant). The inability of state authorities to protect constitu-
tional rights was also expressed in the findings of the House Judiciary 
Committee, which had been directed to investigate the situation. See id., 
at 320. The resolution introduced by Senator Sherman instructing the 
Senate Judiciary Committee to report a bill expressed a similar view. See 
Globe App. 210 (state "courts are rendered utterly powerless by organized 
perjury to punish crime"). 
9 Opponents viewed the bill as a declaration of mistrust for state tribu-
nals. See, e. g., Globe 360 (remarks of Rep. Swann); id., at 397 (remarks 
of Rep. Rice); id., at 454 (remarks of Rep. Cox); Globe App. 216 (remarks 
of Sen. Thurman). Representative McHenry found particularly offensive 
the removal of the fact-finding function from the local institutions. See 
Globe 429. 
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vant to the question of exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies: exhaustion rules are often applied in deference to the 
superior fact-finding ability of the relevant administrative 
agency. See, e. g., McKart v. United States, 395 U. S., at 
192-196. 
A third feature of the debates relevant to the exhaustion 
question is the fact that many legislators interpreted the bill 
to provide dual or concurrent forums in the state and federal 
system, enabling the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to 
seek relief. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961) 
("[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, 
and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the 
federal one is invoked"). For example, Senator Thurman 
noted: 
"I object to [§ 1], first, because of the centralizing ten-
dency of transferring all mere private suits, as well as 
the punishment of offenses, from the State into the Fed-
eral courts. I do not say that this section gives to the 
Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. I do not suppose 
that it is so understood. It leaves it, I presume, in the 
option of the person who imagines himself to be injured 
to sue in the State court or in the Federal court, an op-
tion that he who has been the least injured, but who has 
some malice to gratify, will be the most likely to avail 
himself of." Globe App. 216. 
See also Globe 578, 694-695 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id., 
at 334 (remarks of Rep. Hoar); id., at 514 (remarks of Rep. 
Farnworth); Globe App. 85 (remarks of Rep. Bingham) 
("[a]dmitting that the States have concurrent power to en-
force the Constitution of the United States within their re-
spective limits, must we wait for their action?"). 
This legislative history supports the conclusion that our 
prior decisions, holding that exhaustion of state adminis-
trative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under 
§ 1983, did not misperceive the statutory intent: it seems fair 
~ ... 
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to infer that the 1871 Congress did not intend that an individ-
ual be compelled in every case to exhaust state adminis-
trative remedies before filing an action under § 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act. We recognize, however, that drawing such a 
conclusion from this history alone is somewhat precarious: 
the 1871 Congress was not presented with the question of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies, nor was it aware of the 
potential role of state administrative agencies. Therefore, 
we do not rely exclusively on this legislative history in decid-
ing the question presented here. Congress addressed the 
question of exhaustion under§ 1983 when it recently enacted 
42 U. S. C. § 1997e (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The legislative his-
tory to § 1997e provides strong evidence of congressional in-
tent on this issue. 
B 
The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 
U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV), was enacted pri-
marily to ensure that the United States Attorney General 
has "legal standing to enforce existing constitutional rights 
and Federal statutory rights of institutionalized persons." 
Conf. Rep. No. 9~97, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980) (Conf. 
Rep.). In § 1997e, Congress also created a specific, limited 
exhaustion requirement for adult prisoners bringing actions 
pursuant to § 1983. Section 1997e and its legislative history 
demonstrate that Congress understood that exhaustion is not 
generally required in § 1983 actions, and that it decided to 
carve out only a narrow exception to this rule. A judicially 
imposed exhaustion requirement would be inconsistent with 
Congress' decision to adopt § 1997e and would usurp policy 
judgments that Congress has reserved for itself. 
In considering whether an exhaustion requirement should 
be incorporated into the bill, Congress clearly expressed its 
belief that a decision to require exhaustion for certain § 1983 
actions would work a change in the law. Witnesses testify-
ing before the subcommittee that drafted the bill discussed 
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the decisions of this Court holding that exhaustion was not 
required. See, e.g_., Hearings on H.R. 2439 and H.R. 5791 
before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Ad-
ministration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977) (1977 Hearings); id., at 47; id., 
at 69, 77; id., at 323; Hearings on H.R. 10 before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminstration 
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. 48 (1979) (1979 Hearings). During these hearings, 
Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of this subcommit-
tee, stated: 
"Another thing that I think requires some discussion 
within the committee, and is a point of argument, ... is 
whether there ought to be an exhaustion of remedies 
requirement . 
. . . In fact, I think it has been pointed out that if [we] 
were to require it, particularly in 1983, that would con-
stitute regression from the current state of the law. It 
would set the law back, because presently it is clearly 
held, that is the Supreme Court has held, that in 1983 
civil rights suits the litigant need not necessarily fully 
exhaust State remedies." 1977 Hearings, at 57-58. 
See also id., at 272 (remarks of Rep. Drinan) (Rep. Railsback 
"grounds his bill on doing something which the Supreme 
Court has consistently refused to do, namely require exhaus-
tion of remedies"); 1979 Hearings 26 (remarks of Rep. Kas-
tenmeier) (adopting § 1997e "was resisted as a possible en-
croachment on civil liberties; that is to say, in the free, 
unimpeded resort to 1983"). 
The debates over adopting an exhaustion requirement also 
reflect this understanding. See, e. g., 124 Cong. Rec. H3370 
(May 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Volkmer and Rep. Kasten-
meier); id., at H4624 (May 25, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ertel); 
id., at H7481 (July 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Wiggins) ("it is 
settled law that an exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
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not required as a precondition of maintaining a 1983 action"); 
125 Cong. Rec. H3641 (May 23, 1979) (remarks of Rep. But-
ler) ("[u]nder existing law ther is no requirement that a com-
plainant first ask the State prison system to help him"). 
With the understanding that exhaustion generally is not re-
quired, Congress decided to adopt the limited exhaustion re-
quirement of § 1997e in order to relieve the burden on the 
federal courts by diverting certain prisoner petitions back 
through state and local institutions, and also to encourage the 
States to develop appropriate grievance procedures. See, e. 
g. Conf. Rep. 9; 124 Cong. Rec. H3358 (May 1, 1978) (re-
marks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at H3358, H3365 (remarks 
of Rep. Railsback); id., at H4621 (May 25, 1978) (remarks of 
Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at H4624 (remarks of Rep. Ertel); 
id., at H7477 (July 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); 
id., at H7480-H7481 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id., at H7481 
(remarks of Rep. Ertel). Implicit in this decision is Con-
gress' conclusion that the no-exhaustion rule should be left 
standing with respect to other § 1983 suits. 
A judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would also be 
inconsistent with the extraordinarily detailed exhaustion 
scheme embodied in§ 1997e. Section 1997e carves out a nar-
row exception to the general no-exhaustion rule to govern 
certain prisoner claims, and establishes a procedure to ensure 
that the administrative remedies are adequate and effective. 
The exhaustion requirement is expressly limited to § 1983 ac-
tions brought by an adult convicted of a crime. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1997e(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). 10 Section 1997e(b)(1) in-
10 Representative Kastenmeier explains why juveniles were not included 
in§ 1997e: 
"I think very candidly we should admit that the first reluctance to resort to 
this mechanism embodied in[§ 1997e] was resisted as a possible encroach-
ment on civil liberties; that is to say, in the free, unimpeded resort to 1983; 
because it does deflect 1983 petitions back inter-temporarily in any 
event-back into the State system. Therefore, to the extent that it is 
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structs the Attorney General to "promulgate minimum stand-
ards for the development and implementation of a plain, 
speedy, and effective system" of administrative remedies, 
and § 1997e(b)(2) specifies certain minimum standards that 
must be included. 11 A court may require exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies only if "the Attorney General has cer-
tified or the court has determined that such administrative 
remedies are in substantial compliance with the minimum ac-
ceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b)." 
§ 1997e(a)(2). Before exhaustion may be required, the court 
must further conclude that it "would be appropriate and in 
the interests of justice." § 1997e(a)(1). 12 Finally, in those 
§ 1983 actions meeting all the statutory requirements for ex-
should also extend to juveniles was rejected." 1979 Hearings 26. 
"Section 1997e(b)(2) states: 
The minimum standards shall provide-
(A) for an advisory role for employees and inmates of any jail, prison, or 
other correctional institution (at the most decentralized level as is reason-
ably possible), in the formulation, implementation, and operation of the 
system; 
(B) specific maximum time limits for written replies to grievances with 
reasons thereto at each decision level within the system; 
(C) for priority processing of grievances which are of an emergency na-
ture , including matters in which delay would subject the grievant to sub-
stantial risk of personal injury or other damages; 
(D) for safeguards to avoid reprisals against any grievant or participant 
in the resolution of a grievance; and 
(E) for independent review of the disposition of grievances, including al-
leged reprisals, by a person or other entity not under the direct supervision 
or direct control of the institution." 
12 The Committee Reports state that Congress did not intend that every 
§ 1983 action brought by an adult prisoner in institutions with appropriate 
grievance procedures be delayed pending exhaustion: 
"It is the intent of the Congress that the court not find such a requirement 
appropriate in those situations in which the action brought pursuant to 
[§ 1983] raises issues which cannot, in reasonable probability, be resolved 
by the grievance resolution system, including cases where imminent dan-
ger to life is alleged. Allegations unrelated to conditions of confinement, 
such as those which center on events outside of the institution, would not 
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haustion, the district court may not dismiss the case, but may 
only "continue such case for a period of not to exceed ninety 
days in order to require exhaustion." Ibid. This detailed 
scheme is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc 
basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases. 
Congress hoped that § 1997e would improve prison condi-
tions by stimulating the development of successful grievance 
mechanisms. See, e. g., Conf. Rep. 9; H.R. Rep. No. 96-80, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979); 1979 Hearings 4 (remarks of 
Rep. Railsback); 124 Cong. Rec. H3354 (May 1, 1978) (re-
marks of Rep. Railsback); 125 Cong. Rec. H3637 (May 23 
1979) (remarks of Rep. Drinan); 126 Cong. Rec. H3497 (May 
12, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). To further this 
purpose, Congress provided for the deferral of the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction over certain § 1983 claims only on the con-
dition that the state prisons develop adequate procedures. 
This purpose would be frustrated by judicial discretion to im-
pose exhaustion generally: the States would have no incen-
tive to adopt grievance procedures capable of certification, 
because prisoner § 1983 cases could be diverted to state ad-
ministrative remedies in any event. 
In sum, the exhaustion provisions of the Act make sense, 
and are not superfluous, only if exhaustion could not be re-
quired before its enactment and if Congress intended to 
carve out a narrow exception to this no-exhaustion rule. 
The legislative history to§ 1997e demonstrates that Congress 
has taken the approach of carving out specific exceptions to 
the general rule that federal courts cannot require exhaustion 
under § 1983. It is not our province to alter the balance 
struck by Congress in establishing the procedural framework 
for bringing actions under § 1983. 
appropriately be continued for resolution by the grievance resolution 
system." Conf. Rep. 15. 
See also H.R. Rep. No. 96-80, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1979); S. Rep. No. 
96-416, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1979). 
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G 
Respondent and the Court of Appeals argue that exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies should be required because it 
would further various policies. They argue that an exhaus-
tion requirement would lessen the perceived burden that 
§ 1983 actions impose on federal courts;13 would further the 
goal of comity and improve federal-state relations by post-
poning federal court review until after the state adminis-
trative agency had passed on the issue; 14 and would enable 
the agency, which presumably has expertise in the area at 
issue, to enlighten the federal court's ultimate decision. 
As we noted earlier, policy considerations alone cannot jus-
tify judicially imposed exhaustion unless exhaustion is con-
sistent with congressional intent. See 4-5 and n. 4, supra. 
Furthermore, as the debates over incorporating the exhaus-
tion requirement in § 1997e demonstrate, the relevant policy 
considerations do not invariably point in one direction, and 
there is vehement disagreement over the validity of the as-
sumptions underlying many of them. 15 The very difficulty of 
13 Of course, this burden alone is not sufficient to justify a judicial deci-
sion to alter congressionally imposed jurisdiction. See Thermtron Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Herrnansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336, 344 (1976); United Steelwork-
ers v. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 145, 150-151 (1965). In any event, it is by no 
means clear that judicial discretion to impose an exhaustion requirement in 
§ 1983 actions would lessen the caseload of the federal courts, at least in the 
short run. See 17-18 and n. 18, infra. 
14 The application of these federalism principles to actions brought pursu-
ant to§ 1983 has prompted criticism by several commentators. See, e. g., 
Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity: Two for the Federalism Seesaw, 25 
Loyola L. Rev. 659 (1979); Note, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 838 (1964). 
15 For example, there is serious disagreement over whether judicial or 
administrative procedures offer § 1983 plaintiffs the swiftest, least costly, 
and most reliable remedy. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 263--264; id. , at 
232-233; Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1207 (1968). Similarly, there is 
debate over whether the specialization of federal courts in constitutional 
law is more important than the specialization of administrative agencies in 
their areas of expertise, and over whether the symbolic and institutional 
".J.' .; 
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these policy considerations, and Congress' superior institu-
tional competence to pursue this debate, suggest that legisla-
tive not judicial solutions are preferable. Cf. Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 317 (1980); United Steelworkers 
v. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 146, 150, 153 (1965). 
Beyond the policy issues that must be resolved in deciding 
whether to require exhaustion, there are equally difficult 
questions concerning the design and scope of an exhaustion 
requirement. These questions include how to define those 
categories of § 1983 claims in which exhaustion might be de-
sirable; how to unify and centralize the standards for judging 
the kinds of administrative procedures that should be ex-
hausted;16 what tolling requirements and time limitations 
should be adopted; 17 what is the res judicata and collateral es-
function of federal courts in defining, legitimizing, and enforcing constitu-
tional claims outweighs the educational function that state and local agen-
cies can serve. See, e. g., Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L. 
Rev. 5, 23 (1980); Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1208 (1968). Finally, it is 
uncertain whether the present "free market" system, under which litigants 
are free to pursue administrative remedies if they truly appear to be 
cheaper, more efficient, and more effective, is more likely to induce the 
creation of adequate remedies than a McKart-type standard under which 
plaintiffs have no initial choice. See, e. g., Note, 8 Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975). 
Cf. 1977 Hearings 21, 34, 51; Hearings on S.1393 before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 442 (1977). 
16 Section 1997e resolved this problem by directing the Attorney General 
to promulgate minimum standards and to establish a procedure by which 
prison administrative remedies could be reviewed and certified. 
§ 1997e(b) & (c). If a procedure has not been certified, the court is di-
rected to compare the procedure with the Attorney General's standards 
and to continue the case pending exhaustion only if the procedure is in sub-
stantial compliance with the standards of the Attorney General. 
§ 1997e(a)(2). 
17 Unless the doctrine that statutes of limitations are not tolled pending 
exhaustion were overruled, see Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 
478 (1980), a judicially imposed exhaustion requirement might result in the 
effective repeal of§ 1983. Congress avoided this problem in§ 1997e by di-
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toppel effect of particular administrative determinations; 
what consequences should attach to the failure to comply 
with procedural requirements of administrative proceedings; 
and whether federal courts could grant necessary interim in-
junctive relief and hold the action pending exhaustion, or pro-
ceed to judgment without requiring exhaustion even though 
exhaustion might otherwise be required, where the relevant 
administrative agency is either powerless or not inclined to 
grant such interim relief. These and similar questions might 
be answered swiftly and surely by legislation, but would cre-
ate costly, remedy-delaying, and court-burdening litigation if 
answered incrementally by the judiciary in the context of di-
verse constitutional claims relating to thousands of different 
state agencies. 18 
The very variety of claims, claimants, and state agencies 
involved in § 1983 cases argues for congressional consider-
ation of the myriad of policy considerations, and may explain 
why Congress, in deciding whether to require exhaustion in 
certain § 1983 actions brought by adult prisoners, carved out 
such a narrow, detailed exception to the no-exhaustion rule. 
recting the court to merely continue the case for a period not to exceed 90 
days. 
18 The initial bill proposing to include an exhaustion requirement in 
§ 1997e provided: 
"Relief shall not be granted by a district court in an action brought pursu-
ant to [§ 1983] by an individual involuntarily confined in any State institu-
tion . . . , unless it appears that the individual has exhausted such plain, 
speedy, and efficient State administrative remedy as is available." H. R. 
5791, 95th Gong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
Congress declined to adopt this McKart-type standard after witnesses tes-
tified that this procedure would bog down the courts in massive procedural 
litigation thereby frustrating the purpose of relieving the caseloads of the 
federal courts, that state procedures are often not effective and take too 
much time, and that the court would have to judge a myriad of state proce-
dures without much guidance. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 34-35, 51, 
164-165, 169-170, 263-264, 323; 1979 Hearings 48-49. 
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After full debate and consideration of the various policy argu-
ments, Congress adopted § 1997, taking the largest class of 
§ 1983 actions and constructing an exhaustion requirement 
that differs substantially from the M cKart-type standard 
urged by respondents and adopted by the Court of Appeals. 
See note 18, supra. It is not for us to say whether Congress 
will or should create a similar scheme for other categories of 
§ 1983 claims or whether Congress will or should adopt an al-
together different exhaustion requirement for nonprisoner 
§ 1983 claims. 19 
19 The question was posed from the bench at oral argument whether the 
Eleventh Amendment might bar this suit on the ground that the Board of 
Regents is an arm of the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Cf. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978). Com-
pare Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911), with 
Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147 
(1981). The District Court dismissed this action on the pleadings, and no 
Eleventh Amendment issue had been raised. The Board of Regents first 
raised this issue in its brief to the original panel on appeal, but did not 
argue it in its brief on rehearing en bane. Neither the original panel nor 
the en bane court addressed this issue. Although the State mentioned a 
possible Eleventh Amendment defense in its response in opposition to the 
petition for certiorari, it did not brief the issue or press it at oral argument. 
Indeed, the assistant state attorney general urged that we affirm the 
Court of Appeals solely on its exhaustion holding. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24, 27. 
We have noted that "the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently par-
takes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar" that it may be raised by the 
State for the first time on appeal. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 
(1974). However, because of the importance of state law in analyzing 
Eleventh Amendment questions and because the State may, under certain 
circumstances, waive this defense, we have never held that it is jurisdic-
tional in the sense that it must be raised and decided by this Court on its 
own motion. Cf. Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 279 
(1977). Where, as here, the Board of Regents expressly requested that 
we address the exhaustion question and not pass on its potential Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, and, as a consequence, the 12!!-~ have not bri~fed 
t~, we deem it appropriate to address the issue that was raised and 
decided below and vigorously pressed in this Court. Nothing in this opin-
ion precludes the Board of Regents from raising its Eleventh Amendment 
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IV 
Based on the legislative histories of both § 1983 and 
§ 1997e, we conclude that exhaustion of state administrative 
remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing 
an action pursuant to § 1983. We decline to overturn our 
prior decisions holding that such exhaustion is not required. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and re-
manded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
claim on remand. The District Court is in the best position to address in 
the first instance the competing questions of fact and state law necessary to 
resolve the Eleventh Amendment issue, and at this stage it has the discre-
tion to permit amendments to the pleadings that might cure any potential 
Eleventh Amendment problems. 
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GENTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, ETC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June - , 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court holds that the Board of Regents of the State of 
Florida, a state instrumentality, is subject to suit in federal 
court notwithstanding the bar of the Eleventh Amendment. 
The Court reaches this conclusion through an unprece-
dented- and far reaching- expansion of the holding in Ex 
Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). As I consider the 
Court's holding a serious departure from established con-
stitutional doctrine, this dissent addresses primarily the 
Eleventh Amendment issue. 
I dissent also from the Court's rejection of the rule of "flex-
ible" exhaustion of state administrative remedies developed 
and stated persuasively by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, sitting en bane. In disagreeing \vith the 17 judges 
of the Court of Appeals who adopted the flexible exhaustion 
principle, this Court places mistaken reliance on the Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et '· . 
seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I disagree \Vith both portions of the 
Court's holding and therefore dissent. 
I The Eleventh Amendment 
A 
In this "reverse discrimination" action, petitioner, an em-
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under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the Board of Regents of the 
State of Florida. 1 She did not name the individual regents 
as defendants. She sued for $500,000 in damages, and for 
injunctive and other equitable relief.2. The Board filed a mo-
tion to dismiss arguing that petitioner's suit was premature 
in light of her failure to exhaust availabl~ &:lministrative rem-
edies. The District Court agreed and ~~hted the motion to 
dismiss. \ 
1 ~ 
On petitioner's appeal, the Board added the bar of the 
Eleventh Amendment to its defense. 3 It argued that as an 
instrumentality of the State, the Board could not be sub-
jected to suit in federal court absent a v;aiver of immunity.~ 
'As the Court notes, see ante, at - -, n. 1, petitioner originally named 
the Florida International University as defendant. Because the Florida 
International University lacks the capacity to sue or be sued, the District 
Court found that it was not a proper defendant. Petitioner was permitted 
to amend her complaint, and she simply substituted the Board of Regents. 
In addition to racial discrimination, petitioner also claimed that she had 
been discriminated against on the basis of her sex. 
2 Petitioner sought a declaratory judgment "declaring that the Plaintiff 
has suffered from acts of discrimination." In addition, she asked the court 
to "[r]equire Defendants to remedy the discrimination practiced upon 
Plaintiff by promoting her to the next available position consistent with 
. those previously applied for and for which she is qualified or in the alterna-
tive, to require the Defendants to pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 
as actual and exemplary damages." She requested such further equitable 
and injunctive relief as the court deems appropriate. App. 38--40. 
3 The Eleventh Amendment provides: 
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State." 
The Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in miture, and the defense of 
the Amendment may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Edelman 
v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 (1974) ("Eleventh Amendment defense 
sufficienty partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not 
be raised in the trial court.") 
• "As a corporate state agency and component of state government, the 
[Board] operates ,,·ith state funds, directs the [State UniYersity System], 
~----------· --
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And it asserted that there had teen no waiver. Although 
the Board of Regents was created · as a body corporate with 
power "to sue and be sued ... to plead and be impleaded in 
all courts of law and equity," Fla. Stat. §240.042(1), it is 
well established that language such as tl:lis does not operate 
to waive the defense of the Eleventh )Amendment. 5 In 
t ~ \ 
'·~~-and is local neither in character nor operation. As"the 'arm of the state' 
\Vhich manages the Division of Universities of the Depa1tment of Educa-
tion, it is clearly part of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes." 
Brief at 18. 
The Board of Regents of the Division of Universities of the Department 
of Education is established by the Florida Education Code as a part of the 
State University System. Fla. Stat. 240.2011. The Board consists of the 
Commissioner of Education and twelve citizens appointed by the Governor, 
approved by three members of the Cabinet, and confirmed by the Senate. 
Fla. Stat. 240.207. The chief administrative officer of the Board is the 
Chancellor, who serves by appointment of the Board. 
The Board has general supervisory authority over the State University 
System. Fla. Stat. 240.209. Among its duties are the appointment of 
university presidents, the review of budget requests of each university in 
the state system, the preparation of an aggregated budget for the State 
University System, the development of a master plan, and the establish-
ment of a systemwide personnel classification and pay plan. Fla. Stat. 
§ 240.209. 
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida. Fla. Stat. § 216.011. 
See Relyea v. State, 385 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. App. 1980). The Board may 
claim the defense of sovereign immunity in suits under state law. See id. 
Numerous courts of appeals have held state universities or state Boards 
of Regents immune from suit in federal court by reason of the Eleventh 
Amendment. See, e. g., Rutledge v. Arizona Boa,rd of Regents, 660 F. 2d 
1345, 1349 (CA9 1981); Brennan v. University of Kansa,s, 451 F. 2d 1287 
(CA10 1971); Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F. 2d 1071 (CA9 1981). 
"See Fl01·ida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Hom~. 450 U. S. 147, 
150 (1981); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri BJ-idge Commn, 359 U. S. 275, 
276-277 (1959) ("The conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity 
will not be lightly inferred. . . And where a public instrumentality is cre-
ated with the right 'to sue and be sued' that waiver of immunity in the par-
ticular setting may be restJicted to suits or proceedings of a special charac-
ter in the state, not the federal courts"); Great Northern Insurance Co. v. '·. 
Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54. See Bmgg Y. Bom·d of Public Instntction, 36 So. 
/ 
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reply, petitioner argued that whether the statute creating 
the Board amounted to a waive;- and petitioner believed 
that it did-the Eleventh Amendment simply was irrelevant 
to the equitable claims she had lodged against the State. 
See Reply Brief at 3-4. 
Neither the Court of Appeals panel nor the Court of Ap-
< peals en bane addressed the Board's E}~venth Amendment 
defense. They directed their attention ~l~ly to the question 
of exhaustion of administrative remedies."· The panel held 
that there was no exhaustion requirement in § 1983 suits and 
remanded to the District Court for consideration of the 
Board's Eleventh Amendment argument. 612 F. 2d 946 
(CA5 1980). The Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, reversed 
holding that § 1983 plaintiffs must exhaust available and rea-
sonable administrative remedies. 634 F. 2d 900 (CA5 1981). 
Again the court did not consider the Board's Eleventh 
Amendment defense. 
The Eleventh Amendment question ,,·as fu·st raised before 
this Com;t in the Board's response to the petition for \Vrit of 
certiorari. The Board argued, as it had on appeal, that it 
was an arm of the State and that it had not waived its immu-
nity from suit in federal court. Again petitioner argued that 
at most the Eleventh Amendment defense would bar her 
claim for damages. And, even as to this claim, petitioner 
now argued that the Amendment would not bar damages if 
the Board could meet the claim out of its "own funds"-e. g., 
from gifts and bequests-rather than from the State Treas-
ury. These arguments were repeated at oral argument. 6 
As the Court acknowledges, the Eleventh Amendment 
question is jurisdictional and must be confronted at the out-
set. See ante, at--. 
2d 222 (Fla. 1948) ("The mere fact that the Board of Public Instruction is 
created as a body corporate with power to sue and be sued does not affect 
its immunity from tort"). 
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In interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has 
sought to accommodate both the principle of sovereign immu-
nity embodied in the Amendment and the states' duty to 
obey-and the federal courts to enforc~~federallaw . Thus, 
it is well established that the State is no{ "divested of its im-
munity 'on the mere ground that the cak1is one arising under 
the Constitution or laws of the United St~tes."' Parden v. 
Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184, 186 (1964), quoting, Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 10 (1890).' It also is settled that 
when a State itself is not named as a party to the suit, the 
Amendment nevertheless applies if the State is the real party 
in interest. See Ford Motor Co. v. Departnwnt of Treasury, 
323 U. S. 459 (1945). 8 
On the other hand, the Court has not interpreted the 
Amendment to bar federal court jurisdiction when the State 
has consented to suit, 9 or to bar review by this Court of an 
7 In Hans the Court also held that the Amendment bars suits brought 
against an unconsenting State by its own citizens, although by its terms the 
Amendment does not apply to this situation. Cf. Monaco v. Mississippi, 
292 U. S. 313 (1934) (Ele\'enth Amendment applies to federal suits against 
an unconsenting state by a foreign nation). By contrast, the Amendment 
has not been applied to suits against a State brought by another State or by 
the United States. Nm'lh Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365 (1923); 
United States v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128 (1965). 
8 In Ford Motor the plaintiff sued the Department of Treasury of the 
State of Indiana, and the three officials- the Governor, Treasurer, and Au-
ditor- who constituted the Board of the Department of Treasury. The 
plaintiff sought a refund of gross income taxes paid to the department. 
Suit was brought in federal District Court. The Court held that the suit 
was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The plaintiff was seeking a re-
fund from the state not a personal judgn1ent against the individual officials: 
"[W]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the 
state, the state is the real party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sov-
ereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal de-
fendants." 323 U. S., at 464. See Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 663; 
Great Northern Life Insumnce Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944). '· 
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action brought against the State in slate court. 1° Congress 
may lift the bar of the Amendment ~'hen exercising powers 
granted to it by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). Counties and 
municipalities may not claim immunity under the Amend-
ment. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U, S. 529 (1890); 
Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U~ l 274, 279:-281 
(1977) And under Ex parte Young, 209 U~ S. 123 (1908), a 
federal court may order state officials to ob~Y:·federal law in 
the future. 11 
Application of these settled principles to the present case is 
straightforward. This is an action under § 1983, and Con-
gress has not removed the bar of the Eleventh Amendment 
R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964). 
10 See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 445 (1900); Great Northern Life 
Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 57 (1944); Chandler v. Di.x, 194 U. S. 590, 
592 (1904). The Court's assumption of jwisdiction in University of Cali-
fomia Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), a case originating 
in state court, thus provides no support for today's decision. For the same 
reason, the Court's reliance upon Hopkins \'. Clemson AgricultU?·al Col-
lege, 221 U. S. 636 (1911), is misplaced. See infm. 
11 Under the theory, some would say fiction, of Ex parte Young, the 
Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state officers because 
when a state officer "comes into conflict with the superior authority of [the] 
Constitution, ... he is ... stripped of his official or representative charac-
ter." I d., at 159. On this analysis, a prospective injunction requiring the 
official to conform his future behavior to federal Jaw, does not require any-
thing of the State and therefore does not b1ing the Eleventh Amendment 
to bear. The granting of retroactive relief, on the other hand, would re-
quire the official to take action in his offical capacity. Thus, if the official is 
required to pay damages from state funds, the State is directly affected. 
See Edelman v. Jordan, supm. Similarly, retroactive injunctive relief 
may require the official to take action in his official capacity and also would 
be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Cf. Larson ' ' · Domestic & For-
eign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). Ofcom·se, in addition to pro-
spective injunctive relief, a plaintiff may seek damages from the individual 
officer in his personal capacity. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 
237- 238 (1974). 
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\' 
in such actions. See Quern v. ~ordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979). 
Petitioner seeks relief from the Board of Regents of the State 
of Florida, an instrumentality or agency of the State. The 
Board is not a local political body but bears responsibility for 
the State university system as a whole.. Cf. Mt. Healthy Bd. 
of Ed. v. Doyle, supm. Petitioner's ar~ment that the stat-
ute incorporating the Board should be :ubderstood to waive ' , ~ 
the Eleventh Amendment is foreclose<\ "FJY numerous deci-
sions of this Court. See, e. g., Florida 'Dept of Health v. 
Florida Nursing Honu Assn, 450 U. S. 147 (1981). 12 Simi-
larly, petitioner's suggestion that the Eleventh Amendment 
does not apply to equitable claims against a state is incorrect. 
See Cory v. White, - - U.S. -- (1982). 
Thus, unless the rule in Ex parte Young, supra, is ex-
tended beyond any previous decision of this Court, the Elev-
enth Amendment bars this suit. The theory in Ex pane 
Young, supra, has no application to the State itself or to an 
instrumentality of the State. If petitioner had sued the indi-
vidual members of the Board, her claim for damages against 
them would not have been barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Nor would her claim for equitable relief have been 
barred to the extent it were limited to future conduct. But 
petitioner did not sue the members of the Board. She sued 
only the Board itself, an arm of the State of Florida. More-
over, the }\J-iJ:aeiple relief sought by petitioner would impose-
12 In Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 
147 (1981), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the Florida 
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services had consented to suit. 
The court based its finding of waiver, in part, on the fact that the Depart-
ment was a "body corporate" with the capacity to "sue and be sued" under 
state law. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 402.34. This Court reversed holding that a 
general waiver of sovereign immunity does not amount to a waiver of the 
Eleventh Amendment. See id., at 150. See note 5, supra. 
Without distinguishing Florida Dept of Health, supm, the Court leaves 
open the question of whether the Board has consented to suit. See ante, 
at 9 & n. 10. 
., 
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in the alternative--an affirmative du~y on the Board to pro-
mote her to the next available posftion of comparable status 
to those to which she had applied1 ·or would "require the 
[Board] to pay to [petitioner] the sum of $500,000 as actual 
and exemplary damages." App., 39. See n. 3, ante. 
One would have thought that Ex parte Young was simply 
irrelevant in these circumstances. Althbugh an individual 
official may be viewed as acting on his owri:,ahd v.rithout State 
authority when acting against federal lawJ the State- or an 
agency of the State- cannot act other than in its official State 
capacity. Similarly, an action for damages against the state, 
or an arm of the state, seeks damages that must be paid from 
the state1s own coffers. Whether the damages come directly 
from the State's general fund or from some other State fund, 
the money is no less the State's. Indeed, direct application 
of Ex parte Young to the State and its instrumentalities 
\\'ould read the Eleventh Amendment out of the Constitution. 
If the bar of the Amendment is lifted merely upon the naming 
of a State board, commission, agency or corporation- open-
ing the way to damages as well as to injunctive relief- then 
the Amendment no longer would afford constitutionally pre-
. scribed protection to the states. 
c 
Despite the weight of these considerations, the Court con-
cludes that this action is not barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Indeed, the Court undertakes to apply Ex parte 
Young to the Board of Regents itself. Relying upon the de-
cision in Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 
636 (1911), the Court reasons that the Board of Regents, as a 
body corporate, is no different from a state official. The 
Court attempts to bolster this novel conclusion by observing 
that under Florida law the Board of Regents is termed the 
"director" of the Division of Universities. The Court con-
cludes that, just as in Ex pa1ie Young, the Board of Regents 
"may be sued for unconstitutional or unauthorized actions, as ... . 
---------
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... 
long as the plaintiff is not seeking monetary relief that must 
be paid out of the state treasury." hnte, at 8. 
The Court's conclusion is supported neither by reason nor 
precedents of this Court. As indicated above, the rationale 
of Ex parte Young does not apply to a Stci.te or State instill-
mentality. The State cannot be "stripped" ofjts o~ author-
ity. Moreover, if the Board of Regents is a: &tate agency-
and it clearly is- then its assets are also those' bf the State's. 
Yet the Court's decision exposes the Board's ~s~ets to a dam-
age award on the double fiction that the Boai·d is really an 
"official" and that its separate assets somehow belong to this 
fictitious being rather than to the State. On such a theory, a 
state welfare board, highway department or any other 
agency, board or department of a state with any separate 
funds or income could be sued for damages. Such a conclu-
sion is at odds with the Court's holding in Kennecott Copper 
Corp. v. Tax Conmm, 327 U. S. 573 (1946), that the segre-
gated funds of the State Tax Commission were State monies 
subject to ·the Eleventh Amendment. 
Nor does the Board of Regents' corporate status under 
state law support the Court's holding. State governments 
consist in major part of a variety of boards, commissions, 
agencies, and corporations. These State entities are no less 
instruments of the State because they may be vested under 
state law with the power to contract, to sue and be sued. 
This Court repeatedly has held the Eleventh Amendment to 
bar suit against such state corporate agencies. See Great 
·Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47; Ford Motor 
Co. v. Depart?nent of Treasury, 323 U. S. 454 (1945); 
Kennecott Coppper Corp. v. State Tax Commn, 327 U. S. 
572 (1946). 
Thus, in Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 
(1964), the Court assumed that a state owned railroad- as an 
instrumentality of the State- was immune from suit in fed-
eral court absent a waiver. The railway in Parden was au-
thorized to operate "as though it were an ordinary common .... · 
t r -., 
l 
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carrier." 377 U. S. 185. It perfo'rmed services for profit 
and had contracts and agreemenfi> with various labor orga-
nizations. It was "indisputably a common carrier ... engag-
ing in interstate commerce." /d.: at 185. No suggestion 
was made that as a State body, with separate funds, the rail-
road was no longer an instrumentality of_the State but was 
merely a State official. And just last te~m the Court held .. . '
that the Fl01ida Department of Health, ·a !'body corporate" 
under State law was immune from suit.\ '':Florida Dept of 
Health v. Florida Nursing Horne Assn, 450 U. S. 147 (1981). 
Cf. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) ("There can be no 
doubt ... that suit against the State and its Board of Correc-
tions is barred by the Eleventh Amendment"). The Court's 
' conclusion that corporate status converts a State body into a 
State official, subject to suit, cannot be reconciled with these 
well established precedents. 
D 
I am unav,•are of any prior decision of this Court that sup-
ports the Court's application of Ex parte Young to State in-
strumentalities. Hopkins v. Clemson College, supm, relied 
upon so heavily by the Court, is simply irrelevant. In that 
case suit was brought against a state college in state court to 
recover damages caused by the college's construction of a 
dyke. The state courts held that the college was protected 
from suit by the state law of sovereign immunity. Although 
the Court discussed the Eleventh Amendment in some detail, 
there was simply no Eleventh Amendment question in that 
case. 13 It was clear before Hopkins that the Eleventh 
"The state college recognized that there was no Eleventh Amendment 
question. In its brief it noted : "It is difficult to see how either Section 2 of 
Article III, of the Constitution of the United States or the Eleventh 
amendment has any application to the inquiry whether a suit by a citizen of 
a State in its own Courts is a suit against that State. That seems to be 
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Amendment did not apply to bar revie~ in this Court of any 
federal question presented in a suit against a State in state 
court. See note 10, supra. However th~ holding in Hopkins 
may be viewed, no Eleventh Amendment question was pre-
sented to the Court. 14 It therefore is no surprise that the 
opinion has never been cited by this Court for the proposition 
that the Eleventh Amendment is no bar to~suit against a 
state agency in federal court. If the case co).Ifg be viewed as 
standing for the proposition that state agenc1e~. may be sued 
as if they were state officials, the case long s1nce has been 
overruled sub silento by subsequent decisions. See Florida 
Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, supra. 
Hopkins does not deserve the pride of place given to it by the 
majority. 15 It is in fact a non-precedent. 
The Court today simply announces a new doctrine, one 
that exposes the instrumentalities of the State itself to suit in 
federal court. 16 After today's decision, state boards and 
"Hopkins has been viewed primarily as standing for a principle of 
agency law. See La1·son v. Domestic & F01·eign Corp ., 337 U. S. 682, 
694 (1949) ("agent's liabiity for torts committed by him cannot be aYoided 
by pleading the direction or authorization of his principal"); Hamilton Mfg. 
Co. v. Trustees of State Colleges in Colorado, 356 F. 2d 599, 601 n. 1 (CAlO 
1966). 
,. The irrelevance of Hopkins is further indicated by the fact that the Col-
lege's activities in that case were viewed as prop1ietary in nature: 
"(T]his is not an action against the College for a tort committed in the pros-
ecution of any governmental function. The fee was in the State, but the 
corporation, as equitable owner, was in possession, use and enjoyment of 
the property. For protecting the bottom land the College, for its own cor-
porate purposes and advantage, constructed the dyke. In so doing it was 
not acting in any governmental capacity. The embankment was in law 
similar to one which might have been built for private purposes by the 
plaintiff on the other side of the river. 221 U. S., at 647._ 
Cf. Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 
279 (1973) (distinguishing Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 
(1964), on the basis that Parden concerned State proprietary activity). 
16 The Court suggests that in prior decisions the Court has permitted suit 
against State Boards of Regents. See ante, at 5. Yet in none of these .... 
·~----- ---------...., 
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commissions may be sued for injunctive relief. The Court 
also holds that such bodies may b~ sued for damages on the 
fiction that their segregated assets are not the State's. 17 The 
Court's extension of Ex parte Young to the State itself de-
stroys the rationale of that decision. It also undermines the 
careful balance worked out in this sensitive area of the law. . "' :- ji 
suits was the jurisdictional issue posed as it is her\:,·A. Thus, for example, in . .. 
University of Californi.a Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 26S (1978), 
the Eleventh Amendment issue was not present because the case was here 
on petition to the California Supreme Court. See note S, supra. And in 
each of the other cases cited by the Court, the plaintiff had the good sense 
to name other defendants in addition to the particular state board. See, e. 
g., Board of Regents v. Tom..anio, 446 U. S. 478 (1978); McLaurin v. Okl.a-
hom.a St.ate Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (19SO). 
The Court also argues that the courts of appeals are split on the question 
of whether damages can be awarded against state uniYersities. Yet the 
two cases cited by the Court to demonstrate a split on this question do not 
support the Court's assertion. In SONI v. Board of Tru.stees, S13 F. 2d 
347 (CA6 197S) the court found that the Board of Trustees had waived its 
immunity to suit, while in Goss v. Jacinto Junior College, S88 F. 2d 96, 
98-99 (CAS 1979) the court reasoned that the particular junior college was 
similar to a county or municipality, an "independent 'political subdivision' 
as a matter of Texas statutory and common law." The Court suggests as 
well that the courts of appeals are agreed that injunctive relief may be 
awarded against state universities and state boards of regents. Again the 
cases cited provide little support for the Court's assertion. In New Eng-
l.and Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colorado, S92 F. 2d 
1196, 1201 (CA11979), the court held that individual members of the Board 
of Regents might be sued for prospective injunctive relief. It did not hold, 
as the Court implies, that the University itself might be sued. Rather, it 
accepted "the University's identification \\1th the state." And in Gay Stu-
dent Services v. Texas A & M University, 612 F. 2d 160, 16S (CAS 1980), it 
is unclear that the court held more than that officials of the University 
could be sued for injunctive relief. Unlike the situation in those two cases, 
petitioner sued only the Board of Regents. Numerous courts of appeals 
have held state board of regents to be immune from suit in federal court by 
reason of the Eleventh Amendment. See n. 4, supra. 
"Whether a State board, like a State official, may claim good faith immu-
nity is not clear but of substantial significance. See Owen v. City of Jnde- ... . 
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The decision is simply wrong. The Court should dismiss 
the suit on the basis of the Eleventb Amendment. 
II Exhaustion of Remedies 
In view of my belief that this case should be dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds, I address the exh?,.ustion question 
only briefly. Seventeen judges joined in': the Court of Ap-' .. 
peal's persuasive opinion adopting a rule of(S.exible" exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies in § 1983 .. suits. Other 
Courts of Appeals have adopted a similar rule. See e. g., 
Ei.sen v. Eastrnan, 421 F. 2d 560 (CA2 1969); Secret v. 
Brierton,_ 584 F. 2d 823 (CA 7 1978). The opinjon for the en 
bane court carefully reviewed the exhaustion doctrine in gen-
eral and as applied to § 1983 actions. It found that the prior 
decisions of this Court did not clearly decide the question. 18 
See Barry v. Bm·chi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v. 
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 575 n. 14 (1973). And it concluded 
that the exhaustion of adequate and appropriate state admin-
istrative r emedies would promote the achievement of the 
rights protected by § 1983. · 
I agree with the Court of Appeals' opinion. The require-
ment that a § 1983 plaintiff exhaust adequate state adminis-
trative remedies was the accepted rule of law until quite re-
cently. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 
210, (1908) (opinion of Justice Holmes). The rule rests on 
sound considerations. It does not defeat federal court juris-
diction, it merely defers it. 19 It permits the states to correct 
•• "[I)n all the cases in which the Supreme Court has articulated its no-
exhausbon rule, the state administr~ve r emedies were sufficiently inade-
quate that exhaustion would not have been appropriate in any event." 
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 
1133, 1274 (1977). 
'"Cf. Fair Assess m-ent in Real Estate v. McNary, -- U.S. - -, -
(1982) (BREt..TNAN, J., concuning) (exhaustion requirement in§ 1983 cases 
can be justified by "a somewhat lesser showing ... where ... we are con-
cerned not \\ith the di splacement of the § 1983 remedy, but with the defer-'"". · 
... ,... - -- -~ -l -.~---=:-.:..-7 -:-- --:..::=.::...:-::--:. · . ---,:w::,-·::::.:::::::- r·~ --=---- . 
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violations through their own procedures, and it encourages 
the establishment of such procedures. It is consistent with 
the principles of comity that apply whenever federal courts 
are asked to review state action or supersede state proceed-
ings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S .. 37 (1971). 
Moreover, and highly relevant to th~·· clfective functioning . ' of the overburdened federal court systerp~ ;the rule conserves 
and supplements scarce judicial resource1Jl In 1961, the year 
that Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (196l),' was decided, only 
270 civil rights actions were begun in th~deral district 
courts. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative 
Office c,>f the U. S. Courts 238 (1961). In 1981, over 30,000 
such suits were commenced. 2ll Annual Report of the Direc-
tor of)fhe Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts 63, 68 
(1981). Such a dramatic increase in litigation imposes a 
heavy burden on the federal courts to the detriment of all fed-
eral court litigants, including those whose constitutional 
rights in fact have been infringed. 
The Court argues that past decisions of the Court categori-
cally hold that there is no exhaustion requirement in § 1983 
suits. But as the Court of Apeals demonstrates, and as the 
Court recognizes, many of these decisions can be explained as 
applications of traditional exceptions to the exhaustion re-
quirement. See McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 
668 (1963). Other decisions speak to the question in an off-
hand and conclusory fashion. See Dant-ico v. California, 389 
U. S. 416 (1967) (unargued per curiam). Moreover, a cate-
gorical no-exhaustion rule would seem inconsistent with the 
decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), prescrib-
raJ of federal court consideration pending exhaustion of the state adminis-
trative process"). 
"'Of the approximately 30,000 civil rights (iili$filed in fiscal year 1981, 
15,639 were filed by state prisoners under§ 1983. The remainder involved 
a variety of civil rights suits. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 554 n.~ 
13 (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring). 
- --·--- - -: ----_, -:.._ 
80-1874-DISSENT 
PATSY v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS 15 
. . r 
ing abstention when state criminal proceedings are pending. 
At least where administrative ""proceedings are pending, 
Younger would seem to suggest the approp1'1ateness of ex-
haustion. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574--575 
(1973). Yet the Court today adopts . P flat rule without 
exception. t' · -
The Court seeks to support its no exh?ii?tion rule with in-
dications of congressional intent. Findi~~; nothing/on point 
in the history of the Civil Rights Act itself, the Court places 
primary reliance on the recent Civil Rights of Institutional-
ized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. 
IV). This legislation was designed to authorize the Attorney 
General to begin civil rights actions on behalf of institutional-
ized persons. § 1997a. The Act also placed certain limits on 
the existing authority ofthe Attorney General to intervene in 
suits begun by institutionalized persons. See § 1997c. In 
addition, in § 1997e, the Act sets fmth an exhaustion require-
ment for § 1983 claims brought by adult prisoners. 
On the basis of the exhaustion provision in § 1997e, andre-
marks prima1ily by Representative Kastenmeier, the Court 
contends that Congress has endorsed a general no exhaustion 
rule. The irony in this reasoning should be obvious. The 
concern that prompted the Department of Justice to support, 
and the Congress to adopt, § 1997e was the vast increase in 
§ 1983 suits brought by state prisoners in federal courts. 
There has been a year-by-year increase in these suits since 
the mid-1960's. The increase in fiscal 1981 over fiscal 1980 
was some 26%, resulting in a total of 15,639 such suits filed in 
1981 as compared \vith 12,397 in 1980. The 1981 total consti-
tuted over 11% of the total federal district court docket. 
Although most of these cases present frivolous claims, many 
are litigated through the courts of appeals to this Court. 
The burden on the system fairly can be described as enor-
mous with few, if any, benefits that would not be available in 
me1'1to1'1ous cases if exhaustion of appropdate state adminis~-"' 
trative remedies were required p1'1or to any federal court liti-
!--
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gation. It was primarily this problem that prompted enact-
' ment of§ 1997e. :: 
Moreover, it is clear from the legislative history that Con-
gress simply was not addressing the exhaustion problem in 
any general fashion. The concern focused on the problem of 
prisoner petitions. The new Act had a ·R,ual purpose in this 
respect. In addition to requiring pridr~exhaustion of ade-
quate state remedies, Congress v.'ished.'fP~.authorize the At-
torney General to act when necessary to protect the constitu-
tional rights of prisoners, but at the same time minimize the 
need for federal action of any kind by requiring prior exhaus-
tion. Both sponsors of the Act in the Senate made this clear. 
Senator Hatch explained § 1997e as foJlows: 
"In actions relating to alleged violations of the constitu-
tional rights of prisoners, such persons may be required 
to exhaust internal grievance procedures before the At-
torn.ey General can become involved pursuant to [the 
Act]." Congressional Record S1713, Feb1·uary 26, 
1980.21 
Senator Bayh, the author of the Act, decribed the exhaustion 
provision in similar terms: 
"[l]n the event of a prison inmate's rights being al1eged 
to be violated ... then before the Justice Department 
could intervene or initiate suits, the prison inmate or 
"Senator Hatch offered the same explanation on several other occasions 
in the course of the debate. See Congressional Record S4293, April 29, 
1980 ("Section 7 would establish specific procedures that would be appli-
cable before the Attorney General could enter into an action in behalf of an 
impri soned or incarcerated person. Such person would first have had to 
fully exh~ all internal grievance mechanisms that existed in the institu-
tion in which he was confined"); Congressonal Record S4626, May 6, 1980 
("Section 7(D) further clarifies that the administrative grie\·ance proce-
dures established in section 7 are only for the purposes of requiring prison-
ers to exhaust internal grievance mechanisms before the Attorney General , 
can litigate on his behalf'). ... . 
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class of inmates would have to pursue all of their , 
adiminstrative remedies within the State law before the 
Justice Department could intervene under the provisions 




In short, in enacting the Civil RightS:,,of Institutionalized . . 1 
Act Congress was focussing on the poy.'~rs of the Attorney 
General, and the particular question ofi.Pnsoners' suits, not 
on the general question of exhaustion in·§ l983 actions. Also 
revealing as to the limited purpose of § 1997e is Congress' 
consistent refusal to adopt legislation imposing a general no-
exhaustion requirement. Thus, for example, in 1979, a bill 
was introduced into the Senate providing: 
"No court of the United States shall stay or dismiss any 
civil action brought under this Act on the ground that 
the party bringing such action failed to exhaust the rem-
edies available in the courts or the administrati\'e agen-
cies of any State." 8.1983, 96th Congress, 1st Session. 
The bill was never reported out of committee. . 
The requirement that plaintiffs exhaust available and ade-
quate administrative remedies-subject to well developed 
exceptions- is firmly established in virtually every area of 
the law. This is dictated in § 1983 actions by common sense, 
as well as by comity and federalism, where adequate state 
administrative remedies are available. 
If the exhaustion question were properly before us, I 
would affirm the Court of Appeals. 
.· 
Su£ste d, ~'!J RE w; ,17~ fl 
Pa 1 e s !; -_ r 3 a ,.. t. n e UJ 
I -tf >If"-/} 










From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: _ JU_ N_S __ 19_8_2 __ _ 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1874 
GEORGIA PATSY, PETITIONER v. BOARD OF 
REGENTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, ETC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court holds that the limitations on federal judicial 
power embodied in the Eleventh Amendment and in the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity are not jurisdictional. 1 con-
sider this holding to be a serious departure from established 
constitutional doctrine. 
I dissent also from the Court's rejection of the rule of "flex-
ible" exhaustion of state administrative remedies developed 
and stated persuasively by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, sitting en bane. In disagreeing with the 17 judges 
of the Court of Appeals who adopted the flexible exhaustion 
principle, this Court places mistaken reliance on the Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et 
seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I disagree with both portions of the 
Court's holding and therefore dissent. 
I. The Eleventh Amendment~ 
A 
In this "reverse discrimination" action, petitioner, an em-
' The Eleventh Amendment provides: 
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State. " 
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ployee of the Florida International University, brought suit 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the Board of Regents of the 
State of Florida. 2 She did not name the individual regents 
as defendants. She sued for $500,000 in damages, and for 
injunctive and other equitable relief. See ante, at --, n. 2. 
The Board filed a motion to dismiss arguing that petitioner's 
suit was premature in light of her failure to exhaust available 
.administrative remedies. The District Court agreed and 
granted the motion to dismiss. 
On petitioner's appeal, the Board added the bar of the 
Eleventh Amendment to its defense. 3 It argued that as an 
2 As the Court notes, see ante, at--. n. 1, petitioner originally named 
the Florida International University as defendant. Because the Florida 
International University lacks the capacity to sue or be sued, the District 
Court found that it was not a proper defendant. Petitioner was permitted 
to amend her complaint, and she simply substituted the Board of Regents. 
In addition to racial discrimination. petitioner also claimed that she had 
been discriminated against on the basis of her sex. 
' The Court repeatedly has held that the defense of the Eleventh 
Amendment may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651. 678 (1974) ("Eleventh Amendment defense suffi-
ciently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be 
raised in the trial court"). 
The Board's brief on appeal was divided into three parts. Part III was 
devoted to the argument that "the Eleventh Amendment precludes subject 
matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs complaint." /d., at 17. A lengthy stat-
utory addendum was attached in support of the arguments advanced in this 
section of the brief. After the case was scheduled for rehearing en bane. 
the parties filed short-e. g. four and ten page-supplemental briefs to be 
considered in addition to the main briefs already submitted to the Court of 
A peals. The supplemental briefs did not add to the discussion of the Elev-
enth Amendment issue. But the question was placed before the Court of 
Appeals en bane, as it had been placed before the panel, through the thor-
ough discussion in the main briefs. 
This Court's explanation for not addressing the Eleventh Amendment 
issue is that it was not considered below. Seen. 19, ante. But contrary 
to the implication in the Court's explanation, the issue-as shown here-
was urged by the Board and argued here. 
' ' 
t 
t<· .. ··,f 
.• ,.. ~~ 
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instrumentality of the State, the Board could not be sub-
jected to suit in federal court absent a waiver of immunity.~ 
And it asserted that there had been no waiver. Although 
the Board of Regents was created as a body corporate with 
power "to sue and be sued ... to plead and be impleaded in 
all courts of law and equity," Fla. Stat. § 240.042(1), it is well 
established that language such as this does not operate to 
waive the defense of the Eleventh Amendment. 5 In reply, 
' The Board of Regents of the Division of Universities of the Depart-
ment of Education is established by the Florida Education Code as a part 
of the State University System. Fla. Stat. § 240.2011. The Board con-
sists of the Commissioner of Education and twelve citizens appointed by 
the Governor. Fla. Stat. § 240.207. The Board has general supen;sory 
authority over the State University System. Fla. Stat. § 240.209. 
Among its duties are the appointment of university presidents, the review 
of budget requests of each university in the state system. the preparation 
of an aggregated budget for the State University System, the development 
of a master plan, and the establishment of a systemwide personnel classifi-
cation and pay plan. Fla. Stat. § 240.209. 
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida. Fla. Stat. § 216.011 . 
See Relyea v. State , 385 So. 2d 1378 <Fla. App. 1980). It may claim the 
defense of sovereign immunity in suits under state Jaw. See ibid. 
Numerous courts of appeals have held state universities or state Boards 
of Regents immune from suit in federal court by reason of the Eleventh 
Amendment. See, e. g. , Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents , 660 F. 2d 
1345, 1349 (CA9 1981); Brennan v. University of Ka11 ·s. 451 F. 2d 1287 
(CAlO 1971); Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F. 2d 1071 (CA9 1981). 
•See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home, 450 U.S. 147, 
150 (1981); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commn, 359 U. S. 275, 
276-277 (1959) ("The conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity 
will not be lightly inferred ... And where a public instrumentality is cre-
ated with the right 'to sue and be sued' that waiver of immunity in the par-
ticular setting may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special charac-
ter in the state, not the federal courts"); Kennecott Cooper Corp . v. Sta te 
Tax Commn, 327 U. S. 573 (1946) (language in state statute providing for 
suit in "any court of competent jurisdiction" will not be understood as a 
waiver of the Eleventh Amendment); Jagnandan v. Giles , 538 F . 2d 1166, 
1177 (CA5 1976). Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 , 673 (1974) ("In 
deciding whether a state has waived its constitutional protection under the 
' 80-1874-DISSENT 
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petitioner argued that whether the statute creating the 
Board amounted to a waiver-and petitioner believed that it 
did-the Eleventh Amendment simply was irrelevant to the 
equitable claims she had lodged against the State. See 
Reply Brief at 3-4. 
Neither the Court of Appeals panel nor the Court of Ap-
peals en bane addressed the Board's Eleventh Amendment 
defense. They directed their attention solely to the question 
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The panel held 
that there was no exhaustion requirement in § 1983 suits and 
remanded to the District Court for consideration of the 
Board's Eleventh Amendment argument. 612 F. 2d 946 
(CA51980). The Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, reversed 
holding that § 1983 plaintiffs must exhaust available and rea-
sonable administrative remedies. 634 F. 2d 900 (CA5 1981). 
Again the court did not consider the Board's Eleventh 
Amendment defense. 
The Eleventh Amendment question was raised before this 
Court, at the first opportunity after the Court of Appeals' de-
cision, in the Board's response to the petition for writ of cer-
tiorari. The Board argued, as it had on appeal, that it was 
Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver only where stated 'by the most 
express language or b:v such overwhelming implications from the text as 
[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction."') . 
At oral argument here the Assistant Attorney General of Florida stated 
that the Florida legislature had not waived the Eleventh Amendment and 
had waived the defense of sovereign immunity "only in selected tort cases." 
Tr. at 26. See Bragg v. Board of Public Instruction , 36 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 
1948) ("The mere fact that the Board of Public Instruction is created as a 
body corporate with power to sue and be sued does not affect its immunity 
from tort"); Relyea v. State, supra (Board of Regents retains defense of 
sovereign immunity): Fla. Stat. § 111.0il(i)(b)(3) (provision for payment by 
the state of civil rights judgments against state officers-including judg-
ments under 42 U. S. C. § 1983--<loes not waive sovereign immunity "or 
any other defense or immunity" to such lawsuits). Cf. Long v. Richardson, 
525 F. 2d 74, 79 (CA6 1975) (state university's immunity from suit under 
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an arm of the State and that it had not waived its immunity 
from suit in federal court. 6 Again petitioner answered that 
at most the Eleventh Amendment defense would bar her 
claim for damages. And, even as to this claim, petitioner 
now argued that the Amendment would not bar damages if 
the Board could meet the claim out of its "own funds"-e. g., 
from gifts and bequests-rather than from the State Treas-
ury. These arguments were repeated at oral argument.' 
B 
The Court views the jurisdictional question presented by 
the Eleventh Amendment as if it were of little or no impor-
tance. Its entire discussion of the question is relegated to a 
conclusory note at the end of the opinion. See ante, at--, 
n. 19. The Court concedes that the Amendment and the bar 
of sovereign immunity are "jurisdictional," but only in the 
sense that the State may raise the claim at any point in the 
proceedings. The statement is then made that the Amend-
ment is not jurisdictional "in the sense that it must be raised 
and decided by this Court on its own motion." Ante, at--, 
n. 19. ~ The Court cites to no authority in support of this 
• See Reply Brief at 23 ("Should this Court grant the writ, the Board 
respectfully submits that review should be limited to the jurisdictional is-
sues discussed below and this Court should vacate the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion with instructions to dismiss [petitioner's] suit for lack of 
jurisdiction."). 
The Court in note 19, ante, attaches importance to the Assistant Attor· 
ney General's statement at oral argument that the Board wanted the ex-
haustion issue decided. This must be viewed, however, in light of the 
Board's unsuccessful attempt to have this Court first decide the Eleventh 
Amendment issue. Moreover. a party's request-short of a binding 
waiver-cannot relieve this Court of its duty to resolve a jurisdictional 
question. 
' Tr. of Oral Argument 25-28, 40-41. At oral argument, the Board 
stated that the Eleventh Amendment question had not been addressed in 
its main briefs to this Court "because of the grant of certiorari." I d., at 
27. 
8 In view of the Board's repeated efforts to raise the Eleventh Amend-
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statement, 9 and it would be surprising if any existed. The 
reason that the Eleventh Amendment question may be raised 
at any point in the proceedings is precisely because it places 
limits on the basic authority of federal courts to entertain 
suits against a state. The history and text of the Eleventh 
Amendment, the principle of sovereign immunity exemplified 
by it, and the well established precedents of this Court make 
clear that today's decision misconceives our jurisdiction and 
the purpose of this Amendment. 
A basic principle of our constitutional system is that the 
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Their au-
thority extends only to those matters within the judicial 
power of the United States as defined by the Constitution. 
In language that could not be clearer, the Eleventh Amend-
ment removes from the judicial power, as set forth in Article 
III, suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States." When an Amendment to the Constitution 
ment question, and its specific request that this Court vacate the decision 
of the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction, see note 6 supra, it is hardly 
correct to say that the Court must now raise the question of jurisdiction on 
its own motion. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393. 396 n. 2 (1975). In any 
event, "we are obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to 
the existence of federal jurisdiction." Mt . Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle , 
429 u. s. 274, 278 (1977). 
"The Court cites, with a "compare" signal, to Mt. Healthy City Board of 
Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 279 (1977) . The Mt. Healthy Court in no way 
suggested that the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of sovereign 
immunity embodied in Article III were less than jurisdictional. Indeed. 
t~e Court found it necessary to resolve the Eleventh Amendment question 
in that case prior to reaching the merits. 
On the contrary, the Court consistently has viewed the Amendment as 
jurisdictional. In Sosna v. Iowa , 419 U. S. 393. 396 n. 2 (1975), the Court 
raised the question of the Eleventh Amendment even though the State had 
asserted the bar of the Amendment only in its answer to the complaint and 
had thereafter abandoned this defense. Unlike the Board of Regents in 
this case, the State of Iowa had not advanced the defense in this Court. 
Even so, the Sosna Court raised and addressed the question. These 
precedents are ignored by the Court today. 
- ----- - -- ---- - ---- ·--- -- - -·-
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states in plain language that "the judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend" to suits against a 
state, from what source does the Court today derive its juris-
diction? The Court's "back-of-the-hand" treatment of this 
threshold issue offers no answer. Questions of jurisdiction 
and of the legitimate exercise of power are fundamental in 
our federal constitutional system. 10 
c 
The Eleventh Amendment was adopted as a response to 
this Court's assumption of original jurisdiction in a suit 
brought against the State of Georgia. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 
Dall. 419 (1793). Relying upon express language in Article 
III extending the judicial power to controversies between a 
State and Citizens of another State, the Court found that it 
had jurisdiction. The decision is said to have created a shock 
throughout the country. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 
1, 11 (1890). The Amendment was adopted shortly there-
after, and the Court understood that it had been overruled: 
"the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could 
not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, 
in which a State was sued by the citizens of another State, or 
by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." !d., at 11. 
In light of the history and wording of the Amendment, the 
Court has viewed the Amendment as placing explicit limits 
on the judicial power as defined by Article III. See Nevada 
v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 421 (1979). But more than that, and 
beyond the express provisions of the Amendment, the Court 
has recognized that the Amendment stands for a principle of 
10 "Because of their unusual nature, and because it would not simply be 
wrong but indeed would be an unconstitutional invasion of the powers re-
served to the states if the federal courts were to entertain cases not within 
their jurisdiction, the rule is well settled that the party seeking to invoke 
the jurisdiction of a federal court must demonstrate that the case is within 
the competence of that court." Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 3522. 
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sovereign immunity by which the grant of authority in Arti-
cle III itself must be measured. 11 Thus, in Hans v. Louisi-
ana, supra, the Court held that the federal judicial power did 
not extend to a suit against a nonconsenting State by one of 
its own citizens. Although the Eleventh Amendment by its 
terms does not apply to such suits, the Court found that the 
language of the Amendment was but an illustration of a 
larger principle: Federal jurisdiction over suits against a 
State, absent consent, "was not contemplated by the Con-
stitution when establishing the judicial power of the United 
States." ld., at 15. 12 See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 
(1900). 
Similarly, in Ex Parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490 
(1921), the Court found that despite the Eleventh Amend-
ment's specific reference to suits in "law or equity," the prin-
ciple of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Amendment 
would not permit the extension of federal admiralty jurisdic-
tion over a nonconsenting State. The Court applied the 
same approach in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 
(1934), in which the Court refused to take jurisdiction over a 
""[T)he Eleventh Amendment was introduced to clarify the intent of 
the Framers concerning the reach of the federal judicial power. . . . The 
Eleventh Amendment served effectively to reverse the particular holding 
in Chisholm, and. more generally, to restore the original understanding 
... Thus, despite the narrowness of the language of the Amendment. its 
spirit has consistently guided this Court in interpreting the reach of the 
federal judicial power generally ... " Employees v. Missouri Public 
Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 292-293 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring). 
12 The Hans Court quoted at some length from the constitutional debates 
concerning the scope of Article III. In the eighty-first number of the Fed-
eralist, for example, Hamilton sought to dispel the suggestion that Article 
III extended federal jurisdiction over suits brought against one of the 
states: "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to 
the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and 
the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the 
attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State 
in the Union." 134 U. S., at 13 (emphasis in original). 
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suit against a State by a foreign state. On its face, Article 
III provided jurisdiction over suits "between a State ... and 
foreign States." Nor did the Eleventh Amendment specifi-
cally exempt the states from suit by a foreign state. Never-
theless, the Court concluded that the judicial power of the 
United States, granted by Article III, did not extend so far: 
"We think that Madison correctly interpreted Clause one of 
§ 2 of Article III of the Constitution as making provision for 
jurisdiction of a suit against a State by a foreign State in the 
event of the State's consent but not otherwise." I d., at 330. 
In this case a resident of the State of Florida has sued a 
Board exercising a major function of the State's sovereign au-
thority. As prior decisions have held, whether this case is 
viewed only under the Eleventh Amendment-with its ex-
plicit limitation on federal jurisdiction-or under Article III, 
the analysis must be the same. Absent consent, the "judicial 
power of the United States," as defined by Article III and the 
Eleventh Amendment, simply does not extend to suits 
against one of the States by a citizen of that State:13 
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a 
13 Unlike other limitations on federal jurisdiction. the limitation imposed 
by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity may 
be waived by consent unequivocally expressed. This was the understand-
ing of the doctrine at the time the Constitution was adopted, see note 11 
supra, and the Court has interpreted the "judicial power of the United 
States" as used in the Eleventh Amendment and Article III accordingly. 
But the fact that the state or the United States may consent to federal ju-
risdiction, does not render the Eleventh Amendment or the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity embodied in Article III "quasi" jurisdictional. Quite 
simply, where there has not been consent, there is no jurisdiction. Cf. 
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584. 586 (1941) ("The United States, 
as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and the 
terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction 
to entertain the suit"); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co., 309 U. S. 506, 514 (1940) ("Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge 
against a sovereign. Absent that consent, the attempted exercise of judi-
cial power is void."). 
---- - - - - -- ----- - --------- ---
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fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a 
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the 
United States that it has become established by repeated 
decisions of this court that the entire judicial pou·er 
granted by the Constitution does not embmce authority 
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a 
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens 
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign 
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not 
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fun-
damental rule of which the Amendment is but an exem-
plification." Ex Parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490 
(1921) (emphasis added). 
The Court does not distinguish these unquestioned prece-
dents. They are wholly and inexplicably ignored. Quite 
simply the Court today disregards controlling decisions and 
the explicit limitation on federal court jurisdiction in Article 
III and the Eleventh Amendment. The Court does recog-
nize that the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional "in the 
sense" that the State may raise the bar of the Amendment for 
the first time on appeal. Yet the Court misses the point of 
this statement. The reason that the bar of the Amendment 
may be raised at any time-as the Court previously has ex-
plained-is precisely because it is jurisdictional: 
"The objection to petitioner's suit as a violation of the 
Eleventh Amendment was first made and argued . . . in 
this Court. This was in time, however. The Eleventh 
Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit 
limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling 
force that' this Court will consider the issue arising under 
this Amendment . . . even though urged for the first 
time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of 
Treasury, 323 U. S. 454, 467 (1945). u 
1' See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 (1974); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 
U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975); Mt . Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 
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Despite these precedents, and apparently because of an un-
explained anxiety to reach the exhaustion issue decided by 
the Court of Appeals, this Court remands the issue of its own 
jurisdiction to the courts below. 
D 
I believe that the Eleventh Amendment question must be 
addressed and that the answer could hardly be clearer. This 
is an action under § 1983. 15 Petitioner seeks relief from the 
Board of Regents of the State of Florida, a major instrumen-
tality or agency of the State. Petitioner's argument that the 
statute incorporating the Board should be understood to 
waive the Eleventh Amendment is foreclosed by numerous 
decisions of this Court and is unsupported by State law. 
See, e. g., Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home 
Assn, 450 U. S. 147 (1981); note 5, supra. Similarly, peti-
tioner's suggestion that the Eleventh Amendment does not 
bar her equitable claims against the Board must be rejected. 
The Amendment applies to suits "in law and equity." All 
suits against an unconsenting State-whether for damages or 
injunctive relief-are barred. See Cory v. White,-- U. S. 
278 (1977). The Court has consistently viewed the Eleventh Amendment 
question as jurisdictional. See Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 
322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944) ("A state'sfreedomfrom litigation was established 
as a constitutional right through the Eleventh Amendment") (emphasis 
added); Monaco v. Mississippi, supra , at 320 (Question is ''whether this 
Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought by a foreign State against 
a State without her consent"). 
•& The states consented to a dimunition of their sovereignty by ratifying 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In its exercise of the powers granted to it 
by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may lift the bar of sover-
eign immunity. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). Thus, if 
petitioner had brought this suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, there would have been no jurisdictional problem. But petitioner did 
not do so, and the Court has held that Congress has not removed the bar of 
sovereign immunity in§ 1983 actions. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 
(1979). 
--------- ------- ---- - ---- ------·---
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-- (1982). 16 Finally, the rule in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 
123 (1908), permitting a federal court to order state officials 
to obey federal law in the future, is simply irrelevant to this 
case. 17 Petitioner did not sue the members of the Board of 
16 "It would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment 
does not bar a suit to enjoin the Stte itself simply because no money judg-
ment is sought. . . . [T]he Eleventh Amendment by its terms clearly ap-
plies to a suit seeking an injunction, a remedy available only from equity." 
Cory v. White,- U. S. -,- (1982). 
17 Under the theory of Ex parte Young the Eleventh Amendment does 
not bar suits against state officers because when a state officer "comes into 
conflict with the superior authority of [the] Constitution, ... he is ... 
stripped of his official or representative character." /d ., at 159. Thera-
tionale of that decision has no application to suits against the State or its 
agencies. Although an individual official may be viewed as acting on his 
own and without State authority when acting against federal law, the 
State-{)r an agency of the State-cannot act other than in its official State 
capacity. Similarly, an action for damages against the state, or an arm of 
the state, seeks damages that must be paid from the state's own coffers-
whether the damages come directly from the State's general fund or from 
some other State fund. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Tax Commn, 327 
U. S. 573 (1946) (segregated funds of the State Tax Commission are State 
monies subject to the Eleventh Amendment). 
Moreover, the fact that the Board is a corporate entity under state law 
does not pennit application of the rule in Ex parte Young to the Board it-
self-as if the Board were an official. This Court repeatedly has held the 
Eleventh Amendment to bar suit against such state corporate agencies. 
See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147 
(1981); Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47; Ford Motor 
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 454 (1945); Kennecott Copper 
Corp. v. State Tax Commn, 327 U. S. 572 (1946). 
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911), is not to 
the contrary. In that case suit was brought against a state college in 
state court to recover damages caused by the college's construction of a 
dyke. Although the Court discussed the Eleventh Amendment in some 
detail, there was simply no Eleventh Amendment question in that case. 
It was clear before Hopkins that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to 
bar review in this Court of any federal question presented in a suit against 
a State in state court. See Chandler v. Dix, 194 U. S. 590, 592 (1904). 
Cf. University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke; 438 U. S. 265 
---- ---------·-·- ------ ·--· - - -- -- - - ··-- -- ·-- .. - · 
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Regents. She sued the Board itself, an arm of the State of 
Florida. 
In my view, the Eleventh Amendment-and the principle 
of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Amendment and 
embodied in Article III-clearly bars the suit in this case. 
The Court's refusal to address the question of its own juris-
diction violates well established precedents of this Court as 
well as the basic premise that federal courts are courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction. Even had the parties neglected to address 
the Eleventh Amendment question, it would have been our 
responsibility to consider it on our own motion. In fact, the 
question has been fully briefed to the Court of Appeals and 
raised in this Court. See note 8, supra. See Sosna v. Iowa, 
419 U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975). I would dismiss this suit and 
vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
II. Exhaustion of Remedies 
In view of my belief that this case should be dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds, I address the exhaustion question 
only briefly. Seventeen judges joined in the Court of Ap-
peal's persuasive opinion adopting a rule of "flexible" exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies in § 1983 suits. Other 
Courts of Appeals have adopted a similar rule. See e. g., 
Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F. 2d 560 (CA2 1969); Secret v. 
Brierton, 584 F. 2d 823 (CA 7 1978). The opinion for the en 
bane court carefully reviewed the exhaustion doctrine in gen-
eral and as applied to § 1983 actions. It found that the prior 
(1978). Moreover, the Hopkins Court did not consider the college's activi-
ties in that case to be governmental. 221 U. S., at 647. In short, no 
Eleventh Amendment question was presented to the Court. The opinion in 
Hopkins has never been cited by this Court for the proposition that the 
Eleventh Amendment is no bar to suit against a state corporate agency in 
federal court. See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home 
Assn, supra; Alabama v. pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978); Parden v. Terminal 
R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964). 
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decisions of this Court did not clearly decide the question. 18 
See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v. 
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 575 n. 14 (1973). And it concluded 
that the exhaustion of adequate and appropriate state admin-
istrative remedies would promote the achievement of the 
rights protected by § 1983. 
I agree with the Court of Appeals' opinion. The require-
ment that a § 1983 plaintiff exhaust adequate state adminis-
trative remedies was the accepted rule of law until quite re-
cently. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 
210, (1908) (opinion of Justice Holmes). The rule rests on 
sound considerations. It does not defeat federal court juris-
diction, it merely defers it. 19 It permits the states to correct 
violations through their own procedures, and it encourages 
the establishment of such procedures. It is consistent with 
the principles of comity that apply whenever federal courts 
are asked to review state action or supersede state proceed-
ings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). 
Moreover, and highly relevant to the effective functioning 
of the overburdened federal court system, the rule conserves 
and supplements scarce judicial resources. In 1961, the year 
that Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), was decided, only 
270 civil rights actions were begun in the federal district 
courts. Annual Report of the Director ofthe Administrative 
Office of the U. S. Courts 238 (1961). In 1981, over 30,000 
11 "[l)n all the cases in which the Supreme Court has articulated its no-
exhaustion rule, the state administraive remedies were sufficiently inade-
quate that exhaustion would not have been appropriate in any event. " 
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 
1133, 1274 (1977). 
"Cf. Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary,- U. S.-, -
(1982) (BRENNAN, J., concurring) (exhaustion requirement in§ 1983 cases 
can be justified by "a somewhat lesser showing . . . where ... we are con-
cerned not with the displacement of the § 1983 remedy, but with the defer-
ral of federal court consideration pending exhaustion of the state adminis-
trative process"). 
- --------- ·- ----- --- · 
. ' 
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such suits were commenced. 20 Annual Report of the Direc-
tor, 63, 68 (1981). The result of this unprecedented increase 
in civil rights litigation is a heavy burden on the federal 
courts to the detriment of all federal court litigants, including 
others who assert that their constitutional rights have been 
infringed. 
The Court argues that past decisions of the Court categori-
cally hold that there is no exhaustion requirement in § 1983 
suits. But as the Court of Apeals demonstrates, and as the 
Court recognizes, many of these decisions can be explained as 
applications of traditional exceptions to the exhaustion re-
quirement. See McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 
668 (1963). Other decisions speak to the question in an off-
hand and conclusory fashion. See Damico v. California, 389 
U. S. 416 (1967) (unargued per curiam). Moreover, a cate-
gorical no-exhaustion rule would seem inconsistent with the 
decision in Younger v. Harris , 401 U. S. 37 (1971), prescrib-
ing abstention when state criminal proceedings are pending. 
At least where administrative proceedings are pending, 
Younger would seem to suggest the appropriateness of ex-
haustion. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574-575 
(1973). Yet the Court today adopts a flat rule without 
exception. 
The Court seeks to support its no exhaustion rule with in-
dications of congressional intent. Finding nothing(Oii point 
in the history of the Civil Rights Act itself, the Court places 
primary reliance on the recent Civil Rights of Institutional-
ized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. 
IV). This legislation was designed to authorize the Attorney 
General to begin civil rights actions on behalf of institutional-
ized persons. § 1997a. The Act also placed certain limits on 
111 Of the approximately 30,000 civil rights fuits filed in fiscal year 1981, 
15,639 were filed by state prisoners under § 1983. The remainder involved 
a variety of civil rights suits. See Parrott v. Taylar, 451 U. S. 527, 554 n. 
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the existing authority of the Attorney General to intervene in 
suits begun by institutionalized persons. See § 1997c. In 
addition, in§ 1997e, the Act sets forth an exhaustion require-
ment but only for § 1983 claims brought by prisoners. 
On the basis of the exhaustion provision in§ 1997e, andre-
marks primarily by Representative Kastenmeier, the Court 
contends that Congress has endorsed a general no exhaustion 
rule. The irony in this reasoning should be obvious. A 
principal concern that prompted the Department of Justice to 
support, and the Congress to adopt, § 1997e was the vast in-
crease in § 1983 suits brought by state prisoners in federal 
courts. There has been a year-by-year increase iii these 
suits since the mid-1960's. The increase in fiscal 1981 over 
fiscal 1980 was some 26%, resulting in a total of 15,639 such 
suits filed in 1981 as compared with 12,397 in 1980. The 1981 
total constituted over H% of the total federal district court 
docket. Although most of these cases present frivolous 
claims, many are litigated through the courts of appeals to 
this Court. The burden on the system fairly can be de-
scribed as enormous with few, if any, benefits that would not 
be available in meritorious cases if exhaustion of appropriate 
state administrative remedies were required prior to any fed-
eral court litigation. It was primarily this problem that 
prompted enactment of § 1997e. 21 
Moreover, it is clear from the legislative history that Con-
gress simply was not addressing the exhaustion problem in 
any general fashion. The concern focused on the problem of 
prisoner petitions. The new Act had a dual purpose in this 
respect. In addition to requiring prior exhaustion of ade-
quate state remedies, Congress wished to authorize the At-
n The exhaustion requirement in § 1997e only becomes effective if the 
Attorney General or a federal district court determines that the available 
prison grievance procedures comply with standards set forth in subsection 
(b) of§ 1997e. As of this date, the Department of Justice has not certified 
the inmate grievance procedures of even a single state. 
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torney General to act when necessary to protect the constitu-
tional rights of prisoners, but at the same time minimize the 
need for federal action of any kind by requiring prior exhaus-
tion. Both sponsors of the Act in the Senate made this clear. 
Senator Hatch explained § 1997e as follows: 
"In actions relating to alleged violations of the constitu-
tional rights of prisoners, such persons may be required 
to exhaust internal grievance procedures before the At-
torney General can become involved pursuant to [the 
Act]." Congressional Record S1713, February 26, 1980.22 
Senator Bayh, the author of the Act, decribed the exhaustion 
provision in similar terms: 
"[I]n the event of a prison inmate's rights being alleged 
to be violated ... then before the Justice Department 
could intervene or initiate suits, the prison inmate or 
class of inmates would have to pursue all of their 
adiminstrative remedies within the State law before the 
Justice Department could intervene under the provisions 
of [the Act]." Congressional Record S1859, February 
27, 1980. 
In short, in enacting the Civil Rights of Institutionalized 
Act Congress was focussing on the powers of the Attorney 
General, and the particular question of prisoners' suits, not 
on the general question of exhaustion in § 1983 actions. Also 
11 Senator Hatch offered the same explanation on several other occasions 
in the course of the debate. See Congressional Record S4293, April 29, 
1980 ("Section 7 would establish specific procedures that would be appli-
cable before the Attorney General could enter into an action in behalf of an 
imprisoned or incarcerated person. Such person would first have had to 
fully exhaust all internal grievance mechanisms that existed in the institu-
tion in which he was confined"); Congressonal Record S4626, May 6, 1980 
("Section 7(D) further clarifies that the administrative grievance proce-
dures established in section 7 are only for the purposes of requiring prison-
ers to exhaust internal grievance mechanisms before the Attorney General 
can litigate on his behalf'). 
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revealing as to the limited purpose of § 1997e is Congress' 
consistent refusal to adopt legislation imposing a general no-
exhaustion requirement. Thus, for example, in 1979, a bill 
was introduced into the Senate providing: 
"No court of the United States shall stay or dismiss any 
civil action brought under this Act on the ground that 
the party bringing such action failed to exhaust the rem-
edies available in the courts or the administrative agen-
cies of any State." S.1983, 96th Congress, 1st Session. 
The bill was never reported out of committee. 
The requirement that plaintiffs exhaust available and ade-
quate administrative remedies-subject to well developed 
exceptions-is firmly established in virtually every area of 
the law. This is dictated in§ 1983 actions by common sense, 
as well as by comity and federalism, where adequate state 
administrative remedies are available. 
If the exhaustion question were properly before us, I 
would affirm the Court of Appeals. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court holds that the limitations on federal judicial 
power embodied in the Eleventh Amendment and in the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity are not jurisdictional. I con-
sider this holding to be a serious departure from established 
constitutional doctrine. 
I dissent also from the Court's rejection of the rule of "flex-
ible" exhaustion of state administrative remedies developed 
and stated persuasively by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, sitting en bane. In disagreeing with the 17 judges 
of the Court of Appeals who adopted the flexible exhaustion 
principle, this Court places mistaken reliance on the Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et 
seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I disagree with both portions of the 
Court's holding and therefore dissent. 
I. The Eleventh Amendment1 
A 
'The Eleventh Amendment provides: 
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State. " 
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In tpis "reverse discrimination" action, petitioner, an em-
ployee of the Florida International University, brought suit 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the Board of Regents of the 
State of Florida. 2 She did not name the individual regents 
as defendants. She sued for $500,000 in damages, and for 
injunctive and other equitable relief. See ante, at --, n. 2. 
The Board filed a motion to dismiss arguing that petitioner's 
suit was premature in light of her failure to exhaust available 
administrative remedies. The District Court agreed and 
granted the motion to dismiss. 
On petitioner's appeal, the Board added the bar of the 
Eleventh Amendment to its defense. 3 It argued that as an 
2 As the Court notes, see ante, at--, n. 1, petitioner originally named 
the Florida International University as defendant. Because the Florida 
International University Jacks the capacity to sue or be sued, the District 
Court found that it was not a proper defendant. Petitioner was pennitted 
to amend her complaint, and she simply substituted the Board of Regents. 
In addition to racial discrimination, petitioner also claimed that she had 
been discriminated against on the basis of her sex. 
' The Court repeatedly has held that the defense of the Eleventh 
Amendment may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 (1974) ("Eleventh Amendment defense suffi-
ciently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be 
raised in the trial court"). 
The Board's brief on appeal was divided into three parts. Part III was 
devoted to the argument that "the Eleventh Amendment precludes subject 
matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs complaint. " /d ., at 17. A lengthy stat-
utory addendum was attached in support of the arguments advanced in this 
section of the brief. After the case was scheduled for rehearing en bane, 
the parties filed sho~. g. four and ten page-supplemental briefs to be 
considered in addition to the main briefs already submitted to the Court of 
Apeals. The supplemental briefs did not add to the discussion of the Elev-
enth Amendment issue. But the question was placed before the Court of 
Appeals en bane, as it had been placed before the panel, through the thor-
ough discussion in the main briefs. 
This Court's explanation for not addressing the Eleventh Amendment 
issue is that it was not considered below. Seen. 19, ante. But contrary 
to the implication in the Court's explanation, the issue-as shown here-
was urged by the Board and argued here. 
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instrmpentality of the State, the Board could not be sub-
jected to suit in federal court absent a waiver of immunity. 4 
And it asserted that there had been no waiver. Although 
the Board of Regents was created as a body corporate with 
power "to sue and be sued . . . to plead and be impleaded in 
all courts of law and equity," Fla. Stat. §240.042(1), it is well 
established that language such as this does not operate to 
waive the defense of the Eleventh Amendment." In reply, 
'The Board of Regents of the Division of Universities of the Depart-
ment of Education is established by the Florida Education Code as a part 
of the State University System. Fla. Stat. § 240.2011. The Board con-
sists of the Commissioner of Education and twelve citizens appointed by 
the Governor. Fla. Stat. § 240.207. The Board has general supervisory 
authority over the State University System. Fla. Stat. § 240.209. 
Among its duties are the appointment of university presidents, the review 
of budget requests of each university in the state system, the preparation 
of an aggregated budget for the State University System, the development 
of a master plan, and the establishment of a systemwide personnel classifi-
cation and pay plan. Fla. Stat. § 240.209. 
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida. Fla. Stat. § 216.011. 
See Relyea v. State, 385 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. App. 1980). It may claim the 
defense of sovereign immunity in suits under state law. See ibid. 
Numerous courts of appeals have held state universities or state Boards 
of Regents immune from suit in federal court by reason of the Eleventh 
Amendment. See, e. g., Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F. 2d 
1345, 1349 (CA9 1981); Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451 F. 2d 1287 
(CAlO 1971); Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F. 2d 1071 (CA9 1981). 
3 See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home, 450 U.S. 147, 
150 (1981); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commn, 359 U. S. 275, 
276-277 (1959) ("The conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity 
will not be lightly inferred ... And where a public instrumentality is cre-
ated with the right 'to sue and be sued' that waiver of immunity in the par-
ticular setting may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special charac-
ter in the state, not the federal courts"); Kennecott Cooper Corp. v. State 
Tax Commn, 327 U. S. 573 (1946) (language in state statute providing for 
suit in "any court of competent jurisdiction" will not be understood as a 
waiver of the Eleventh Amendment); Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F. 2d 1166, 
1177 (CA5 1976). Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974) ("In 
deciding whether a state has waived its constitutional protection under the 
• 'v 
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petitioner argued that whether the statute creating the 
Board' amounted to a waiver-and petitioner believed that it 
did-the Eleventh Amendment simply was irrelevant to the 
equitable claims she had lodged against the State. See 
Reply Brief at 3-4. 
Neither the Court of Appeals panel nor the Court of Ap-
peals en bane addressed the Board's Eleventh Amendment 
defense. They directed their attention solely to the question 
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The panel held 
that there was no exhaustion requirement in § 1983 suits and 
remanded to the District Court for consideration of the 
Board's Eleventh Amendment argument. 612 F. 2d 946 
(CA5 1980). The Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, reversed 
holding that § 1983 plaintiffs must exhaust available and rea-
sonable administrative remedies. 634 F. 2d 900 (CA5 1981). 
Again the court did not consider the Board's Eleventh 
Amendment defense. 
The Eleventh Amendment question was raised before this 
Court, at the first opportunity after the Court of Appeals' de-
cision, in the Board's response to the petition for writ of cer-
tiorari. The Board argued, as it had on appeal, that it was 
Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver only where stated 'by the most 
express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as 
[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.'"). 
At oral argument here the Assistant Attorney General of Florida stated 
that the Florida legislature had not waived the Eleventh Amendment and 
had waived the defense of sovereign immunity "only in selected tort cases." 
Tr. at 26. See Bragg v. Board of Public Instruction, 36 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 
1948) ("The mere fact that the Board of Public Instruction is created as a 
body corporate with power to sue and be sued does not affect its immunity 
from tort"); Relyea v. State, supra (Board of Regents retains defense of 
sovereign immunity); Fla. Stat. § 111.071(i)(b)(4) (provision for payment by 
the state of civil rights judgments against state officers-including judg-
ments under 42 U. S. C. § 1983----does not waive sovereign immunity "or 
any other defense or immunity" to such lawsuits). Cf. Long v. Richardson, 
525 F. 2d 74, 79 (CA6 1975) (state university's immunity from suit under 
state law disposes of Eleventh Amendment question). 
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an arm of the State and that it had not waived its immunity 
from suit in federal court. 6 Again petitioner answered that 
at most the Eleventh Amendment defense would bar her 
claim for damages. And, even as to this claim, petitioner 
now argued that the Amendment would not bar damages if 
the Board could meet the claim out of its "own funds"-e. g., 
from gifts and bequests-rather than from the State Treas-
ury. These arguments were repeated at oral argument. 7 
B 
The Court views the jurisdictional question presented by 
the Eleventh Amendment as if it were of little or no impor-
tance. Its entire discussion of the question is relegated to a 
conclusory note at the end of the opinion. See ante, at --, 
n. 19. The Court concedes that the Amendment and the bar 
of sovereign immunity are "jurisdictional," but only in the 
sense that the State may raise the claim at any point in the 
proceedings. The statement is then made that the Amend-
ment is not jurisdictional "in the sense that it must be raised 
and decided by this Court on its own motion." Ante, at--, 
n. 19.8 The Court cites to no authority in support of this 
6 See Reply Brief at 23 ("Should this Court grant the writ, the Board 
respectfully submits that review should be limited to the jurisdictional is-
sues discussed below and this Court should vacate the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion with instructions to dismiss [petitioner's] suit for lack of 
jurisdiction."). 
The Court in note 19, ante, attaches importance to the Assistant Attor-
ney General's statement at oral argument that the Board wanted the ex-
haustion issue decided. This must be viewed, however, in light of the 
Board's unsuccessful attempt to have this Court first decide the Eleventh 
Amendment issue. Moreover, a party's request-short of a binding 
waiver-cannot relieve this Court of its duty to resolve a jurisdictional 
question. 
'Tr. of Oral Argument 25-28, 40-41. At oral argument, the Board 
stated that the Eleventh Amendment question had not been addressed in 
its main briefs to this Court "because of the grant of certiorari." !d., at 
27. 
• In view of the Board's repeated efforts to raise the Eleventh Amend-
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statement, 9 and it would be surprising if any existed. The 
reason that the Eleventh Amendment question may be raised 
at any point in the proceedings is precisely because it places 
limits on the basic authority of federal courts to entertain 
suits against a state. The history and text of the Eleventh 
Amendment, the principle of sovereign immunity exemplified 
by it, and the well established precedents of this Court make 
clear that today's decision misconceives our jurisdiction and 
the purpose of this Amendment. 
A basic principle of our constitutional system is that the 
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Their au-
thority extends only to those matters within the judicial 
power of the United States as defined by the Constitution. 
In language that could not be clearer, the Eleventh Amend-
ment removes from the judicial power, as set forth in Article 
III, suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States." When an Amendment to the Constitution 
ment question, and its specific request that this Court vacate the decision 
of the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction, see note 6 supra, it is hardly 
correct to say that the Court must now raise the question of jurisdiction on 
its own motion. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975). In any 
event, "we are obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to 
the existence of federal jurisdiction." Mt . Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 
429 u. s. 274, 278 (1977). 
•The Court cites, with a "compare" signal, to Mt. Healthy City Board of 
Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 279 (1977). The Mt. Healthy Court in no way 
suggested that the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of sovereign 
immunity embodied in Article III were less than jurisdictional. Indeed, 
the Court found it necessary to resolve the Eleventh Amendment question 
in that case prior to reaching the merits. 
On the contrary, the Court consistently has viewed the Amendment as 
jurisdictional. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975), the Court 
raised the question of the Eleventh Amendment even though the State had 
asserted the bar of the Amendment only in its answer to the complaint and 
had thereafter abandoned this defense. Unlike the Board of Regents in 
this case, the State of Iowa had not advanced the defense in this Court. 
Even so, the Sosna Court raised and addressed the question. These 
precedents are ignored by the Court today. 
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states jn plain language that "the judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend" to suits against a 
state, from what source does the Court today derive its juris-
diction? The Court's "back-of-the-hand" treatment of this 
threshold issue offers no answer. Questions of jurisdiction 
and of the legitimate exercise of power are fundamental in 
our federal constitutional system. 10 
c 
The Eleventh Amendment was adopted as a response to 
this Court's assumption of original jurisdiction in a suit 
brought against the State of Georgia. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 
Dall. 419 (1793). Relying upon express language in Article 
III extending the judicial power to controversies between a 
State and Citizens of another State, the Court found that it 
had jurisdiction. The decision is said to have created a shock 
throughout the country. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 
1, 11 (1890). The Amendment was adopted shortly there-
after, and the Court understood that it had been overruled: 
"the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could 
not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, 
in which a State was sued by the citizens of another State, or 
by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." I d., at 11. 
In light of the history and wording of the Amendment, the 
Court has viewed the Amendment as placing explicit limits 
on the judicial power as defined by Article III. See Nevada 
v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 421 (1979). But more than that, and 
beyond the express provisions of the Amendment, the Court 
has recognized that the Amendment stands for a principle of 
10 "Because of their unusual nature, and because it would not simply be 
wrong but indeed would be an unconstitutional invasion of the powers re-
served to the states if the federal courts were to entertain cases not within 
their jurisdiction, the rule is well settled that the party seeking to invoke 
the jurisdiction of a federal court must demonstrate that the case is within 
the competence of that court." Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 3522. 
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sovereign immunity by which the grant of authority in Arti-
cle III itself must be measured. 11 Thus, in Hans v. Louisi-
ana, supra, the Court held that the federal judicial power did 
not extend to a suit against a nonconsenting State by one of 
its own citizens. Although the Eleventh Amendment by its 
terms does not apply to such suits, the Court found that the 
language of the Amendment was but an illustration of a 
larger principle: Federal jurisdiction over suits against a 
State, absent consent, "was not contemplated by the Con-
stitution when establishing the judicial power of the United 
States." /d., at 15. 12 See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436 
(1900). 
Similarly, in Ex Parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490 
(1921), the Court found that despite the Eleventh Amend-
ment's specific reference to suits in "law or equity," the prin-
ciple of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Amendment 
would not permit the extension of federal admiralty jurisdic-
tion over a nonconsenting State. The Court applied the 
same approach in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 
(1934), in which the Court refused to take jurisdiction over a 
11 "(T]he Eleventh Amendment was introduced to clarify the intent of 
the Framers concerning the reach of the federal judicial power. . . . The 
Eleventh Amendment served effectively to reverse the particular holding 
in Chisholm, and, more generally, to restore the original understanding 
... Thus, despite the narrowness of the language of the Amendment, its 
spirit has consistently guided this Court in interpreting the reach of the 
federal judicial power generally ... " Employees v. Missouri Public 
Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 292-293 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring). 
IRThe Hans Court quoted at some length from the constitutional debates 
concerning the scope of Article III. In the eighty-first number of the Fed-
eralist, for example, Hamilton sought to dispel the suggestion that Article 
III extended federal jurisdiction over suits brought against one of the 
states: "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to 
the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and 
the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the 
attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State 
in the Union." 134 U. S., at 13 (emphasis in original). 
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suit against a State by a foreign state. On its face, Article 
III provided jurisdiction over suits "between a State ... and 
foreign States." Nor did the Eleventh Amendment specifi-
cally exempt the states from suit by a foreign state. Never-
theless, the Court concluded that the judicial power of the 
United States, granted by Article III, did not extend so far: 
''We think that Madison correctly interpreted Clause one of 
§ 2 of Article III of the Constitution as making provision for 
jurisdiction of a suit against a State by a foreign State in the 
event of the State's consent but not otherwise." I d., at 330. 
In this case a resident of the State of Florida has sued a 
Board exercising a major function of the State's sovereign au-
thority. As prior decisions have held, whether this case is 
viewed only under the Eleventh Amendment-with its ex-
plicit limitation on federal jurisdiction-or under Article III, 
the analysis must be the same. Absent consent, the "judicial 
power of the United States," as defined by Article III and the 
Eleventh Amendment, simply does not extend to suits 
against one of the States by a citizen of that State: 13 
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a 
"Unlike other limitations on federal jurisdiction, the limitation imposed 
by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity may 
be waived by consent unequivocally expressed. This was the understand-
ing of the doctrine at the time the Constitution was adopted, see note 11 
supra, and the Court has interpreted the "judicial power of the United 
States" as used in the Eleventh Amendment and Article III accordingly. 
But the fact that the state or the United States may consent to federal ju-
risdiction, does not render the Eleventh Amendment or the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity embodied in Article III "quasi" jurisdictional. Quite 
simply, where there has not been consent, there is no jurisdiction. See 
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941) ("The United States, 
as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and the 
terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction 
to entertain the suit"); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co., 309 U. S. 506, 514 (1940) ("Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge 
against a sovereign. Absent that consent, the attempted exercise of judi-
cial power is void."). 
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fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a 
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the 
United States that it has become established by repeated 
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power 
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority 
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a 
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens 
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign 
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not 
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fun-
damental rule of which the Amendment is but an exem-
plification." Ex Parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490 
(1921) (emphasis added). 
The Court does not distinguish these unquestioned prece-
dents. They are wholly and inexplicably ignored. Quite 
simply the Court today disregards controlling decisions and 
the explicit limitation on federal court jurisdiction in Article 
III and the Eleventh Amendment. The Court does recog-
nize that the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional "in the 
sense" that the State may raise the bar of the Amendment for 
the first time on appeal. Yet the Court misses the point of 
this statement. The reason that the bar of the Amendment 
may be raised at any time-as the Court previously has ex-
plained-is precisely because it is jurisdictional: 
"The objection to petitioner's suit as a violation of the 
Eleventh Amendment was first made and argued ... in 
this Court. This was in time, however. The Eleventh 
Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit 
limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling 
force that this Court will consider the issue arising under 
this Amendment . . . even though urged for the first 
time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of 
Treasury, 323 U. S. 454, 467 (1945). 14 
,. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 (1974); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 
U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975); Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 
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-- (1982). 16 Finally, the rule in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 
123 (1008), permitting a federal court to order state officials 
to obey federal law in the future, is simply irrelevant to this 
case. 17 Petitioner did not sue the members of the Board of 
'
6 "It would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment 
does not bar a suit to enjoin the State itself simply because no money judg-
ment is sought. . . . [T]he Eleventh Amendment by its terms clearly ap-
plies to a suit seeking an injunction, a remedy available only from equity." 
Cory v. White,- U. S. -,- (1982). 
"Under the theory of Ex parte Young the Eleventh Amendment does 
not bar suits against state officers because when a state officer "comes into 
conflict with the superior authority of [the] Constitution, ... he is .. . 
stripped of his official or representative character." /d., at 159. The ra-
tionale of that decision has no application to suits against the State or its 
agencies. Although an individual official may be viewed as acting on his 
own and without State authority when acting against federal law, the 
State-or an agency of the State-cannot act other than in its official State 
capacity. Similarly, an action for damages against the state, or an arm of 
the state , seeks damages that must be paid from the state's own coffers-
whether the damages come directly from the State's general fund or from 
some other State fund . See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Tax Commn, 327 
U. S. 573 (1946) (segregated funds of the State Tax Commission are State 
monies subject to the Eleventh Amendment). 
Moreover, the fact that the Board is a corporate entity under state law 
does not permit application of the rule in Ex parte Young to the Board it-
self-as if the Board were an official. This Court repeatedly has held the 
Eleventh Amendment to bar suit against such state corporate agencies. 
See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147 
(1981) ; Great Northern Insurance Co . v. Read, 322 U. S. 47; Ford Motor 
Co . v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 454 (1945); Kennecott Copper 
Corp . v. State Tax Commn, 327 U. S. 572 (1946). 
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College , 221 U. S. 636 (1911) , is not to 
the contrary. In that case suit was brought against a state college in 
state court to recover damages caused by the college's construction of a 
dyke. Although the Court discussed the Eleventh Amendment in some 
detail, there was simply no Eleventh Amendment question in that case. 
It was clear before Hopkins that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to 
bar review in this Court of any federal question presented in a suit against 
a State in state court. See Chandler v. Dix, 194 U. S. 590, 592 (1904). 
Cf. University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 
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Regents. She sued the Board itself, an arm of the State of 
Florida. 
In my view, the Eleventh Amendment-and the principle 
of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Amendment and 
embodied in Article III-clearly bars the suit in this case. 
The Court's refusal to address the question of its own juris-
diction violates well established precedents of this Court as 
well as the basic premise that federal courts are courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction. Even had the parties neglected to address 
the Eleventh Amendment question, it would have been our 
responsibility to consider it on our own motion. In fact, the 
question has been fully briefed to the Court of Appeals and 
raised in this Court. See note 8, supra. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 
419 U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975). I would dismiss this suit and 
vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
II. Exhaustion of Remedies 
In view of my belief that this case should be dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds, I address the exhaustion question 
only briefly. Seventeen judges joined in the Court of Ap-
peal's persuasive opinion adopting a rule of "flexible" exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies in § 1983 suits. Other 
Courts of Appeals have adopted a similar rule. See e. g., 
Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F. 2d 560 (CA2 1969); Secret v. 
Brierton, 584 F. 2d 823 (CA 7 1978). The opinion for the en 
bane court carefully reviewed the exhaustion doctrine in gen-
eral and as applied to § 1983 actions. It found that the prior 
(1978). Moreover, the Hopkins Court did not consider the college's activi-
ties in that case to be governmental. 221 U. S., at 647. In short, no 
Eleventh Amendment question was presented to the Court. The opinion in 
Hopkins has never been cited by this Court for the proposition that the 
Eleventh Amendment is no bar to suit against a state corporate agency in 
federal court. See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Horne 
Assn, supra; Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978); Parden v. Terminal 
R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964). 
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decisions of this Court did not clearly decide the question. 18 
See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v. 
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 575 n. 14 (1973). And it concluded 
that the exhaustion of adequate and appropriate state admin-
istrative remedies would promote the achievement of the 
rights protected by § 1983. 
I agree with the Court of Appeals' opinion. The require-
ment that a § 1983 plaintiff exhaust adequate state adminis-
trative remedies was the accepted rule of law until quite re-
cently. See Eisen v. Eastman, supra, at 567. The rule 
rests on sound considerations. It does not defeat federal 
court jurisdiction, it merely defers it. 19 It permits the states 
to correct violations through their own procedures, and it en-
courages the establishment of such procedures. It is consist-
ent with the principles of comity that apply whenever federal 
courts are asked to review state action or supersede state 
proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971) . 
Moreover, and highly relevant to the effective functioning 
of the overburdened federal court system, the rule conserves 
and supplements scarce judicial resources. In 1961, the year 
that Monroe v. Pape , 365 U. S. 167 (1961), was decided , only 
270 civil rights actions were begun in the federal district 
courts. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative 
Office of the U. S. Courts 238 (1961). In 1981, over 30,000 
such suits were commenced. 20 Annual Report of the Direc-
•• "[l]n all the cases in which the Supreme Court has articulated its no-
exhaustion rule , the state administrative remedies were sufficiently inade-
quate that exhaustion would not have been appropriate in any event." 
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 
1133, 1274 (1977). 
"Cf. Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary,- U. S. - , -
(1982) (BRENNAN, J ., concurring) (exhaustion requirement in§ 1983 cases 
can be justified by "a somewhat lesser showing .. . where . .. we are con-
cerned not with the displacement of the§ 1983 remedy, but with the defer-
ral of federal court consideration pending exhaustion of the state adminis-
trative process"). 
"'Of the approximately 30,000 civil rights fuits filed in fiscal year 1981, 
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tor, 63, 68 (1981). The result of this unprecedented increase 
in civil 'rights litigation is a heavy burden on the federal 
courts to the detriment of all federal court litigants, including 
others who assert that their constitutional rights have been 
infringed. 
The Court argues that past decisions of the Court categori-
cally hold that there is no exhaustion requirement in § 1983 
suits. But as the Court of Apeals demonstrates, and as the 
Court recognizes, many of these decisions can be explained as 
applications of traditional exceptions to the exhaustion re-
quirement. See McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 
668 (1963). Other decisions speak to the question in an off-
hand and conclusory fashion without full briefing and argu-
ment. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 251 
(1971) (unargued per curiam); Damico v. California, 389 
U. S. 416 (1967) (unargued per curiam). Moreover, a cate-
gorical no-exhaustion rule would seem inconsistent with the 
decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), prescrib-
ing abstention when state criminal proceedings are pending. 
At least where administrative proceedings are pending, 
Younger would seem to suggest the appropriateness of ex-
haustion. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574-575 
(1973). Yet the Court today adopts a fiat rule without 
exception. 
The Court seeks to support its no exhaustion rule with in-
dications of congressional intent. Finding nothing directly 
on point in the history of the Civil Rights Act itself, the 
Court places primary reliance on the recent Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C.§ 1997 et seq. (1976 
ed., Supp. IV). This legislation was designed to authorize 
the Attorney General to initiate civil rights actions on behalf 
15,639 were filed by state prisoners under§ 1983. The remainder involved 
a variety of civil rights suits. Annual Report of the Director of the Ad-
ministrative Office of the U.S. Courts 63,68 (1981). See Parratt v. Tay-
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of institutionalized persons. § 1997a. The Act also placed 
certain limits on the existing authority of the Attorney Gen-
eral to intervene in suits begun by institutionalized persons. 
See§ 1997c. In addition, in§ 1997e, the Act sets forth an ex-
haustion requirement but only for § 1983 claims brought by 
prisoners. 
On the basis of the exhaustion provision in § 1997e, andre-
marks primarily by Representative Kastenmeier, the Court 
contends that Congress has endorsed a general no exhaustion 
rule. The irony in this reasoning should be obvious. A 
principal concern that prompted the Department of Justice to 
support, and the Congress to adopt, § 1997e was the vast in-
crease in § 1983 suits brought by state prisoners in federal 
courts. There has been a year-by-year increase in these 
suits since the mid-1960's. The increase in fiscal 1981 over 
fiscal 1980 was some 26%, resulting in a total of 15,639 such 
suits filed in 1981 as compared with 12,397 in 1980. The 1981 
total constituted over 8.6% of the total federal district court 
docket. Although most of these cases present frivolous 
claims, many are litigated through the courts of appeals to 
this Court. The burden on the system fairly can be de-
scribed as enormous with few, if any, benefits that would not 
be available in meritorious cases if exhaustion of appropriate 
state administrative remedies were required prior to any fed-
eral court litigation. It was primarily this problem that 
prompted enactment of § 1997e. 21 
Moreover, it is clear from the legislative history that Con-
gress simply was not addressing the exhaustion problem in 
any general fashion. The concern focused on the problem of 
prisoner petitions. The new Act had a dual purpose in this 
respect. In addition to requiring prior exhaustion of ade-
21 The exhaustion requirement in § 1997e only becomes effective if the 
Attorney General or a federal district court determines that the available 
prison grievance procedures comply with standards set forth in subsection 
(b) of§ 1997e. As of this date, the Department of Justice has not certified 
the inmate grievance procedures of even a single state . 
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quate state remedies, Congress wished to authorize the At-
torney General to act when necessary to protect the constitu-
tional rights of prisoners, but at the same time minimize the 
need for federal action of any kind by requiring prior exhaus-
tion. Both sponsors of the Act in the Senate made this clear. 
Senator Hatch explained § 1997e as follows: 
"In actions relating to alleged violations of the constitu-
tional rights of prisoners, such persons may be required 
to exhaust internal grievance procedures before the At-
torney General can become involved pursuant to [the 
Act]." Congressional Record S1713, February 26, 1980. 22 
Senator Bayh, the author of the Act, decribed the exhaustion 
provision in similar terms: 
"[l]n the event of a prison inmate's rights being alleged 
to be violated . . . then before the Justice Department 
could intervene or initiate suits, the prison inmate or 
class of inmates would have to pursue all of their 
adiminstrative remedies within the State law before the 
Justice Department could intervene under the provisions 
of [the Act]." Congressional Record S1859, February 
27, 1980. 
In short, in enacting the Civil Rights of Institutionalized 
Act Congress was focussing on the powers of the Attorney 
General, and the particular question of prisoners' suits, not 
22 Senator Hatch offered the same explanation on several other occasions 
in the course of the debate. See Congressional Record 84293, April 29, 
1980 ("Section 7 would establish specific procedures that would be appli-
cable before the Attorney General could enter into an action in behalf of an 
imprisoned or incarcerated person. Such person would first have had to 
fully exhaust all internal grievance mechanisms that existed in the institu-
tion in which he was confined"); Congressonal Record 84626, May 6, 1980 
("Section 7(D) further clarifies that the administrative grievance proce-
dures established in section 7 are only for the purposes of requiring prison-
ers to exhaust internal grievance mechanisms before the Attorney General 
can litigate on his behalf'). 
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on the· general question of exhaustion in§ 1983 actions. Also 
revealing as to the limited purpose of § 1997e is Congress' 
consistent refusal to adopt legislation imposing a general no-
exhaustion requirement. Thus, for example, in 1979, a bill 
was introduced into the Senate providing: 
"No court of the United States shall stay or dismiss any 
civil action brought under this Act on the ground that 
the party bringing such action failed to exhaust the rem-
edies available in the courts or the administrative agen-
cies of any State." S.l983, 96th Congress, 1st Session. 
The bill was never reported out of committee. 
The requirement that plaintiffs exhaust available and ade-
quate administrative remedies-subject to well developed 
exceptions-is firmly established in virtually every area of 
the law. This is dictated in § 1983 actions by common sense, 
as well as by comity and federalism, where adequate state 
administrative remedies are available. 
If the exhaustion question were properly before us, I 
would affirm the Court of Appeals. 
I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER joins 
in Part II of this dissenting opinion. 
~ 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court holds that the limitations on federal judicial 
power embodied in the Eleventh Amendment and in the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity are not jurisdictional. I con-
sider this holding to be a serious departure from established 
constitutional doctrine. 
I dissent also from the Court's rejection of the rule of "flex-
ible" exhaustion of state administrative remedies developed 
and stated persuasively by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, sitting en bane. In disagreeing with the 17 judges 
of the Court of Appeals who adopted the flexible exhaustion 
principle, this Court places mistaken reliance on the Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et 
seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I disagree with both portions of the 
Court's holding and therefore dissent. 
I. The Eleventh Amendment1 
A 
' The Eleventh Amendment provides: 
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State." 
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In this "reverse discrimination" action, petitioner, an em-
ployee of the Florida International University, brought suit 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the Board of Regents of the 
State of Florida. 2 She did not name the individual regents 
as defendants. She sued for $500,000 in damages, and for 
injunctive and other equitable relief. See ante, at --, n. 2. 
The Board filed a motion to dismiss arguing that petitioner's 
suit was premature in light of her failure to exhaust available 
administrative remedies. The District Court agreed and 
granted the motion to dismiss. 
On petitioner's appeal, the Board added the bar of the 
Eleventh Amendment to its defense. 3 It argued that as an 
2 As the Court notes, see ante, at--, n. 1, petitioner originally named 
the Florida International University as defendant. Because the Florida 
International University lacks the capacity to sue or be sued, the District 
Court found that it was not a proper defendant. Petitioner was permitted 
to amend her complaint, and she simply substituted the Board of Regents. 
In addition to racial discrimination, petitioner also claimed that she had 
been discriminated against on the basis of her sex. 
8 The Court repeatedly has held that the defense of the Eleventh 
Amendment may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 (1974) ("Eleventh Amendment defense suffi-
ciently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be 
raised in the trial court"). 
The Board's brief on appeal was divided into three parts. Part III was 
devoted to the argument that "the Eleventh Amendment precludes subject 
matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs complaint." !d., at 17. A lengthy stat-
utory addendum was attached in support of the arguments advanced in this 
section of the brief. After the case was scheduled for rehearing en bane, 
the parties filed short-e. g. four and ten page-supplemental briefs to be 
considered in addition to the main briefs already submitted to the Court of 
Apeals. The supplemental briefs did not add to the discussion of the Elev-
enth Amendment issue. But the question was placed before the Court of 
Appeals en bane, as it had been placed before the panel, through the thor-
ough discussion in the main briefs. 
This Court's explanation for not addressing the Eleventh Amendment 
issue is that it was not considered below. See n. 19, ante. But contrary 
to the implication in the Court's explanation, the issue-as shown here-
was urged by the Board and argued here. 
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instrumentality of the State, the Board could not be sub-
jected to suit in federal court absent a waiver of immunity. 4 
And it asserted that there had been no waiver. Although 
the Board of Regents was created as a body corporate with 
power "to sue and be sued . . . to plead and be impleaded in 
all courts of law and equity," Fla. Stat. § 240.042(1), it is well 
established that language such as this does not operate to 
waive the defense of the Eleventh Amendment. 5 In reply, 
'The Board of Regents of the Division of Universities of the Depart-
ment of Education is established by the Florida Education Code as a part 
of the State University System. Fla. Stat. § 240.2011. The Board con-
sists of the Commissioner of Education and twelve citizens appointed by 
the Governor. Fla. Stat. § 240.207. The Board has general supervisory 
authority over the State University System. . Fla. Stat. § 240.209. 
Among its duties are the appointment of university presidents, the review 
of budget requests of each university in the state system, the preparation 
of an aggregated budget for the State University System, the development 
of a master plan, and the establishment of a systemwide personnel classifi-
cation and pay plan. Fla. Stat. § 240.209. 
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida. Fla. Stat. § 216.011. 
See Relyea v. State, 385 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. App. 1980). It may claim the 
defense of sovereign immunity in suits under state law. See ibid. 
Numerous courts of appeals have held state universities or state Boards 
of Regents immune from suit in federal court by reason of the Eleventh 
Amendment. See, e. g., Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F. 2d 
1345, 1349 (CA9 1981); Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451 F. 2d 1287 
(CAlO 1971); Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F. 2d 1071 (CA9 1981). 
•see e. g., Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home, 450 U.S. 
147, 150 (1981); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commn, 359 U. S. 
275, 276-277 (1959) ("The conclusion that there has been a waiver of immu-
nity will not be lightly inferred ... And where a public instrumentality is 
created with the right 'to sue and be sued' that waiver of immunity in the 
particular setting may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special 
character in the state, not the federal courts"); Kennecott Cooper Corp. v. 
State Tax Commn, 327 U. S. 573 (1946) (language in state statute provid-
ing for suit in "any court of competent jurisdiction" will not be understood 
l 
as a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment); Ford Motor Co., v. Department 
of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945) (same); Great Northern Life Insurance 
Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1~4) ("a clear declaration of the state's in-
l{ 
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petitioner argued that whether the statute creating the 
Board amounted to a waiver-and petitioner believed that it 
did-the Eleventh Amendment simply was irrelevant to the 
equitable claims she had lodged against the State. See 
Reply Brief at 3-4. 
Neither the Court of Appeals panel nor the Court of Ap-
peals en bane addressed the Board's Eleventh Amendment 
defense. They directed their attention solely to the question 
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The panel held 
that there was no exhaustion requirement in § 1983 suits and 
remanded to the District Court for consideration of the 
Board's Eleventh Amendment argument. 612 F. 2d 946 
(CA5 1980). The Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, reversed 
holding that § 1983 plaintiffs must exhaust available and rea-
sonable administrative remedies. 634 F. 2d 900 (CA5 1981). 
Again the court did not consider the Board's Eleventh 
Amendment defense. 
l tention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found"); Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F. 2d 1166, 1177 (CA5 
1976). Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974) ("In deciding 
whether a state has waived its constitutional protection under the Elev-
enth Amendment, we will find waiver only where stated 'by the most ex-
press language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as 
[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction."'). It is diffi-
{ 
cult to reconcile the Court's consistent requirement of an express waiver 
with the approach advocated by JUSTICE WHITE. See ante, at --, n. *. 
At oral argument here the Assistant Attorney General of Florida stated 
that the Florida legislature had not waived the Eleventh Amendment and 
had waived the defense of sovereign immunity "only in selected tort cases." 
Tr. at 26. See Bragg v. Board of Public Instruction, 36 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 
1948) ("The mere fact that the Board of Public Instruction is created as a 
body corporate with power to sue and be sued does not affect its immunity 
from tort"); Relyea v. State, supra (Board of Regents retains defense of 
sovereign immunity); Fla. Stat. § 111.071(i)(b)(4) (provision for payment by 
the state of civil rights judgments against state officers-including judg-
ments under 42 U. S. C. § 1983--does not waive sovereign immunity "or 
any other defense or immunity" to such lawsuits). Cf. Long v. Richardson, 
525 F. 2d 74, 79 (CA6 1975) (state university's immunity from suit under 
state law disposes of Eleventh Amendment question). 
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The Eleventh Amendment question was raised before this 
Court, at the first opportunity after the Court of Appeals' de-
cision, in the Board's response to the petition for writ of cer-
tiorari. The Board argued, as it had on appeal, that it was 
an arm of the State and that it had not waived its immunity 
from suit in federal court. 6 Again petitioner answered that 
at most the Eleventh Amendment defense would bar her 
claim for damages. And, even as to this claim, petitioner 
now argued that the Amendment would not bar damages if 
the Board could meet the claim out of its "own funds" -e. g., 
from gifts and bequests-rather than from the State Treas-
ury. These arguments were repeated at oral argument. 7 
B 
The Court views the jurisdictional question presented by 
the Eleventh Amendment as if it were of little or no impor-
tance. Its entire discussion of the question is relegated to a 
conclusory note at the end of the opinion. See ante, at--, 
n. 19. The Court concedes that the Amendment and the bar 
of sovereign immunity are "jurisdictional," but only in the 
sense that the State may raise the claim at any point in the 
proceedings. The statement is then made that the Amend-
' See Reply Brief at 23 ("Should this Court grant the writ, the Board 
respectfully submits that review should be limited to the jurisdictional is-
sues discussed below and this Court should vacate the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion with instructions to dismiss [petitioner's] suit for lack of 
jurisdiction."). 
The Court in note 19, ante, attaches importance to the Assistant Attor-
ney General's statement at oral argument that the Board wanted the ex-
haustion issue decided. This must be viewed, however, in light of the 
Board's unsuccessful attempt to have this Court first decide the Eleventh 
Amendment issue. Moreover, a party's request-short of a binding 
waiver-cannot relieve this Court of its duty to resolve a jurisdictional 
question. 
7 Tr. of Oral Argument 25-28, 40-41. At oral argument, the Board 
stated that the Eleventh Amendment question had not been addressed in 
its main briefs to this Court "because of the grant of certiorari." I d., at 
27. 
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ment is not jurisdictional "in the sense that it must be raised 
and decided by this Court on its own motion." Ante, at--, 
n. 19.8 The Court cites to no authority in support of this 
statement, 9 and it would be surprising if any existed. The 
reason that the Eleventh Amendment question may be raised 
at any point in the proceedings is precisely because it places 
limits on the basic authority of federal courts to entertain 
suits against a state. The history and text of the Eleventh 
Amendment, the principle of sovereign immunity exemplified 
by it, and the well established precedents of this Court make 
clear that today's decision misconceives our jurisdiction and 
the purpose of this Amendment. 
A basic principle of our constitutional system is that the 
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Their au-
thority extends only to those matters within the judicial 
power of the United States as defined by the Constitution. 
In language that could not be clearer, the Eleventh Amend-
8 In view of the Board's repeated efforts to raise the Eleventh Amend-
ment question, and its specific request that this Court vacate the decision 
of the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction, see note 6 supra, it is hardly 
correct to say that the Court must now raise the question of jurisdiction on 
its own motion. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975). In any 
event, "we are obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to 
the existence of federal jurisdiction." Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 
429 u. s. 274, 278 (1977). 
9 The Court cites, with a "compare" signal, to Mt. Healthy City Board of 
Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274,279 (1977). The Mt. Healthy Court in no way 
suggested that the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of sovereign 
immunity embodied in Article III were less than jurisdictional. Indeed, 
the Court found it necessary to resolve the Eleventh Amendment question 
in that case prior to reaching the merits. 
On the contrary, the Court consistently has viewed the Amendment as 
jurisdictional. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975), the Court 
raised the question of the Eleventh Amendment even though the State had 
asserted the bar of the Amendment only in its answer to the complaint and 
had thereafter abandoned this defense. Unlike the Board of Regents in 
this case, the State of Iowa had not advanced the defense in this Court. 
Even so, the Sosna Court raised and addressed the question. These 
precedents are ignored by the Court today. 
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ment removes from the judicial power, as set forth in Article 
III, suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States." · When an Amendment to the Constitution 
states in plain language that "the judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend" to suits against a 
state, from what source does the Court today derive its juris-
diction? The Court's "back-of-the-hand" treatment of this 
threshold issue offers no answer. Questions of jurisdiction 
and of the legitimate exercise of power are fundamental in 
our federal constitutional system. 10 
c 
The Eleventh Amendment was adopted as a response to 
this Court's assumption of original jurisdiction in a suit 
brought against the State of Georgia. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 
Dall. 419 (1793). Relying upon express language in Article 
III extending the judicial power to controversies between a 
State and Citizens of another State, the Court found that it 
had jurisdiction. The decision is said to have created a shock 
throughout the country. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 
1, 11 (1890). The Amendment was adopted shortly there-
after, and the Court understood that it had been overruled: 
"the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could 
not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, 
in which a State was sued by the citizens of another State, or 
by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." Id., at 11. 
In light of the history and wording of the Amendment, the 
Court has viewed the Amendment as placing explicit limits 
on the judicial power as defined by Article III. See Nevada 
10 "Because of their unusual nature, and because it would not simply be 
wrong but indeed would be an unconstitutional invasion of the powers re-
served to the states if the federal courts were to entertain cases not within 
their jurisdiction, the rule is well settled that the party seeking to invoke 
the jurisdiction of a federal court must demonstrate that the case is within 
the competence of that court." Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 3522. 
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v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 421 (1979). But more than that, and 
beyond the express provisions of the Amendment, the Court 
has recognized that the Amendment stands for a principle of 
sovereign immunity by which the grant of authority in Arti-
cle III itself must be measured. 11 Thus, in Hans v. Louisi-
ana, supra, the Court held that the federal judicial power did 
not extend to a suit against a nonconsenting State by one of 
its own citizens. Although the Eleventh Amendment by its 
terms does not apply to such suits, the Court found that the 
language of the Amendment was but an illustration of a 
larger principle: Federal jurisdiction over suits against a 
State, absent consent, "was not contemplated by the Con-
stitution when establishing the judicial power of the United 
States." I d., at 15. 12 See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436 
(1900). 
Similarly, in Ex Parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490 
(1921), the Court found that despite the Eleventh Amend-
ment's specific reference to suits in "law or equity," the prin-
ciple of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Amendment 
would not permit the extension of federal admiralty jurisdic-
11 "[T]he Eleventh Amendment was introduced to clarify the intent of 
the Framers concerning the reach of the federal judicial power. . . . The 
Eleventh Amendment served effectively to reverse the particular holding 
in Chisholm, and, more generally, to restore the original understanding 
.. . Thus, despite the narrowness of the language of the Amendment, its 
spirit has consistently guided this Court in interpreting the reach of the 
federal judicial power generally ... " Employees v. Missouri Public 
Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 292-293 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring). 
12 The Hans Court quoted at some length from the constitutional debates 
concerning the scope of Article III. In the eighty-first number of the Fed-
eralist, for example, Hamilton sought to dispel the suggestion that Article 
III extended federal jurisdiction over suits brought against one of the 
states: "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to 
the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and 
the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the 
attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State 
in the Union." 134 U. S., at 13 (emphasis in original). 
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tion over a nonconsenting State. The Court applied the 
same approach in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 
(1934), in which the Court refused to take jurisdiction over a 
suit against a State by a foreign state. On its face, Article 
III provided jurisdiction over suits "between a State ... and 
foreign States." Nor did the Eleventh Amendment specifi-
cally exempt the states from suit by a foreign state. Never-
theless, the Court concluded that the judicial power of the 
United States, granted by Article III, did not extend so far: 
"We think that Madison correctly interpreted Clause one of 
§ 2 of Article III of the Constitution as making provision for 
jurisdiction of a suit against a State by a foreign State in the 
event of the State's consent but not otherwise." I d., at 330. 
In this case a resident of the State of Florida has sued a 
Board exercising a major function of the State's sovereign au-
thority. As prior decisions have held, whether this case is 
viewed only under the Eleventh Amendment-with its ex-
plicit limitation on federal jurisdiction-or under Article III, 
the analysis must be the same. Absent consent, the "judicial 
power of the United States," as defined by Article III and the 
Eleventh Amendment, simply does not extend to suits 
against one of the States by a citizen of that State:13 
'
3 Unlike other limitations on federal jurisdiction, the limitation imposed 
by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity may 
be waived by consent unequivocally expressed. This was the understand-
ing of the doctrine at the time the Constitution was adopted, see note 11 
supra, and the Court has interpreted the "judicial power of the United 
States" as used in the Eleventh Amendment and Article III accordingly. 
But the fact that the state or the United States may consent to federal ju-
risdiction, does not render the Eleventh Amendment or the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity embodied in Article III "quasi" jurisdictional. Quite 
simply, where there has not been consent, there is no jurisdiction. See 
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941) ("The United States, 
as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and the 
terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction 
to entertain the suit"); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co., 309 U. S. 506, 514 (1940) ("Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge 
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"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a 
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a 
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the 
United States that it has become established by repeated 
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power 
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority 
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a 
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens 
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign 
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not 
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fun-
damental rule of which the Amendment is but an exem-
plification." Ex Parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490 
(1921) (emphasis added). 
The Court does not distinguish these unquestioned prece-
dents. They are wholly and inexplicably ignored. Quite 
simply the Court today disregards controlling decisions and 
the explicit limitation on federal court jurisdiction in Article 
III and the Eleventh Amendment. The Court does recog-
nize that the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional "in the 
sense" that the State may raise the bar of the Amendment for 
the first time on appeal. Yet the Court misses the point of 
this statement. The reason that the bar of the Amendment 
may be raised at any time-as the Court previously has ex-
plained-is precisely because it is jurisdictional: 
"The objection to petitioner's suit as a violation of the 
Eleventh Amendment was first made and argued . . . in 
this Court. This was in time, however. The Eleventh 
Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit 
limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling 
force that this Court will consider the issue arising under 
this Amendment . . . even though urged for the first 
against a sovereign. Absent that consent, the attempted exercise of judi-
cial power is void."). 
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time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of 
Treasury, 323 U. S. 454, 467 (1945). 14 
Despite these precedents, and apparently because of an un-
explained anxiety to reach the exhaustion issue decided by 
the Court of Appeals, this Court remands the issue of its own 
jurisdiction to the courts below. 
D 
I believe that the Eleventh Amendment question must be 
addressed and that the answer could hardly be clearer. This 
is an action under § 1983. 15 Petitioner seeks relief from the 
Board of Regents of the State of Florida, a major instrumen-
tality or agency of the State. Petitioner's argument that the 
statute incorporating the Board should be understood to 
waive the Eleventh Amendment is foreclosed by numerous 
decisions of this Court and is unsupported by State law. 
See, e. g., Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home 
Assn, 450 U. S. 147 (1981); note 5, supra. Similarly, peti-
tioner's suggestion that the Eleventh Amendment does not 
"See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 (1974); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 
U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975); Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 
278 (1977). The Court has consistently viewed the Eleventh Amendment 
question as jurisdictional. See Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 
322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944) ("A state'sfreedomfrom litigation was established 
as a constitutional right through the Eleventh Amendment") (emphasis 
added); Monaco v. Mississippi, supra, at 320 (Question is "whether this 
Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought by a foreign State against 
a State without her consent"). 
15 The states consented to a dimunition of their sovereignty by ratifying 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In its exercise of the powers granted to it 
by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may lift the bar of sover-
eign immunity. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). Thus, if 
petitioner had brought this suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, there would have been no jurisdictional problem. But petitioner did 
not do so, and the Court has held that Congress has not removed the bar of 
sovereign immunity in§ 1983 actions. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 
(1979). 
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bar her equitable claims against the Board must be rejected. 
The Amendment applies to suits "in law or equity." All suits 
against an unconsenting State-whether for damages or in-
junctive relief-are barred. See Cory v. White,-- U. S. 
-- (1982). 16 Finally, the rule in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 
123 (1908), permitting a federal court to order state officials 
to obey federal law in the future, is simply irrelevant to this 
case. 17 Petitioner did not sue the members of the Board of 
16 "It would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment 
does not bar a suit to enjoin the State itself simply because no money judg-
ment is sought. . . . [T]he Eleventh Amendment by its terms clearly ap-
plies to a suit seeking an injunction, a remedy available only from equity." 
Cory v. White, -- U. S. --, -- (1982). 
"Under the theory of Ex parte Young the Eleventh Amendment does 
not bar suits against state officers because when a state officer "comes into 
conflict with the superior authority of [the] Constitution, ... he is ... 
stripped of his official or representative character." I d., at 159. The ra-
tionale of that decision has no application to suits against the State or its 
agencies. Although an individual official may be viewed as acting on his 
own and without State authority when acting against federal law, the 
State-or an agency of the State-cannot act other than in its official State 
capacity. Similarly, an action for damages against the state, or an arm of 
the state, seeks damages that must be paid from the state's own coffers-
whether the damages come directly from the State's general fund or from 
some other State fund. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Tax Commn, 327 
U. S. 573 (1946) (segregated funds of the State Tax Commission are State 
monies subject to the Eleventh Amendment). 
Moreover, the fact that the Board is a corporate entity under state law 
does not permit application of the rule in Ex parte Young to the Board it-
self-as if the Board were an official. This Court repeatedly has held the 
Eleventh Amendment to bar suit against such state corporate agencies. 
See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147 
(1981); Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47; Ford Motor 
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 454 (1945); Kennecott Copper 
Corp. v. State Tax Commn, 327 U. S. 572 (1946). 
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911), is not to 
the contrary. In that case suit was brought against a state college in 
state court to recover damages caused by the college's construction of a 
dyke. Although the Court discussed the Eleventh Amendment in some 
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Regents. She sued the Board itself, an arm of the State of 
Florida. 
In my view, the Eleventh Amendment-and the principle 
of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Amendment and 
embodied in Article III-clearly bars the suit in this case. 
The Court's refusal to address the question of its own juris-
diction violates well established precedents of this Court as 
well as the basic premise that federal courts are courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction. Even had the parties neglected to address 
the Eleventh Amendment question, it would have been our 
responsibility to consider it on our own motion. In fact, the 
question has been fully briefed to the Court of Appeals and 
raised in this Court. See note 8, supra. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 
419 U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975). I would dismiss this suit and 
vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
II. Exhaustion of Remedies 
In view of my belief that this case should be dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds, I address the exhaustion question 
only briefly. Seventeen judges joined in the Court of Ap-
peal's persuasive opinion adopting a rule of "flexible" exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies in § 1983 suits. Other 
Courts of Appeals have adopted a similar rule. See e. g., 
detail, there was simply no Eleventh Amendment question in that case. 
It was clear before Hopkins that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to 
bar review in this Court of any federal question presented in a suit against 
a State in state court. See Chandler v. Dix, 194 U. S. 590, 592 (1904). 
Cf. University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 
(1978). Moreover, the Hopkins Court did not consider the college's activi-
ties in that case to be governmental. 221 U. S., at 647. In short, no 
Eleventh Amendment question was presented to the Court. The opinion in 
Hopkins has never been cited by this Court for the proposition that the 
Eleventh Amendment is no bar to suit against a state corporate agency in 
federal court. See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home 
Assn, supra; Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978); Parden v. Terminal 
R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). 
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Eisen Vo Eastman, 421 F. 2d 560 (CA2 1969); Secret v. 
Brierton, 584 F. 2d 823 (CA7 1978). The opinion for the en 
bane court carefully reviewed the exhaustion doctrine in gen-
eral and as applied to § 1983 actions. It found that the prior 
decisions of this Court did not clearly decide the question. 18 
See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v. 
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 575 n. 14 (1973). And it concluded 
that the exhaustion of adequate and appropriate state admin-
istrative remedies would promote the achievement of the 
rights protected by § 1983. 
I agree with the Court of Appeals' opinion. The require-
ment that a § 1983 plaintiff exhaust adequate state adminis-
trative remedies was the accepted rule of law until quite re-
cently. See Eisen v. Eastman, supra, at 567. The rule 
rests on sound considerations. It does not defeat federal 
court jurisdiction, it merely defers it. 19 It permits the states 
to correct violations through their own procedures, and it en-
courages the establishment of such procedures. It is consist-
ent with the principles of comity that apply whenever federal 
courts are asked to review state action or supersede state 
proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). 
Moreover, and highly relevant to the effective functioning 
of the overburdened federal court system, the rule conserves 
and supplements scarce judicial resources. In 1961, the year 
that Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), was decided, only 
'
8 "[l]n all the cases in which the Supreme Court has articulated its no-
exhaustion rule, the state administrative remedies were sufficiently inade-
quate that exhaustion would not have been appropriate in any event." 
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harvo L. Rev. 
1133, 1274 (1977). 
19 Cfo Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary,- U. S. -,-
(1982) (BRENNAN, Jo, concurring) (exhaustion requirement in § 1983 cases 
can be justified by "a somewhat lesser showing 0 0 0 where . 0 0 we are con-
cerned not with the displacement of the§ 1983 remedy, but with the defer-
ral of federal court consideration pending exhaustion of the state adminis-
trative process"). 
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270 civil rights actions were begun in the federal district 
courts. Annual Report of the Director ofthe Administrative 
Office of the U. S. Courts 238 (1961). In 1981, over 30,000 
such suits were commenced. 20 Annual Report of the Direc-
tor, 63, 68 (1981). The result of this unprecedented increase 
in civil rights litigation is a heavy burden on the federal 
courts to the detriment of all federal court litigants, including 
others who assert that their constitutional rights have been 
infringed. 
The Court argues that past decisions of the Court categori-
cally hold that there is no exhaustion requirement in § 1983 
suits. But as the Court of Apeals demonstrates, and as the 
Court recognizes, many of these decisions can be explained as 
applications of traditional exceptions to the exhaustion re-
quirement. See McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 
668 (1963). Other decisions speak to the question in an off-
hand and conclusory fashion without full briefing and argu-
ment. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 251 
(1971) (unargued per curiam); Damico v. California, 389 
U. S. 416 (1967) (unargued per curiam). Moreover, a cate-
gorical no-exhaustion rule would seem inconsistent with the 
decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), prescrib-
ing abstention when state criminal proceedings are pending. 
At least where administrative proceedings are pending, 
Younger would seem to suggest the appropriateness of ex-
haustion. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574-575 
(1973). Yet the Court today adopts a fiat rule without 
exception. 
The Court seeks to support its no exhaustion rule with in-
dications of congressional intent. Finding nothing directly 
20 Of the approximately 30,000 civil rights fuits filed in fiscal year 1981, 
15,639 were filed by state prisoners under§ 1983. The remainder involved 
a variety of civil rights suits. Annual Report of the Director of the Ad-
ministrative Office of the U. S. Courts 63, 68 (1981). See Parratt v. Tay-
lor, 451 U. S. 527, 554 n. 13 (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring). 
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on point in the history of the Civil Rights Act itself, the 
Court places primary reliance on the recent Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 
ed., Supp. IV). This legislation was designed to authorize 
the Attorney General to initiate civil rights actions on behalf 
of institutionalized persons. § 1997a. The Act also placed 
certain limits on the existing authority of the Attorney Gen-
eral to intervene in suits begun by institutionalized persons. 
See§ 1997c. In addition, in§ 1997e, the Act sets forth an ex-
haustion requirement but only for § 1983 claims brought by 
prisoners. 
On the basis of the exhaustion provision in § 1997e, andre-
marks primarily by Representative Kastenmeier, the Court 
contends that Congress has endorsed a general no exhaustion 
rule. The irony in this reasoning should be obvious. A 
principal concern that prompted the Department of Justice to 
support, and the Congress to adopt, § 1997e was the vast in-
crease in § 1983 suits brought by state prisoners in federal 
courts. There has been a year-by-year increase in these 
suits since the mid-1960's. The increase in fiscal 1981 over 
fiscal 1980 was some 26%, resulting in a total of 15,639 such 
suits filed in 1981 as compared with 12,397 in 1980. The 1981 
total constituted over 8.6% of the total federal district court 
docket. Although most of these cases present frivolous 
claims, many are litigated through the courts of appeals to 
this Court. The burden on the system fairly can be de-
scribed as enormous with few, if any, benefits that would not 
be available in meritorious cases if exhaustion of appropriate 
state administrative remedies were required prior to any fed-
eral court litigation. It was primarily this problem that 
prompted enactment of § 1997e. 21 
21 The exhaustion requirement in § 1997e only becomes effective if the 
Attorney General or a federal district court determines that the available 
prison grievance procedures comply with standards set forth in subsection 
(b) of§ 1997e. As of this date, the Department of Justice has not certified 
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Moreover, it is clear from the legislative history that Con-
gress simply was not addressing the exhaustion problem in 
any general fashion. The concern focused on the problem of 
prisoner petitions. The new Act had a dual purpose in this 
respect. In addition to requiring prior exhaustion of ade-
quate state remedies, Congress wished to authorize the At-
torney General to act when necessary to protect the constitu-
tional rights of prisoners, but at the same time minimize the 
need for federal action of any kind by requiring prior exhaus-
tion. Both sponsors of the Act in the Senate made this clear. 
Senator Hatch explained § 1997e as follows: 
"In actions relating to alleged violations of the constitu-
tional rights of prisoners, such persons may be required 
to exhaust internal grievance procedures before the At-
torney General can become involved pursuant to [the 
Act]." Congressional Record S1713, February 26, 1980. 22 
Senator Bayh, the author of the Act, decribed the exhaustion 
provision in similar terms: 
"[l]n the event of a prison inmate's rights being alleged 
to be violated ... then before the Justice Department 
could intervene or initiate ~uits, the prison inmate or 
class of inmates would have to pursue all of their 
adiminstrative remedies within the State law before the 
the inmate grievance procedures of even a single state. 
22 Senator Hatch offered the same explanation on several other occasions 
in the course of the debate. See Congressional Record S4293, April 29, 
1980 ("Section 7 would establish specific procedures that would be appli-
cable before the Attorney General could enter into an action in behalf of an 
imprisoned or incarcerated person. Such person would first have had to 
fully exhaust all internal grievance mechanisms that existed in the institu-
tion in which he was confined"); Congressonal Record S4626, May 6, 1980 
("Section 7(D) further clarifies that the administrative grievance proce-
dures established in section 7 are only for the purposes of requiring prison-
ers to exhaust internal grievance mechanisms before the Attorney General 
can litigate on his behalf'). 
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Justice Department could intervene under the provisions 
of [the Act]." Congressional Record S1859, February 
27, 1980 . . 
In short, in enacting the Civil Rights of Institutionalized 
Act Congress was focussing on the powers of the Attorney 
General, and the particular question of prisoners' suits, not 
on the general question of exhaustion in § 1983 actions. Also 
revealing as to the limited purpose of § 1997e is Congress' 
consistent refusal to adopt legislation imposing a general no-
exhaustion requirement. Thus, for example, in 1979, a bill 
was introduced into the Senate providing: 
"No court of the United States shall stay or dismiss any 
civil action brought under this Act on the ground that 
the party bringing such action failed to exhaust the rem-
edies available in the courts or the administrative agen-
cies of any State." S.1983, 96th Congress, 1st Session. 
The bill was never reported out of committee. 
The requirement that plaintiffs exhaust available and ade-
quate administrative remedies-subject to well developed 
exceptions-is firmly established in virtually every area of 
the law. This is dictated in§ 1983 actions by common sense, 
as well as by comity and federalism, where adequate state 
administrative remedies are available. 
If the exhaustion question were properly before us, I 
would affirm the Court of Appeals. 
I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER joins 
in Part II of this dissenting opinion. 
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Draft: Patsy v. Board of Regents, No. 80-1874 
Justice Powell, dissenting. 
The Court holds that the Board of Regents of the 
State of Florida, a state instrumentality, is subject to 
suit in federal court notwithstanding the bar of the 
Eleventh Amendment. The Court reaches this conclusion 
2. 
through a novel--and, to me, i llog ical--expans ion of the 
holding in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Court 
then rejects the rule of "flexible" exhaustion of state 
administrative remedies stated by the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane. Relying principally 
on the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 
u.s.c. §1997e (1976 ed., Supp. IV), the Court holds that 
any exhaustion requirement in §1983 suits would violate 
the intent of Congress. I disagree with both portions of 
the Court's holding and therefore dissent. 
~ (~,;a-
~ 
In interpreting the Eleventh ~~ Amendment, the 
Court has sought to accommodate both the principle of 
sovereign immunity embodied in the Amendment and the 
states' duty to obey--and the federal courts to enforce--
federal law. 1 Thus, it is well established that the State 
1The Eleventh Amendment provides: 
"The judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, 
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State." 
The Amendment was adopted in response to the Court's 
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). ~ 
Foetnebe eont4nue~ neKt page. 
3. 
is not "divested of its immunity 'on the mere ground that 
the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of 
the United States.'" Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 u.s. 
184, 186 (1964), quoting, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 
\~ 
10 (1890). 2 And the Court has held that even when a State
1 
is not named as a party to the suit, the Amendment 
nevertheless applies if the State is the real party in 
interest. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 
323 u.s. 459 (1945) • 3 
Court in Chisolm took original jurisdiction over an action 
to collect a debt brought by two citizens of South 
Carolina against the State of Georgia. The Court's 
decision "that a State was liable to suit by a citizen of 
another State or of a foreign country, literally shocked 
the Nation." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974). 
The Eleventh Amendment was adopted five years later. 
21n Hans the Court also held that the Amendment 
bars suits brought against an unconsenting State by its 
own citizens, although by its terms the Amendment does not 
apply to this situation. Cf. Monaco v. Mississip~i, 292 
U.S. 313 (1934) (Eleventh Amendment applies to ederal 
suits against an unconsenting state by a foreign nation). 
By contrast, the Amendment has not been applied to suits 
against a State brought by another State or by the United 
States. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); 
United States v. MlSSlssippi, 380 u.s. 128 (1965). 
31n Ford Motor the plaintiff sued the department 
of treasury of the State of Indiana, and the three 
officials--the Governor, Treasurer, and Auditor--who 
constituted the board of the department of treasury. The 
plaintiff sought a refund of gross income taxes paid to 
the department. Suit was brought in federal District 
Court. The Court held that the suit was barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. The plaintiff was seeking a refund 
from the state not a personal judgment against the 
individual officials: " [W] hen the act ion is in essence 
one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is 
the real party in interest and is entitled to invoke its 
sovereign immunity from suit even though individual 
Footnote continued on next page. 
4. 
On the other hand, the Court has not interpreted 
the Amendment to bar federal court jurisdiction when the 
State has consented to suit, 4 or to bar review by this 
Court of an action brought against the State in state 
court. 5 Counties and municipalities may not claim immunity 
officials are nominal defendants." 323 u.s., at 464. See 
Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 663 ("It is well 
established that even though a State is not named a party 
to the action, the suit may nonetheless be barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment ... The rule has evolved that suit by 
private parties seeking to impose a liability which must 
be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment")~ Great Northern Life 
Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944). 
4see Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) ~ 
Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 u.s. 184 (1964). See 
Tribe, Intergovernmentar-- Immunities in Litigation, 
Taxation, and Regulation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 685 (1976) 
(" [U] nlike the identical ;feference to 'the judicial Power 
of the United States~ in~rticle III--a power which cannot 
be expanded by legislation or by consent of the parties to 
a lawsuit--the language of the eleventh amendment has not 
been interpreted to prohibit a suit once a state has given 
its consent"). In additio,n, by ratifying the Fourteenth yr Amendment, the states consented to a diminution of their 
sovereignt~, Thus, Congress may provide for suits against 
the States when exercising the powers granted to it by §5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 
427 U.S. 445 (1976) ~ Quern v. Jordan, 440 u.s. 332 (1979). 
5 In Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445 (1900), 
the Court noted that even if California had consented to 
suit only in its own courts, review would be available in 
this Court of any federal question: 
"If the California statute be construed as 
referring only to suits brought in one of its 
own courts, it does not follow that injustice 
will be done to any taxpayer whose case presents 
a Federal question. For, if he be denied any 
right, privilege or immunity secured by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States and 
specially set up by him, the case can be brought 
here upon writ of error from the highest court 
of the State." 
Accord Chandler v. Dix, 194 u.s. 590, 592 (1904) ~ Great 
Footnote continued on next page. 
5. 
under the Amendment. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 
529 (1890) . And under &:he im~ decisioA iofl Ex parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), a federal court may order 
state officials to obey federal law in the future. 6 
;B 
In this "reverse discrimination" action, 
petitioner brought suit under 42 u.s.c. §1983 against the 
Board of Regents of the State of Florida. 7 She did not 
Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47, 57 (1944). 
The Court's assumption of jurisdiction in University of 
California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), 
a case originating in state court, thus provides no 
support for today' s dec is ion. For the same reason, the 
Court's reliance upon Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural 
College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911), is misplaced. See infra. 
6under the theory, some would say fiction, of Ex 
parte Young, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits 
against state officers because when a state officer "comes 
into conflict with the superior authority of [the] 
Constitution, •.. he is ••• stripped of his official or 
representative character." Id., at 159. On this 
analysis, a prospective injunction requiring the official 
to conform his future behavior to federal law, does not 
require anything of the State and therefore does not run 
afoul of the Eleventh Amendment. The granting of 
_'1 _ retroactive relief, on the other hand, would require the 
~~~· official to take action in his offical capacity. Thus, if 
~ the official is required to pay damages from state funds, 
the State is directly affected. See Edelman v. Jordan, 
~ supra. Similarly, retroactive injunctive relief may 
~ -~ require the official to take action in his official 
~~ capacity and also would be barred by the Eleventh 
.J..C Amendment. Cf. Larson v. Domestic .!_ Foreign Commerce 
~./ Corp., 337 u.s. 682 (1949). Of course, in addition to 
~· . prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff may seek 
damages from the individual officer in his personal 
~ capacity. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-238 
~ ~ (1974). 
t~, . ~~ 7As the Court notes, see ante, at , n. 1, 
~~~~petitioner originally named the Florida International 
~-~(:... University as defendant. Because the Florida 
~~~ International University lacks the capacity to sue or be 
0 
~ · sued, the District Court found that it was not a proper 
J .~ defendant. Petitioner was permitted to amend her 




name the individual regents as defendants. She sued for 
$500,000 in damages, and requested a declaratory judgment 
d . . t' 1' f 8 an lnJunc 1ve re 1e . Under prior decisions of this 
Court, the appropriate Eleventh Amendment analysis of this 
{.A.) 
case ~m straightforward. This is an action under 
1\ 
§1983, and .we havef~at Congress has not removed the 
bar of the Elevent Amendment.~ns. See Quern 
v. Jordan, 440 u.s. 332 (1979). Petitioner seeks relief 
from the Board of Regents of the State of Florida, an 
instrumentality or agency of the State. 9 It does not 
~~omplaint, and she simply substituted the Board of 
~,.A/ Regents. 
~ pv In addition to racial discrimination, petitioner 
.~
{5 also claimed that she had been discriminated against on 
I' the basis of her sex. 
 ~~ 8Petitioner sought a declaratory judgment 
~ ().J' "declaring that the Plaintiff has suffered from acts of 
~ discrimination." In addition, she asked the court to 
~~~~ ~ "[r]equire Defendant to remedy the discrimination rvv ~ practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the next 
VV available position consistent with those previously 
/ .t?. applied for and for which she is qualified or in the 
~ alternative, to require the Defendant to pay to the 
Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary 
damages." She requested any further equitable and 
injunctive relief that the court deemed appropriate. 
9The Board of Regents of the Division of 
Universities of the Department of Education is established 
by the Florida Education Code as a part of the State 
University System. Fla. Stat. 240.2011. The Board 
consists of the Commissioner of Education and twelve 
citizens appointed by the Governor, approved by three 
members of the Cabinet, and confirmed by the Senate. Fla. 
Stat. 240. 207. The chief administrative officer of the 
Board is the Chancellor, who serves by appointment of the 
Board. 
The Board has general supervisory authority over the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
7. 
appear that the State has waived the bar of the Eleventh 
State University System. Fla. Stat. 240.209. Among its 
duties are the appointment of university presidents, the 
review of budget requests of each university in the state 
system, the preparation of an aggrgated budget for the 
State University System, the development of a master plan, 
and the establishment of a systemwide personnel 
classification and pay plan. Fla. Stat. §240.209. 
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida. 
Fla. Stat. §216.011. See Relyea v. State, 385 So.2d 1378 
{Fla. App. 1980} {"Florida Atlantic University, the Board 
of Regents and the Chancellor of the State University 
System are agencies and instrumentalities 'of the State of 
Florida."}. Accord Greer v. Mathews, 409 So.2d 1105 {Fla. 
App. 1982}. Cf. Byron v. University of Florida, 403 F. 
Supp. 49, 51 {N.D. Fla. 1975} {"It must be conceded that 
the University is a political instrumentality of the State 
of Florida."}~ Dacey v. Florida Bar, Inc., 414 F. 2d 195, 
198 {CAS 1969} {state bar a state agency}~ Spangler v. 
Florida State Turnpike Authority, 106 So. 2d 421, 422 
{1958} {Turnpike Authority a state agency even though its 
revenues derive primarily from tolls}. The Board may 
claim the defense of sovereign immunity in suits at state 
law. See Relyea v. State, supra~ State Bd. of Regents v. 
Yant, 360 So. 2d 99 {Fla. App. 1978}. 
Numerous Courts of Appeals have held state 
universities or state Boards of Regents immune from suit 
~in federal court by reason of the Eleventh Amendment. See 
Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F. 2d 1345, 1349 
{CA9 1981}~~ Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451 F. 2d 
1287 {CAlO 1971}~ Ronwin v. Shapiro;-657 F. 2d 1071 {CA9 
1981}~ Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Trustees of State Colleges in 
Colorado, 356 F. 2d 599 {CAlO 1066} ~ Jefferson County 
Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, 656 F. 2d 92 , 99 {CAS 
1981}, cert granted on~ different question, ___ u.s. __ _ 
{ 198 2} ~ Jag nandan v. Giles, 5 38 F. 2d 1166 {CAS 19 7 6} 
{Board of Trustees of Mississippi State University}~ 
~ Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 
:--...J 590 F. 2d 470 {CA3 1978} ~ Prebble v. Brodrick, 535 F. 2d 
605 {CAlO 1976} {Univerity of Wyom1ng} ~ Long v. 
--........; Richardson, 525 F. 2d 74 {CA6 1974} {Memphis State 
University}. 
The majority argues that the Courts of Appeals are 
split on the question of whether damages can be awarded 
against state universities. Yet the two cases cited by 
the Court to demonstrate a split on this question do not 
support the Court's assertion. In SON! v. Board of 
Trustees, 513 F. 2d 347 {CA6 1975} the court found that 
the Board of Trustees had waived its immunity to suit, 
while in Goss v. Jacinto Junior College, 588 F. 2d 96, 98-
99 {CAS 1979} the court reasoned that the particular 
junior college was similar to a county or municipality, an 
"independent 'political subdivision' as a matter of Texas 
statutory and common law." The Court suggests as well 
that the Courts of Appeals are agreed that injunctive 
relief may be awarded against state universities and state 
boards of regents. Yet again the cases cited provide 
Footnote continued on next page. 
8. 
Amendment by consenting to suit in federal court. 10 Nor 
can it be argued persuasively that the Board of Regents is 
similar to those local governmental bodies as to which 
Amendment does not extend. See Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. 
little support for the Court's assertion. In New England 
Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colorado, 
592 F. 2d 1196, 1201 (CAl 1979), the court held that 
individual members of the Board of Regents might be sued 
for prospective injunctive relief. It did not hold, 
however, as the Court implies, that the University itself 
might be sued. Rather, it accepted "the University's 
identification with the state." And in ~ Student 
Services v. Texas Ji. ~ M University, 612 F. ~ 160, 165 
(CAS 1980), it is unclear that the court held more than 
that officials of the University could be sued for 
injunctive relief. Unlike the situation in those two 
case, petitioner sued only the Board of Regents. 
10The Board of Regents is incorporated and has the 
power "to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be 
sued, and to plead and be impleaded 1n all courts of law 
and equity." Section 240.205, Fla. Stat. In past cases 
the Court has cautioned against inferring a waiver of 
immunity on the basis of similar such provisions. "The 
conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity will 
not be lightly inferred And where a public 
instrumentality is created with the right 'to sue and be 
sued' that waiver of immunity in the particular setting 
may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special 
character in the state, not the federal courts." Petty v. 
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commn, 359 u.s. 275, 276-277 
(19 59) • See Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 3 22 
u.S. 4 7, 54 ("When a state author izesa suit against 
itself to do justice to taxpayers who deem themselves 
injured by any exaction, it is not consonant with our dual 
system for the federal courts to be astute to read the 
consent to embrace federal as well as state courts"). In 
the absence of "any clear indication that the state 
intended to consent to suit in federal courts," Ford Motor 
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 u.s. 454, 465 (1945), 
there is no basis for inferring a waiver of the Eleventh 
Immunity in this case. See Bragg v. Board of Public 
Instruction, 36 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1948) ("The mere fact 
that the Board of Public Instruction is created as a body 
corporate with power to sue and be sued does not affect 
its immunity from tort")~ Martin v. University of 
Louisville, 541 F. 2d 1171, 1175 n. 4 (CA6 1976) ("Other 
courts have construed similar 'sue and be sued' language 
in the grant of a corporate charter to a university not to 
create a waiver of sovereign immunity"). 
9. 
Doyle, 429 u.s. 274, 279-281 {1977); Lake Country Estates 
v. Tahoe Planning Acency, 440 u.s. 391, 401 {1979). The 
Board of Regents is not a local body but rather bears 
responsibility for the State university system as a whole. 
Cf. Goss v. Jacinto Junior College, 588 F. 2d 9 6d {CAS 
1979) • 
I~ /Jm1ess the rule in Ex parte Young, -... 
supra, is applicable, the Eleventh Amendment clearly bars 
suit. But the theory in Ex parte Young, supra, wotlld seem 
~ 'h~ • • h . f ~..v--rrav~l\ no appl1cat1on to t e State 1tsel or to an 
instrumentality of the State. ~/-/rad petitioner 
~) 
sued the indittrel members of the, Boar~, tite t'ireory i:u Ex 
~laim, at least ~eclaratory relief, would not~~ 
~ ~) ~L_h-~ ~~ 
been barred) 11 In addition, petitioner could have sought~~ 
damages from the individual members of the Board of 
Regents in their personal capacities. 
But petitioner did not sue the members of the 
11Petitioner's injunctive 
retroactive to the extent that she 
Regents to appoint her to the next 
Presumably, such an appointment would 
of the state's authority. See note 3, 
relief may be 
asks the Board of 
available position. 





Board~e sued the Board itself, an arm of the State of 
Florida. One would have thought that Ex parte Young was 
simply irrelevant in these circumstances. Although an 
~~.a.£..~ 
individual official may be efiou~ to aet on his own and 
A 
without State authority when acting against federal law, 
I 
~~,..v 
the State--or,\~ depaftment' of the State--cannot act ~ 
~~~~~s~~41 
artythiflg--etSef'"-t:han the-state. Similarly, Lt is difficul~ 
to eoRsid.er an action for damages against the state)or an Ef!!!i';-
~ ..s 
arm of the state ~ seek~ damages 
Ht.d-~~~ 
whish \lill- Rot der ir:e 
...Jo -"' 
from the state's own coffers. Whether the damages come 
directly from the State's general fund or from some other 
State fund, the money is no less the State's. Indeed, 
direct application of Ex parte Young to the State and its 
instrumentalities would read the Eleventh Amendment out of 
---the Constitution. If the bar of the Amendment is lifted 
merely upon the naming of a State board, commission, 
agency or corporation--opening the way 
as to injunctive relief--then the 
l-1u-~~~ 
vittually ~~protection to the states. 
c 
Despite the weight of these 





Court undertakes to apply Ex parte Young to the Board of 
11. 
Regents itself. Relying upon the decision in Hopkins v. 
Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911), the 
Court reasons that the Board of Regents, as a body 
corporate, is no different from a state official. The 
Court attempts to bolster thi~sion by ~ 
~ ~ 
under Florida law the Board of Regents is termed the 
"director" of the Division of Universities. The Court 
concludes that, just as in Ex parte Young, the Board of 
Regents "may be sued for unconstitutional or unauthorized 
actions, as long as the plaintiff is not seeking monetary 
relief that must be paid out of the state treasury." 
Ante, at 8. ~ 
~'2 ~h:;:::;onclusion,l ~-~~A~ 4 
t\ finds ne -BI:i~ t .-i:fl "the precedents of this Court. As 
~:~~ ~ 
indicated above, the ~y~ Ex parte Young simply~ 
"' 
not lc;rally apply to a State or State instrumentality. 
The State cannot be "stripped" of its own authority. 
Moreover, if the Board of Regents is a State agency--and 
it clearly is--then its assets are also those of the 
State's. Yet the Court's decision exposes the Board's 
assets to a damage award on the double fiction that the 
12. 
Board is really an "official" assets 
~IY{~J 
State. On such a theory, a state,.\ tGll commission e-& 
~~~/ ~ ~ 
indQed any &t.«ee 6oQ.¥ wi th~e sources of income)-fy 
be sued for damages. In addition, such a conclusion is 
at odds with the Court's holding in Kennecott Copper Corp. 
v. Tax Commn, 327 U.S. 573 (1946), that the segregated 
funds of the State Tax Commission were State monies 
subject to the Eleventh Amendment. 
Nor does the Board of Regents' corporate status 
under state law support the Court's holding. State 
~f-1 lAA.-~ ~/ 
governments of a variety of boards, 
1\ " ~~-?tv~ 
commissions, agencies, and Board -of corporations. ~The 
~ Regent• t,;';;o less j;f' inStrumen:- of the State because~~ 
~... ~ /-z5 tb /] /7 - . 
~-h...-~~~~~ 
~ i.s a --lega-i entit¥~ with the power to contract, to sue and 
~~e sued. Jndee~ khis Cour.t repeatedly has held that a 
J t-- /)A)' ~ 






sue and be sued" does not support the inference that the 
State thereby waives the Eleventh Amendment. See Great 
Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47: Ford Motor 
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 u.s. 454 (1945); 
13. 
Kennecott Coppper Corp. v. State Tax Commn, 327 U.S. 572 
{1946) • h ~? 1 . h T e maJOO ty. s cone us1on t at corporate status 
converts a State body into a State official, subject to 
~-~~ 
suit, weuld S'e'em -te centradi:et-1, these well established 
precedents. 
~' I am unaware of any prior decision of 
l-td- Cv-u.-,.., 1- i 
this Court wftteh supports the ~·s application of Ex 
I 
parte Young to State instrumentalities. Hopkins v. 
Clemson College, supra, relied upon so heavily by the 
Court is simply irrelevant. In that case suit was brought 
against a state college in state court to recover damages 
caused by the college's construction of a dyke. The state 
courts held that the college was protected from suit by 
the state law of sovereign immunity. Although the Court 
discussed the Eleventh Amendment in some detail, there was 
simply no Eleventh Amendment question in that case. 12 It 
12The state college recognized that there was no 
Eleventh Amendment question. In its brief it noted: "It 
is difficult to see how either Section 2 of Article III, 
of the Constitution of the United States or the Eleventh 
amendment has any application to the inquiry whether a 
suit by a citizen of a State in its own Courts is a suit 
against that State. That seems to be purely a question of 




was clear before Hopkins that the Eleventh Amendment does 
not apply to bar review in this Court of any federal 
question presented in a suit against a State in state 
court. See note 5, supra. Indeed, were the question in 
Hopkins presented today, the Court undoubtedly would 
decline to review it: The state courts' holding that an 
action against the college could not be maintained because 
of sovereign immunity would be seen as an independent and 
adequate state law ground. See Georgia R. R. ~ Banking 
Co. v. Redwine, 335 u.s. 900 (1949). The fact remains 
that however the holding in Hopkins is stated, no Eleventh 
Amendment question was presented to the Court. 13 It 
therefore is no surprise that the opinion has rarely been 
cited in the subsequent decisions of this Court. 14 The 
13It is no easy matter to state the holding in 
Hopkins. The decision antedated Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 u.s. 64 (1938). It is likely that the Hopkins Court 
simply did not differentiate between the state law of 
sovereign immunity and the federal law of sovereign 
immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment. In Hamilton 
Mfg. Co. v. Trustees of State Colleges in Colorado, 356 F. 
2d 599, 601 n. 1 (CAlO 1966), the court viewed Hopkins as 
standing for a principle of agency law: "[N]either a state 
nor an individual can confer upon an agent authority to 
commit a tort, so as to excuse the perpetrator. In such 
cases the law of agency has no application,--the wrongdoer 
is treated as a principal, and individually liable for the 
damages inflicted, and subject to injunction ••. " Id. , 
quoting 221 u.s., at 643. ---
Footnote(s) 14 will appear on following pages. 
15. 
case does not deserve the pride of place given to it by 
the majority. 15 9 f LA-&- /U..IJU _. ~ 
Moreover, two recent decisions of this Court 
14The de is ion in Hopkins was most recently cited 
in Larson v. Domestic ~Foreign Corp., 337, u.s. 682 
(1949}. The ma:tG;ri-ty in Larson relied upon Hopkins for 
the proposit on that an "agent's liability for torts 
committed by him cannot be avoided by pleading the 
direction or atuhorization of his principal." 337 u.s., 
at 694. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion 
included Hopkins with cases standing for the proposition 
that jurisdiction is barred when the plaintiff seeks an 
"interest in property which concededly belonged to the 
Government, or demanded relief calling for an assertion of 
what was unquestionably official authority." Id., at 710 
& 29. The m&jori.t¥ does not cite to any,.<tleclSlOn of lh:i:e 
<Js.u..r..t that relies upon Hopkins for the principle that a 
state instrumentality may be sued in federal court. 
15Any reliance on Hopkins further must be tempered 
by the Court's view in Hopkins that it was not reviewing 
official action. Rather, it viewed the College's activity 
as proprietary in nature: 
"[T]his is not an action against the College for 
a tort committed in the prosecution of any 
governmental function. The fee was in the 
State, but the corporation, as equitable owner, 
was in possession, use and enjoyment of the 
property. For protecting the bot tom land the 
College, for its own corporate purposes and 
advantage, constructed the dyke. In so doing it 
was not acting in any governmental capacity. 
The embankment was in law similar to one which 
might have been built for private purposes by 
the plaintiff on the other side of the river. 
221 U.S., at 647. 
In Employees v. Department of Public Health and 
Welfare, 411 u.s. 279 (1973}, the Court distinguished the 
earlier Eleventh Amendment decision in Parden v. Terminal 
R. Co., 377 u.s. 184 (1964}, on the basis that Parden 
concerned State proprietary activity: "Parden involved 
the railroad business which Alabama operated 'for profit.' 
Parden was in the area where private persons and 
corporations normally ran the enterprise." By contrast, 
the Employees Court found that the employment practices of 
state hospitals did not concern state proprietary 
activity. A similar distinction can be drawn between 
Hopkins and the present case involving the employment 
practices of a state educational institution. 
16. 
on the majority's holding that 
state and corporate bodies may be 
treated as state "officials," subject to Ex parte Young. 
In Alabama v. Pugh, 438 u.s. 781 (1978), the Court held 
that suit for injunctive relief against the State of 
Alabama and the Alabama Board of Corrections was barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment. The Court found that "[t]here can 
be no doubt •.. that suit against the State and its Board 
of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless 
Alabama has consented to the filing of such a suit." Id., 
U der the rule announced today, however, there 
~--..... 
ould be considerable doubt whether suit 
f Corrections could be dismissed. were ever 
reated by single unit--and undoubtedly 
asily could be found--it would be said 
that the Board was really an "official" at least subject 
Similarly, in Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 
ftu_ ~ ~ ~ - d.-t.--
u.s. ~84 (1964), involving) a state owned railroa~\ 4::he----
~~~~ ~ ~ A~:::(OL -~  
Court never indicated that a state corporation could be P--
~~~~~L4.~~~~~ I 
sued as an "off1cial." The railway in Parden was 
~A~· 
..____~~-~p~4.dL~ ~6; 
~ uaZb.. a-r::v~~ -
17. 
authorized to operate "as though it were an ordinary 
common carrier." 377 us. 185. It performed services for 
profit and had contracts and agreements with various labor 
orgainzations. It was "indisputably a common carrier 
engaging in interstate commerce." Id. , at 185. 
Nonetheless, the Court cons ide red that the railroad was 
immune from suit in federal court unless the State had 
waived its immunity. 
State body, with separate funds, the railroad was no 
longer an instrumentality of the State but was merely a 
State official. 
In short, the Court's holding is supported 
neither by precedent nor logic.l6 
rl~~e<' .c.~ 
Court should wish to ~ the petitioner 
/1 
.:af!f' < 4 4 'SiL e.....c._ 
from what A c&n oAl¥- bQ termed 
16The majority suggests that in prior decisions the 
has permitted suit against State Boards of Regents. 
See ante, at 5. Yet in none of these suits was the 
~
.jurisdictional issue posed as it is here. Thus, for 
example, in University of California Board of Regents v. 
Bakke, 438 u.s. 265 (1978), the Eleventh Amendment issue 
was not present because the case was here on petition to 
the California Supreme Court. See note 5, supra. And in 
each of the other cases cited by the Court, the plaintiff 
had the good sense to name other defendants in addition to 
the particular state board. See, e. g., Board of Regents 
v. Tomanio, 446 u.s. 478 (1978); McLaur1n v-. -Oklahoma 
State Regents, 339 u.s. 637 (1950). 
18. 
announcing a 
new doctrine, one that exposes the instrumentalities of 
/ 
the State itself to suit in federal court. After today's 
decision, state boards and commissions may be sued for 
injunctive relief. I·n(jeeu-, tile !,;;t~ t~s~lf) 
bodies may be sued for damages on the fiction that their 
segregated assets are not the State's. 17 The Court's ~ 
~-~ ~"-' icn>~ 
,..t~oa~rr of Ex parte Young to the State itself ueriJ es-
~~./.J... Hu.- ~~~~. 1-1--~ ~ 
~ -
the careful balance worked out in this ~er of the law 
~~~ 1\ ) 
jand lea-ves little stan~ to the Eleventh Arne~ 
the sui t,~r alternatively remand to the 
? 
of Appeals for consideration of the Elevent . 
-::---:------.---.~~~;k.. ~ 1-o ~ a.-1-




17whether a State board, like a State offici~_!--~ 
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r- In short, in enacting ;;;;e Civil Rights 
Institutionalized Act Congress was focussing on the powers 
of the Attorney General, and the particular question 
~
prisoners' suits, not on 
exhaustion -ifl cl-9-83 actions -· 
the general questio~ 
~ 
;\ Perbaps -:mo:r;e 
 vf;;c;~;.,... .. v 
~Congress' consistent refusal to adopt legislation imposing 
a general no-exhaustion requirement. Thus, for example, 
in 1979, a bill was introduced into the Senate providing: 
"No court of the United States shall stay or dismiss any 
civil action brought under this Act on the ground that the 
party brining such action failed to exhaust the remedies 
available in the courts or the administrative agencies of 
any State." The bill was never reported out of 
committee. 21 
The requirement that plaintiffs exhaust 
available and adequate ~e~ administrative remedies--
subject to well developed exceptions--is firmly 
established in virtually every area of the la~ I seen& 
reason to dev:i.aJ;.e.... from --tbis ~mmon_ seRse ~le irr-§"'1-983 
a~s. 1fif the exhaustion question were properly before 
us, I would affirm the Court of Appeals. 
~-~19$3~~ 
v-z-~,~,~~~,1~ 
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If petitioner had sued the individual members of the 
"-.c~ 
Board, p&titii.clil&l7 '" claim for damages against them would 
~ .._ 
not have been barred by the Eleventh Amendmen~~ Nor 5 
would her claim for equitable relief to the extent it were 
limited to future conduct. But petitioner did not sue the 
members of the Board. She sued only the Board itself, an 
arm of the State of Florida. Moreover, the principle 
relief sought by petitioner would impose in the 10 
alternative - an affirmative duty on the Board to promote 
her to the next available position of comparable status to 
~ 
those to which she had applied, or }\equire/ the [Board] 
to pay to [petitioner] the sum of $500,000.00 as actual 
and exemplary damages." (David cite the complaint, and 15 
also say see n. 3 ante). 
··,. . ·' ·~ 
lfp/ss 05/28/82 Rider A, p. 23 (Patsy) 
PATSY23 SALLY-POW 
The conern that prompted the Department of Justice to 
support, and the Congress to adopt, §1997(e) was the vast 
increase in §1983 suits brought by state prisoners in 
federal courts. There has been a year-by-year increase in 
these suits since the mid-1960's. The increase in fiscal 
1981 over fiscal 1982 was some 26%, resulting in a total 
of 16,000 (David, get correct figure) such suits filed in 
1981 as compared with in 1980. The 1981 total 
constitued ____ % (David, figure it out, it's about 9%) of 
the total federal district court docket. Although most of 
these cases present frivolous claims, many are litigated 
through the Court of Appeals to this Court. The burden on 
the system fairly can be described as enormous with few if 
any benefits that would not be available in meritorious 
cases if exhaustion of appropriate state administrative 
remedies were required prior to any federal court 
litigation. It was primarily this problem that prompted 
enactment of §1997(e). 
2. 
Moreover, it is clear from the legislative 
history that Congress simply was not addressing exhaustion 
problem in any general fashion. The concern focused on 
the prisoner petitions. The new Act had a dual purpose in 
this respect. In addition to requiring prior exhaustion 
of adequate state remedies, Congress wished to authorized 
the Attorney General to act when necessary to protect the 
constitutional rights of prisoners, but at the same time 
minimize the need for federal action of any kind by 
requiring prior exhaustion. Both sponsors of the Act in 
the Senate made this clear. 
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remedies were required prior to any federal court 
litigation. It was primarily this problem that prompted 
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2. 
Moreover, it is clear from the legislative 
history that Congress simply was not addressing exhaustion 
problem in any general fashion. The concern focused on 
the prisoner petitions. The new Act had a dual purpose in 
this respect. In addition to requiring prior exhaustion 
of adequate state remedies, Congress wished to authorized 
the Attorney General to act when necessary to protect the 
constitutional rights of prisoners, but at the same time 
minimize the need for federal action of any kind by 
requiring prior exhaustion. Both sponsors of the Act in 
the Senate made this clear. 
23. 
Kastenmeier, the Court contends that Congress has endorsed 
~~ 
a no exhaustion rule. 
~ 
The irony in this reasoning should 
be obvious. ~Undoubtedly the supporters of §19 ~-
/ 
) proponents of exhaustion--would be surprised o learn that 
t hey J somehow~ had instructed this COUrt to adopt a 
exhaustion rule for all other §1983 claims ~ 
is clear from the legislative history that Congress simply 
was not addressing the exhaustion problem in any general 
fashion when it enacted §1997e. Indeed, both sponsors of 
the Act in the Senate viewed this section as 
limit on the Attorney General's power to 
placing a 
intervenJ 
Senator Hatch co-sponsor of the Act, explained §1997e as 
follows: 
"In actions relating to alleged violations of 
the constitutional rights of prisoners, such 
persons may be required to exhaust internal 
grievance procedures before the Attorney General 
can become involved pursuant to [the Act]." 
Congr20sional Record Sl713, February 26, 1980. 
20senator Hatch offered the same explanation on 
several other occasions in the course of the debate. See 
Congressional Record S4293, April 29, 1980 ("Section 7 
would establish specific procedures that would be 
applicable before the Attorney General could enter into an 
action in behalf of an imprisoned or incarcerated person. 
Such person would first have had to fully exhasut all 
internal grievance mechanisms that existed in the 
institution in which he was confined"); Congressonal 
Record S4626, May 6, 1980 ("Section 7(D) further clarifies 
that the administrative grievance procedures established 
Footnote continued on next page. 
24. 
Senator Bayh, the author of the Act, decribed the . 
exhaustion provision in similar terms: 
"[I]n the event of a prison inmate's rights 
being alleged to be violated, [, constitutional 
rights [are] alleged to be violatedj then before 
the Justice Department could intervene or 
initiate suits, the prison inmate or class of 
inmates would have to pursue all of their 
adiminstrative remedies within the State law 
before the Justice Department could intervene 
under the provisions of [the Act]." 
Congressional Record Sl859, February 27, 1980. 
?1 
; 
In short, in enacting the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Act Congress was focussing on the powers 
of the Attorney General, not on the general question of 
exhaustion in §1983 suits. Indeed, Congress repeatedly 
has failed to enact legislation including a general no-
exhaustion requirement such as the Court adopts today. 21 
If the exhaustion question were properly before 
us, I would affirm the Court of Appeals. 
in section 7 are only for the purposes of requiring 
prisoners to exhaust internal grievance mechanisms before 
the Attorney General can litigate on his behalf"}. 
21citations 
dfl 05/27/82 
Draft: Patsy v. Board of Regents, No. 80-1874 
Justice Powell, dissenting. 
The Court holds that the Board of Regents of the 
State of Florida, a state instrumentality, is subject to 
suit in federal court notwithstanding the bar of the 
Eleventh Amendment. The Court reaches this conclusion 
2. 
through a novel--and, to me, illogical--expansion of the 
holding in Ex Parte Young, 209 u.s. 123 {1908). The court 
then rejects the rule of "flexible" exhaustion of state 
administrative remedies stated by the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane. Relying principally 
on the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 
u.s.c. §1997e {1976 ed., Supp. IV), the Court holds that 
any exhaustion requirement in §1983 suits would violate 
the intent of Congress. I disagree with both portions of 
the Court's holding and therefore dissent. 
I The Eleventh Amendment 
A 
In this "reverse discrimination" action, 
petitioner, an employee of the Florida International 
University, brought suit under 42 u.s.c. §1983 against the 
Board of Regents of the State of Florida . 1 She did not 
1As the Court notes, see ante, at , n. 1, 
petitioner originally named the Florida International 
Uni ver si ty as defendant. Because the Florida 
International University lacks the capacity to sue or be 
sued, the District Court found that it was not a proper 
defendant. Petitioner was permitted to amend her 
complaint, and she simply substituted the Board of 
Regents. 
In addition to racial discrimination, petitioner 
also claimed that she had been discriminated against on 
the basis of her sex. 
- t 
• 3 • 
name the individual regents as defendants. She sued for 
$500,000 in damages, and for injunctive and other 
equitable relief. 2 The Board filed a motion to dismiss 
arguing that petitioner's suit was premature in light of 
her failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. 
The District Court agreed and granted the motion to 
dismiss. 
On petitioner's appeal, the Board added the bar 
of the Eleventh Amendment to its defense. 3 It argued that 
as an instrumentality of the 
~15~ 
State ~ could not be 
) 
subjected to suit in federal court absent a waiver of 
2Petitioner sought a declaratory judgment 
"declaring that the Plaintiff has suffered from acts of 
discrimination." In addition, she asked the court to 
"[r]equire Defendant to remedy the discrimination 
practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the next 
available position consistent with those previously 
applied for and for which she is qualified or in the 
alternative, to require the Defendant to pay to the 
Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary 
~ :. J r damages." She requested ..&a¥" fur t~er equitable and 
~~ injunctive rel~~e court deeme~ appropriate. 
~· 3The Eleventh Amendment provides: 
11
' ~ ~ • "The judicial power of the United States shall 
·~- not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, 
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State." 
The Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in nature, 
and the defense of the Amendment may be raised for the 
first time on appeal. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s. 
651, 678 (1974) ("Eleventh Amendment defense sufficienty 
partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it 
need not be raised in the trial court.") 
. 't 4 1mmun1 y. 
4. 
Although the Board of Regents was created as a body 
corporate with power "to sue and be sued ..• to plead and 
be impleaded in all courts of law and equity," Fla. Stat. I 
/ 
~ 
§240.042(1), it ~well established that language such as ~ 
this did not operate to waive the defense of the Eleventh 
Amendment. 5 In reply, petitioner argued that whether the 
4 "As a corporate state agency and component of 
state government, the [Board] operates with state funds, 
directs the [State University System], and is local 
neither in character nor operation. As the 'arm of the 
state' which manages the Division of Universitites of the 
Department of Education, it is clearly part of the state 
for Eleventh Amendment purposes." Brief at 18. 
The Board of Regents of the Division of Universities 
of the Department of Education is established by the 
Florida Education Code as a part of the State University 
System. Fla. Stat. 240.2011. The Board consists of the 
Commissioner of Education and twelve citizens appointed by 
the Governor, approved by three members of the Cabinet, 
and confirmed by the Senate. Fla. Stat. 240.207. The 
chief administrative officer of the Board is the 
Chancellor, who serves by appointment of the Board. 
The Board has general supervisory authority over the 
State University System. Fla. Stat. 240.209. Among its 
duties are the appointment of university presidents, the 
review of budget requests of each university in the state 
system, the preparation of an aggrgatea budget for the 
State University System, the development of · a master plan, 
and the establishment of a systemwide personnel 
classification and pay plan. Fla. Stat. §240.209. 
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida. 
Fla. Stat. §216.011. See Relyea v. State, 385 So.2d 1378 
(Fla. App. 1980) . The Board may claim the defense of 
sovereign immunity in suits ft~ state law. See id. 
Numerous Courts of Appeals have held state 
universities or state Boards of Regents immune from suit 
in federal court by reason of the Eleventh Amendment. 
See, e. g., Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F. 
2d 1345, 1349 (CA9 1981); Brennan v. University of 
Kansas, 451 F. 2d 1287 (CAlO 19 71) ; Ronwin v. Shapiro, 
657 F. 2d 1071 (CA9 1981). 
5see Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing 
Home, u.s. , (1981); Petty v. Tennessee-
Footnote continued on next page. 
5. 
statute creating the Board amounted to a waiver--and 
petitioner believed that it did--the Eleventh Amendment 
simply was irrelevant to the equitable claims she had 
lodged against the State. See Reply Brief at 3-4. 
Neither the Court of Appeals panel nor the Court 
of Appeals en bane addressed the Board's Eleventh 
Amendment defense. They directed their at tent ion solely 
to the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
The panel held that there was no exhaustion requirement in 
§1983 suits and remanded to the District Court for 
consideration of the Board's Eleventh Amendment argument. 
612 F. 2d 946 {CA5 1980}. The Court of Appeals, sitting 
en bane, reversed holding that §1983 plaintiffs must 
exhaust available and reasonable administrative remedies. 
Again the court did not consider the Board's Eleventh 
Missouri Bridge Commn, 359 u.s. 275, 276-277 {1959} {"The 
conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity will 
not be lightly inferred And where a public 
instrumentality is created with the right 'to sue and be 
sued' . that waiver of immunity in the particular setting 
may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special 
character in the state, not the federal courts"}; Great 
Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47, 54. See 
Bragg v. Board of PU5IIc Instruction, 36 So. 2d 222 {Fla. 
1948) {"The mere-fact that the Board of Public Instruction 
is created as a body corporate with power to sue and be 
sued does not affect its immunity from tort"}. 
6. 
Amendment defense. 
The Eleventh Amendment question was first raised 
before this Court in the Board's response to the petition 
for writ of certiorari. The Board argued, as it had on 
appeal, that it was an arm of the State and that it had 
not waived its immunity from suit in federal court. Again 
petitioner argued that at most the Eleventh Amendment 
defense would bar her claim for damages. And, even as to 
this claim, petitioner now argued that the Amendment 
would not bar damages if the Board could meet the claim 
{ 
7 out of 
If \.\ 
its own funds--e. g., from gifts and bequests--
rather than from the State Treasury. These arguments were 
repeated at oral argument. 6 
As the Court acknowledges, the Eleventh 
Amendment question is jurisdictional and must be 
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its Eleventh Amendment defense. See , n. 3. 
though the Board did not present the def se to the 
District Court, it briefed the question t the Court of 
Appeals and argued to this Court that e petition for 
writ of certiorari should not be gra ed because of this 
jurisdictional bar. Once the peti 'on was granted, it is 
understandable that the State not continue to press 
the efense in its main brief o this Court. 
J/t(_; 1/LUv-7 ~ q t::Z;;; ~ 'b J L . ~ 
~ ~ J' ~ ~ 7A-/) 4~~-
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7. 
B 
In interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, the 
Court has sought to accommodate both the principle of 
sovereign immunity embodied in the Amendment and the 
states' duty to obey--and the federal courts to enforce--
federal law. Thus, it is well established that the State 
is not "divested of its immunity 'on the mere ground that 
the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of 
the United States."' Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 u.s. 
184, 186 (1964), quoting, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 u.s. 1, 
Jf-~w~ 
10 (1890) •7 ,{And the Cml;f4: bas bebtl"\that ~when a State 
itself is not named as a party to the suit, the Amendment 
nevertheless applies if the State is the real party in 
interest. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 
323 u.s. 459 (1945). 8 
7 In Hans the Court also held that the Amendment 
bars suits brought against an unconsenting State by its 
own citizens, although by its terms the Amendment does not 
apply to this situation. Cf. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 
u.s. 313 (1934) (Eleventh Amendment applies to federal 
suits against an unconsenting state by a foreign nation). 
By contrast, the Amendment has not been applied to suits 
against a State brought by another State or by the United 
States. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 u.s. 365 (1923); 
United States v. Mississippi, 380 u.s. 128 (1965). 
8 In Ford Motor the plaintiff sued the ~partment ? 
of t reasury of the State of Indiana, and ~he three 
off j di als--the Governor, Treasurer, and Auditor--who 
Footnote continued on next page. 
8. 
On the other hand, the Court has not interpreted 
the Amendment to bar federal court jurisdiction when the 
State has consented to suit, 9 or to bar review by this 
Cou-r:t of an action brought against the State in state 
court. 1° Congress may lift the bar of the Amendment when 
exercising powers granted to it by §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 u.s. 445 
{1976). Counties and municipalities may not claim 
immunity under the Amendment. Lincoln County v. Luning, 
133 u.s. 529 {1890): Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 
429 u.s. 274, 279-281 {1977) And under Ex parte Young, 
constituted the board of the department of treasury. The 
plaintiff sought a refund of -=gross income t axes paid to 
the department. Suit was brought in federal District 
Court. The Court held that the suit was barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. The plaintiff was seeking a refund 
from the state not a personal judgment against the 
individual officials: "[W]hen the action is in essence 
one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is 
the real party in interest and is entitled to invoke its 
sovereign immunity from suit even though individual 
officials are nominal defendants." 323 U.S., at 464. See 
Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 663: Great Northern Life 
Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47 {1944). 
9see Clark v. Barnard, 108 u.s. 436, 447 {1883): 
Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 {1964). 
10see Smith v. Reeves, 178 u.s. 436, 445 {1900): 
Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47, 57 
{1944): Chandler v. Dix, 194 u.s. 590, 592 {1904). The 
Court's assumption of jurisdiction in University of 
California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 {1978), 
a case originating in state court, thus provides no 
support for today • s dec is ion. For the same reason, the 
Court's reliance upon Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural 
College, 221 u.s. 636 {1911), is misplaced. See infra. 
9. 
209 u.s. 123 {1908), a federal court may order state 
officials to obey federal law in the future. 11 
Application of these settled principles to the 
present case is straightforward. This is an action under 
§1983, and Congress has not removed the bar of the 
Eleventh Amendment in such actions. See Quern v. Jordan, 
440 u.s. 332 {1979). Petitioner seeks relief from the 
Board of Regents of the State of Florida, an 
instrumentality or agency of the State. The Board is not 
a local political body but bears responsibility for the 
State university system as a whole. Cf. Mt. Healthy Bd. 
of Ed. v. Doyle, supra. Petitioner's argument that the 
11under the theory, some would say fiction, of Ex 
parte Young, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar su1 ts 
against state officers because when a state officer "comes 
into conflict with the superior authority of [the] 
Constitution, ... he is ••• stripped of his official or 
representative character." Id., at 159. On this 
analysis, a prospective injunction requiring the official 
to conform his future behavior to federal law, does not 
require anything of the State and therefore does not bring 
the Eleventh Amendment to bear. The granting of 
retroactive relief, on the other hand, would require the 
official to take action in his offical capacity. Thus, if 
the official is required to pay damages from state funds, 
the State is directly affected. See Edelman v. Jordan, 
supra. Similarly, retroactive injunctive relief may 
require the official to take action in his official 
capacity and also would be barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. Cf. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce 
Corp., 337 u.s. 682 {1949). Of course, in addition to 
prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff may seek 
carnages from the individual officer in his personal 
capacity. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-238 
{1974). 
10. 
statute incorporating the Board should be understood 
t~aive the Eleventh Amendment is foreclosed by numerous 
dec is ions of this Court. See, e. g. , Florida Dept of 
Health v. Florida Nursing Horne Assn, u.s. 
(1981) . 12 Similarly, petitioner's suggestion that the 
Eleventh Arnendrnen t does not apply to equitable claims 
against a state is incorrect. See Cory v. White, u.s. 
(1982). 
Thus, unless the rule in Ex parte Young, supra, 
~~ ~.nd-~~ ~ "'1 ~~ 
is 1\a~plicai:He, the Eleventh Amendment r y bars this 
suit. G 1he theory in Ex parte Young, supra, has no v 
application to the State itself or to an instrumentality 
of the State. petitioner had sued 
ndividual members of the Board, petitioner's clairn; .. { at 
not have 
-~-
12 In Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Horne 
Assn, u.s. (1981), the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit found that the Florida Department of Health 
and Rehabilitative Services had consented to suit. The 
court based its finding of waiver, in part, on the fact 
that the Department was a "body corporate" with the 
capacity to "sue and be sued" under state law. Fla. Stat. 
Ann. §402.34. This Court reversed holding that a general 
waiver of sovereign immunity does not amount to a waiver 
of the Eleventh Amendment. See id., at See note 5, 
supra. 
Without distinguishing 
supra, the Court leaves open 
Board has consented to suit. 
Florida Dept of Health, 
the question of whether the 
See ante, at 9 & n. 10. 
addition, petitioner could have sought 
from the individual members of the Board 
their personal capacities. ---- ~----'-~ 
But petitioner did not sue the members of the 
Board: she sued the Board itself, an arm of the State of 
Florida. One would have thought that Ex parte Young was 
simply irrelevant in these circumstances. Although an 
individual official may be viewed as acting on his own and 
without State authority when acting against federal law, 
the State--or an agency of the State--cannot act other 
than in its official State capacity. Similarly, an action 
for damages against the state, or an arm of the state, 
seeks damages that must be paid from the state's own 
coffers. Whether the damages come directly from the 
State's general fund or from some other State fund, the 
money is no less the State's. Indeed, direct application 
of Ex parte Young to the State and its instrumentalities 
would read the Eleventh Amendment out of the Constitution. 
13Petitioner's injunctive 
retroactive to the extent that she 
Regents to appoint her to the next 
Presumably, such an appointment would 
of the state's authority. See note 3, 
relief may be 
asks the Board of 
available position. 
require an exercise 
supra. 
12. 
If the bar of the Amendment is lifted merely upon the 
naming of a State board, commission, agency or 
corporation--opening the way to damages as well as to 
injunctive relief--then the Amendment no longer would 
afford constitutionally prescribed protection to the 
states. 
c 
Despite the weight of these considerations, the 
Court concludes that this action is not barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. Indeed, the Court undertakes to apply 
Ex parte Young to the Board of Regents itself. Relying 
upon the decision in Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural 
College, 221 u.s. 636 (1911), the Court reasons that the 
Board of Regents, as a body corporate, is no different 
from a state official. The Court attempts to bolster this 
novel conclusion by observing that under Florida law the 
Board of Regents is termed the "director" of the Division 
of Universities. The Court concludes that, just as in Ex 
parte Young, the Board of Regents "may be sued for 
unconstitutional or unauthorized act ions, as long as the 
13. 
plaintiff is not seeking monetary relief that must be paid 
out of the state treasury." Ante, at 8. 
The Court's conclusion is supported neither by 
reason nor precedents of this Court. As indicated above, 
the rationale of Ex parte Young does not ~y apply 
to a State or State instrumentality. The State cannot be 
"stripped" of its own authority. Moreover, if the Board 
of Regents is a State agency--and it clearly is--then its 
assets are also those of the State's. Yet the Court's 
decision exposes the Board's assets to a damage award on 
the double fiction that the Board is really an "official" 
and that its separate assets somehow belong to this 
fictitious being rather than to the State. On such a 
theory, a state 
~~I 
-boa~~of education, highway deartment or 
any other agency, board or department of a state with any 
~ 
separate sources ~income could be sued for damages. 
Such a conclusion is at odds with the Court's holding in 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Tax Commn, 327 u.s. 573 {1946), 
that the segregated funds of the State Tax Commission were 
State monies subject to the Eleventh Amendment. 
14. 
Nor does the Board of Regents' corporate status 
under state law support the Court's holding. State 
governments consist in major part of a variety of boards, 
commissions, agencies, and corporations. These State 
entities are no less instruments of the State because they 
may be vested under state law with the power to contract, 
to sue and be sued. This Court repeatedly has held the 
Eleventh Amendment to bar suit against such state 
corporate agencies. See Great Northern Insurance Co. v. 
Read, 322 u.s. 47; Ford Motor Co. v. Department of 
Treasury, 323 u.s. 454 (1945); Kennecott Coppper Corp. v. 
State Tax Commn, 327 u.s. 572 (1946). 
Thus, in Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 u.s. 
184 (1964) , the Court assumed that a state owned railroad-
-as an instrumentality of the State--was immune from suit 
in federal court absent a waiver. The railway in Parden 
was authorized to operate "as though it were an ordinary 
common carrier." 377 US. 185. It performed services for 
profit and had contracts and agreements with various labor 
orgainzations. It was "indisputably a common carrier 
engaging in interstate commerce." Id., at 185. No 
15. 
suggestion was made that as a State body, with separate 
funds, the railroad was no longer an instrumentality of 
the State but was merely a State official. And just last 
term the Court held that the Florida Department of Health, 
a "body corporate" under State law was immune from suit. 
Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 
u.s. (1981). Cf. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 u.s. 781 (1978) 
("There can be no doubt that suit against the St tae 
and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment"). The Court's conclusion that corporate 
status converts a State body into a State official, 
subject to suit, cannot be reconciled with these well 
established precedents. ? 
I am unaware of any prior decision of this Court 
that supports the Court's application of Ex parte Young to 
State instrumentalities. Hopkins v. Clemson College, 
supra, relied upon so heavily by the Court is simply 
irrelevant. In that case suit was brought against a state 
college in state court to recover damages caused by the 
college's construction of a dyke. The state courts held 
that the college was protected from suit by the state law 
1 
16. 
of sovereign immunity. Although the Court discussed the 
Eleventh Amendment in some detail, there was simply no 
Eleventh Amendment question in that case. 14 It was clear 
before Hopkins that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply 
to bar review in this Court of any federal question 
presented in a suit against a State in state court. See 
note 5, supra. However the holding in Hopkins is stated, 
no Eleventh Amendment question was presented to the 
Court. 15 It therefore is no surprise that the opinion has 
14The state college recognized that there was no 
Eleventh Amendment question. In its brief it noted: "It 
is difficult to see how either Section 2 of Article III, 
of the Constitution of the United States or the Eleventh 
amendment has any application to the inquiry whether a 
suit by a citizen of a State in its own Courts is a suit 
against that State. That seems to be purely a question of 
local law to be determined by the State Court." Brief at 
20. 
15It is no easy matter to state the holding in 
Hopkins. Normally the Court would not review a state 
court decision holding the state immune from suit brought 
under state tort law. Review would be barred not by the 
Eleventh Amendment, but because the holding on sovereign 
immunity would be seen as an independent and adequate 
state law ground. See Georgia R. R • .!_ Banking Co. v. 
Redwine, 335 u.s. 900 (1949). Of course, the decision in 
Hopkins antedated Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938). It is likely that the Hopkins Court simply did 
not differentiate between the state law of sovereign 
immunity and the federal law of sovereign immunity 
embodied in the Eleventh Amendment. In Hamilton Mfg. Co. 
v. Trustees of State Colleges in Colorado, 356 F. 2d 599, 
601 n. 1 (CAlO 1966) , the court viewed Hopkins as standing 
for a principle of agency law: "[N]either a state nor an 
individual can confer upon an agent authority to commit a 
tort, so as to excuse the perpetrator. In such cases the 
law of agency has no application,--the wrongdoer is 
treated as a principal, and individually liable for the 
damages inflicted, and subject to injunction ••• " Id., 
quoting 221 u.s., at 643. ---
this 
Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, __ _ 
u.s. ~~ (1981). ~ does not deserve the pride of 
.1\ 
place given majority. 17 
w...~r 
isA a non-it by the to It 
16The decision in Hopkins was most recently cited 
in Larson v. Domestic _!_Foreign Corp., 337, u.s. 682 
(1949). The Court in Larson relied upon Hopkins for the 
proposition that an "agent's liability for torts committed 
by him cannot be avoided by pleading the direction or 
atuhorization of his principal." 337 u.s., at 694. 
ustice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion included 
Hopkins with cases standing for the proposition that 
jurisdiction is barred when the plaintiff seeks an 
"interest in property which concededly belonged to the 
~overnment, or demanded relief calling for an assertion of 
what was unquestionably official authority." !d., at 710 
& 729. The Court does not cite to any Supreme Court 
decision that relies upon Hopkins for the principle that a 
state instrumentality may be sued in federal cour.~. . d 
17 fJ.A_~~c~ ~ L.-t.,. ~ £., ~ 
An¥- ~ Ho kins further mwst be t~mp~ed 
' . · 1 . . k-
official action. Rather, it v1ewed the College's activit ~ 
"[T]his is not an action against the College for 
a tort committed in the prosecution of any 
governmental function. The fee was in the 
State, but the corporation, as equitable owner, 
was in possession, use and enjoyment of the 
property. For protecting the bottom land the 
College, for its own corporate purposes and 
advantage, constructed the dyke. In so doing it 
was not acting in any governmental capacity. 
The embankment was in law similar to one which 
might have been built for private purposes by 
the plaintiff on the other side of the river. 





In Employees v. Department of Public Health and 
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (197 3) , the Court distinguished the 




earlier Eleventh Amendment decision in Parden v. Terminal 
R. Co., 377 u.s. 184 (1964), on the basis that Parden 
concerned State proprietary activity: "Parden involved 
the railroad business which Alabama operated 'for profit.' 
Parden was in the area where private persons and ? 
corporations normally ran the enterprise." By contrast, 
the Employees Court found that the employment practices of 
state hospitals did not concern state proprietary 
activity. A similar distinction can be drawn between 
Hopkins and the present case involving the employment 
practices of a state educational institution. 
18The ~suggests that in prior decisions the 
Court has permitted suit against State Boards of Regents. 
See ante, at 5. Yet in none of these suits was the Jz e 
jurisdictional issue posed as it is here. Thus, for 
example, in University of California Board of Regents v. 
Bakke, 438 u.s. 265 (1978), the Eleventh Amendment issue 
was not present because the case was here on petition to 
the California Supreme Court. See note 5, supr~. And in 
each of the other cases cited by the Court, the plaintiff 
had the good sense to name other defendants in addition to 
the particular state board . See, e. g., Board of Regents 
v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1978); McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Rege~,u.s. 637 (1950). 
· 4ftt1P The · als·o argues that the Jtourts of ~peals 
are split on the question of whethe { damages can be 
awarded against state universities. Yet the two cases 
cited by the Court to demonstrate a split on this question 
do not support the Court's assertion. In SON! v. Board of 
Trustees, 513 F. 2d 347 (CA6 1975) the court found that 
the Board of Trustees had waived its immunity to suit, 
while in Goss v. Jacinto Junior College, 588 F. 2d 96, 98-
99 (CA5 1979) the court reasoned that the particular 
junior college was similar to a county or municipality, an 
"independent 'political subdivision' as a matter of Texas 
statutory and common law." The Court suggests as well 
that the Courts of Appeals are agreed that injunctive 
relief may be awarded again~ t state universities and state 
boards of regents. .x.e-t f,lgain the cases cited provide 
little support for the Court's assertion. In New England 
Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colorado, 
592 F. 2d 1196, 1201 (CAl 1979), the court held that 
individual members of the Board of Regents might be sued 
for prospective injunctive relief. It did not hold, 
~---n~~~ , as the Court implies, that the University itself 
might be sued. Rather, it accepted "the University's 
identification with the state." And in ~ Student 
Services v. Texas ~ ~ M University, 612 F. 2d 160, 165 
(CA5 1980) , it is unclear that the court held more than 
Footnote continued on next page. 
..i 
19. 
new doctrine, one that exposes the instrumentalities of 
the State itself to suit in federal court. After today's 
a:l '=z-c;;r 
for decision, state boards and commission~ay be sued 
~t' l'f lnJunc 1ve re 1e . The decision also holds that such 
~ 
bodies may be sued for damages on the fiction that their 
segregated assets are not the State's. 19 The Court's 
~~ 
r---~=- aAsion of Ex parte Young to the State itself destroys 
the rationale of that decision. It also undermines the 
careful balance worked out in this sensitive area of the 
The decision is simply worng. The Court should 
dismiss the suit on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment. 
II Exhaustion of Remedies 
Seventeen judges joined in the Court of Appeal's 
persuasive opinion in this case adopting a rule of 
"flexible" exhaustion of administrative remedies in §1983 
that officials of the University could be 
injunctive relief. Unlike the situation in 
cases, petitioner sued only the Board of 
Numerous Courts of Appeals have held state 
regents to be immune from suit in federal court 






19whether a State board, like a State official, 
may claim good faith immunity is not clear but of 
substantial significance. See Owen v. City of 
Independence, u.s. 
dfl 05/27/82 
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The Court holds that the Board of Regents of the 
State of Florida, a state instrumentality, is subject to 
suit in federal court notwithstanding the bar of the 
Eleventh Amendment. The Court reaches this conclusion 
~ .. 
lfp/ss 05/28/82 Rider A, p. 2 (Patsy) 
PATSY2A SALLY-POW 
through an unprecedented - and far reaching e~~t;~~ -
expansion of the holding in Ex Parte Young, 209 u.s. 123 
(1908). As I consider the Court's holding a serious 
departure from established constitutional doctrine, this 
dissent addresses primarily the Eleventh Amendment issue. 
ently the Court was anxious to reach the 
exh~ue 
attention to the constitutional question. 
from the Court's rejection of the rule of "flexible" 
exhaustion of state administrative remedies developed and 
stated persuasively by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, sitting en bane. In disagreeing with the 17 judges 
of the Court of Appeals who adopted the flexible exhaustion 
~~ 





through f\ a Rev-d oaR-d..,. t.o -r;e.., lll-og-iea-1--expansion of the 
holding in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Cour · 
then rejects the rule of "flexible" exhaustion of 
administrative remedies stated by the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane. Relying principally 
on the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 
u.s.c. §1997e (1976 ed., Supp. IV):Jhe Court holds that 
exhaustion requirement in 
t Congress. 
I The Eleventh Amendment 
A 
In this "reverse discrimination" action, 
petitioner, an employee of the Florida International 
University, brought suit under 42 u.s.c. §1983 against the 
Board of Regents of the State of Florida •1 She did not 
1As the Court notes, see ante, at , n. 1, 
petitioner originally named the Florida International 
University as defendant. Because the Florida 
International University lacks the capacity to sue or be 
sued, the District Court found that it was not a proper 
defendant. Petitioner was permitted to amend her 
complaint, and she simply substituted the Board of 
Regents. 
In addition to racial discrimination, petitioner 
also claimed that she had been discriminated against on 
the basis of her sex. 
3. 
name the individual regents as defendants. She sued for 
$500,000 in damages, and for injunctive and other 
equitable relief. 2 The Board filed a motion to dismiss 
arguing that petitioner's suit was premature in light of 
her failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. 
The District Court agreed and granted the motion to 
dismiss. 
On petitioner's appeal, the Board added the bar 
of the Eleventh Amendment to its defense. 3 It argued that 
as an instrumentality of the State, the Board could not be 
subjected to suit in federal court absent a waiver of 
2Petitioner sought a declaratory judgment 
"declaring that the Plaintiff has suffered from acts of 
discrimination." In addition, she asked the court to 
"[r]equire Defendant to remedy the discrimination 
practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the next 
available position consistent with those previously 
applied for and for which she is qualified or in the 
alternative, to require the Defendant to pay to the 
Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary 
damages." She requested such further equitable and 
injunctive relief as the court deems appropriate. 
3The Eleventh Amendment provides: 
"The judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, 
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State." 
The Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in nature, 
and the defense of the Amendment may be raised for the 
first time on appeal. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s. 
651, 678 (1974) ("Eleventh Amendment defense sufficienty 
partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it 
need not be raised in the trial court.") 
. 't 4 1mmun1 y. 
4. 
And it asserted that there had been no waiver. 
Although the Board of Regents was created as a body 
corporate with power "to sue and be sued ... to plead and 
be impleaded in all courts of law and equity," Fla. Stat. 
§240.042(1), it is well established that language such as 
this did not operate to waive the defense of the Eleventh 
Amendment. 5 In reply, petitioner argued that whether the 
4 "As a corporate state agency and component of 
state government, the [Board] operates with state funds, 
directs the [State University System], and is local 
neither in character nor operation. As the 'arm of the 
state' which manages the Division of Universitites of the 
Department of Education, it is clearly part of the state 
for Eleventh Amendment purposes." Brief at 18. 
The Board of Regents of the Division of Universities 
of the Department of Education is established by the 
Florida Education Code as a part of the State University 
System. Fla. Stat. 240.2011. The Board consists of the 
Commissioner of Education and twelve citizens appointed by 
the Governor, approved by three members of the Cabinet, 
and confirmed by the Senate. Fla. Stat. 240.207. The 
chief administrative officer of the Board is the 
Chancellor, who serves by appointment of the Board. 
The Board has general supervisory authority over the 
State University System. Fla. Stat. 240.209. Among its 
duties are the appointment of university presidents, the 
review of budget requests of each university in the state 
system, the preparation of an aggrgated budget for the 
State University System, the development of a master plan, 
and the establishment of a systemwide personnel 
classification and pay plan. Fla. Stat. §240.209. 
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida. 
Fla. Stat. §216.011. See Rellea v. State, 385 So.2d 1378 
(Fla. App. 1980) . The Boar may claim the defense of 
sovereign immunity in suits under state law. See id. 
Numerous Courts of Appeals have held--state 
universities or state Boards of Regents immune from suit 
in federal court by reason of the Eleventh Amendment. 
See, e. g., Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F. 
2d 1345, 1349 (CA9 1981); Brennan v. University of 
Kansas, 451 F. 2d 1287 (CAlO 19 71) ; Ron win v. Shapiro, 
657 F. 2d 1071 (CA9 1981). 
5see Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing 
Home, u.s. , (1981); Petty v. Tennessee-
Footnote continued on next page. 
5. 
statute creating the Board amounted to a waiver--and 
petitioner believed that it did--the Eleventh Amendment 
simply was irrelevant to the equitable claims she had 
lodged against the State. See Reply Brief at 3-4. 
Neither the Court of Appeals panel nor the Court 
of Appeals en bane addressed the Board's Eleventh 
Amendment defense. They directed their attention solely 
to the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
The panel held that there was no exhaustion requirement in 
§1983 suits and remanded to the District Court for 
consideration of the Board's Eleventh Amendment argument. 
612 F. 2d 946 (CAS 1980). The Court of Appeals, sitting 
en bane, reversed holding that §1983 plaintiffs must 
exhaust available and reasonable administrative remedies. 
Again the court did not consider the Board's Eleventh 
Missouri Bridge Commn, 359 U.S. 275, 276-277 (1959) ("The 
conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity will 
not be 1 ightly infer red And where a public 
instrumentality is created with the right 'to sue and be 
sued' that waiver of immunity in the particular setting 
may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special 
character in the state, not the federal courts")~ Great 
Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54. See 
Bragg v. Board of PUbiic Instruction, 36 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 
1948) ("The mere fact that the Board of Public Instruction 
is created as a body corporate with power to sue and be 
sued does not affect its immunity from tort"). 
6. 
Amendment defense. 
The Eleventh Amendment question was first raised 
before this Court in the Board's response to the petition 
for writ of certiorari. The Board argued, as it had on 
appeal, that it was an arm of the State and that it had 
not waived its immunity from suit in federal court. Again 
petitioner argued that at most the Eleventh Amendment 
defense would bar her claim for damages. And, even as to 
this claim, petitioner now argued that the Amendment 
would not bar damages if the Board could meet the claim 
out of its "own funds"--e. g., from gifts and bequests--
~ 
rather than from the State Treasury. These arguments were 
repeated at oral argument. 6 
As the Court acknowledges, the Eleventh 
Amendment question is jurisdictional and must be 
confronted at the outset. See ante, at 
B 
In interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, the 
Court has sought to accommodate both the principle of 
6Tr. of Oral Argument 25-28, 40-41. 
7 . 
sovereign immunity embodied in the Amendment and the 
states' duty to obey--and the federal courts to enforce--
federal law. Thus, it is well established that the State 
is not "divested of its immunity 'on the mere ground that 
the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of 
the United States.'" Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S. 
184, 186 (1964), quoting, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 u.s. 1, 
10 (1890). 7 It also is settled that when a State itself 
is not named as a party to the suit, the Amendment 
nevertheless applies if the State is the real party in 
interest. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 
323 u.s. 459 (1945). 8 
7 In Hans the Court also held that the Amendment 
bars suits brought against an unconsenting State by its 
own citizens, although by its terms the Amendment does not 
apply to this situation. Cf. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 
u.s. 313 (1934) (Eleventh Amendment applies to federal 
suits against an unconsenting state by a foreign nation). 
By contrast, the Amendment has not been applied to suits 
against a State brought by another State or by the United 
States. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 u.s. 365 (1923); 
United States v. MlSSlssippi, 380 u.s. 128 (1965). 
8 In Ford Motor the plaintiff sued the Department 
of Treasury of the State of Indiana, and the three 
officials--the Governor, Treasurer, and Auditor--who 
constituted the Board of the Department of Treasury. The 
plaintiff sought a refund of gross income taxes paid to 
the department. Suit was brought in federal District 
Court. The Court held that the suit was barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. The plaintiff was seeking a refund 
from the state not a personal judgment against the 
individual officials: "[W]hen the action is in essence 
one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is 
the real party in interest and is entitled to invoke its 
Footnote continued on next page. 
8. 
On the other hand, the Court has not interpreted 
the Amendment to bar federal court jurisdiction when the 
State has consented to suit, 9 or to bar review by this 
Court of an action brought against the State in state 
court. 1° Congress may lift the bar of the Amendment when 
exercising powers granted to it by §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 
(1976). Counties and municipalities may not claim 
immunity under the Amendment. Lincoln County v. Luning, 
133 u.s. 529 (1890); Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 
429 u.s. 274, 279-281 (1977) And under Ex parte Young, 
209 u.s. 123 (1908), a federal court may order state 
officials to obey federal law in the future. 11 
sovereign immunity from suit even though individual 
officials are nominal defendants." 323 u.s., at 464. See 
Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 663; Great Northern Life 
Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944). 
9see Clark v. Barnard, 108 u.s. 436, 447 (1883); 
Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). 
10see Smith v. Reeves, 178 u.s. 436, 445 (1900); 
Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47, 57 
(1944); Chandler v. Dix, 194 u.s. 590, 592 (1904). The 
Court's assumption ~ jurisdiction in Universit~ of 
California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265 (~78T; 
a case originating in state court, thus provides no 
support for today' s decision. For the same reason, the 
Court's reliance upon Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural 
College, 221 u.s. 636 (1911), is misplaced. See infra. 
11under the theory, some would say fiction, of Ex 
parte Young, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits 
Footnote continued on next page. 
9. 
Application of these settled principles to the 
present case is straightforward. This is an action under 
§1983, and Congress has not removed the bar of the 
Eleventh Amendment in such actions. See Quern v. Jordan, 
440 u.s. 332 (1979} • Petitioner seeks relief from the 
Board of Regents of the State of Florida, an 
instrumentality or agency of the State. The Board is not 
a local political body but bears responsibility for the 
State university system as a whole. Cf. Mt. Healthy Bd. 
of Ed. v. Doyle, supra. Petitioner's argument that the 
statute incorporating the Board should be understood to 
waive the Eleventh Amendment is foreclosed by numerous 
against state officers because when a state officer "comes 
into conflict with the superior authority of [the] 
Constitution, ..• he is .•• stripped of his official or 
representative character." Id., at 159. On this 
analysis, a prospective injunction requiring the official 
to conform his future behavior to federal law, does not 
require anything of the State and therefore does not bring 
the Eleventh Amendment to bear. The granting of 
retroactive relief, on the other hand, would require the 
official to take action in his offical capacity. Thus, if 
the official is required to pay damages from state funds, 
the State is directly affected. See Edelman v. Jordan, 
supra. Similarly, retroactive injunctive relief may 
require the official to take action in his official 
capacity and also would be barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. Cf. Larson v. Domestic _!_ Foreign Commerce 
Corp., 337 u.s. 682 (1949}. Of course, in addition to 
prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff may seek 
damages from the individual officer in his personal 
capacity. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232, 237-238 
(1974}. 
10. 
decisions of this Court. See, e. g., Florida Dept of 
Health v. Florida Nursing Horne Assn, u.s. 
{1981). 12 Similarly, petitioner's suggestion that the 
Eleventh Amendment does not apply to equitable claims 
against a state is incorrect. See Cory v. White, u.s. 
{1982) • 
Thus, unless the rule in Ex parte Young, supra, 
is extended beyond any previous decision of this Court, 
the Eleventh Amendment bars this suit. The theory in Ex 
parte Young, supra, has no application to the State itself 
or to an instrumentality of the State. If petitioner had 
sued the individual members of the Board, her claim for 
damages against them would not have been barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. Nor would her claim for equitable 
relief have been barred to the extent it were limited to 
12In Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Horne 
Assn, u.s. {1981), the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit found that the Florida Department of Health 
and Rehabilitative Services had consented to suit. The 
court based its finding of waiver, in part, on the fact 
that the Department was a "body corporate" with the 
capacity to "sue and be sued" under state law. Fla. Stat. 
Ann. §402.34. This Court reversed holding that a general 
waiver of sovereign immunity does not amount to a waiver 
of the Eleventh Amendment. See id., at See note 5, 
supra. 
Without distinguishing 
supra, the Court leaves open 
Board has consented to suit. 
Florida Dept of Health, 
the question of whether the 
See ante, at 9 & n. 10. 
11. 
future conduct. But petitioner did not sue the members of 
the Board. She sued only the Board itself, an arm of the 
State of Florida. Moreover, the principle relief sought 
by petitioner would impose--in the alternative--an 
affirmative duty on the Board to promote her to the next 
available position of comparable status to those to which 
she had applied, or would "require the [Board] to pay to 
[petitioner] the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary 
damages." App., 39. Seen. 3, ante. 
One would have thought that Ex parte Young was 
simply irrelevant in these circumstances. Although an 
individual official may be viewed as acting on his own and 
without State authority when acting against federal law, 
the State--or an agency of the State--cannot act other 
than in its official State capacity. Similarly, an action 
for damages against the state, or an arm of the state, 
seeks damages that must be paid from the state's own 
coffers. Whether the damages come directly from the 
State's general fund or from some other State fund, the 
money is no less the State's. Indeed, direct application 
of Ex parte Young to the State and its instrumentalities 
12. 
would read the Eleventh Amendment out of the Constitution. 
If the bar of the Amendment is lifted merely upon the 
naming of a State board, commission, agency or 
corporation--opening the way to damages as well as to 
injunctive relief--then the Amendment no longer would 
afford constitutionally prescribed protection to the 
states. 
c 
Despite the weight of these considerations, the 
Court concludes that this action is not barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. Indeed, the Court undertakes to apply 
Ex parte Young to the Board of Regents itself. Relying 
upon the decision in Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural 
College, 221 u.s. 636 (1911), the Court reasons that the 
Board of Regents, as a body corporate, is no different 
from a state official. The Court attempts to bolster this 
novel conclusion by observing that under Florida law the 
Board of Regents is termed the "director" of the Division 
of Universities. The Court concludes that, just as in Ex 
parte Young, the Board of Regents "may be sued for 
unconstitutional or unauthorized actions, as long as the 
13. 
plaintiff is not seeking monetary relief that must be paid 
out of the state treasury." Ante, at 8. 
The Court's conclusion is supported neither by 
reason nor precedents of this Court. As indicated above, 
the rationale of Ex parte Young does not apply to a State 
or State instrumentality. The State cannot be "stripped" 
of its own authority. Moreover, if the Board of Regents 
is a State agency--and it clearly is--then its assets are 
also those of the State's. Yet the Court's decision 
exposes the Board's assets to a damage award on the double 
fiction that the Board is really an "official" and that 
its separate assets somehow belong to this fictitious 
being rather than to the State. On such a theory, a state 
welfare board, highway deartment or any other agency, 
board or department of a state with any separate funds or 
income could be sued for damages. Such a conclusion is at 
odds with the Court's holding in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. 
Tax Commn, 327 u.s. 573 (1946), that the segregated funds 
of the State Tax Commission were State monies subject to 
the Eleventh Amendment. 
14. 
Nor does the Board of Regents' corporate status 
under state law support the Court's holding. State 
governments consist in major part of a variety of boards, 
commissions, agencies, and corporations. These State 
entities are no less instruments of the State because they 
may be vested under state law with the power to contract, 
to sue and be sued. This Court repeatedly has held the 
Eleventh Amendment to bar suit against such state 
corporate agencies. See Great Northern Insurance Co. v. 
Read, 322 u.s. 47; Ford Motor Co. v. Department of 
Treasury, 323 U.S. 454 (1945); Kennecott Coppper Corp. v. 
State Tax Commn, 327 u.s. 572 (1946). 
Thus, in Parden v. Terminal R. Co. , 3 77 U.S. 
184 (1964), the Court assumed that a state owned railroad-
-as an instrumentality of the State--was immune from suit 
in federal court absent a waiver. The railway in Parden 
was authorized to operate "as though it were an ordinary 
common carrier." 377 us. 185. It performed services for 
profit and had contracts and agreements with various labor 
orgainzations. It was "indisputably a common carrier 
engaging in interstate commerce." Id., at 185. No 
15. 
suggestion was made that as a State body, with separate 
funds, the railroad was no longer an instrumentality of 
the State but was merely a State official. And just last 
term the Court held that the Florida Department of Health, 
a "body corporate" under State law was immune from suit. 
Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 
u.s. (1981). Cf. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 u.s. 781 (1978) 
("There can be no doubt .•• that suit against the Sttae 
and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment"). The Court's conclusion that corporate status 
converts a State body into a State official, subject to 
suit, cannot be reconciled with these well established 
precedents. 
D 
I am unaware of any prior decision of this Court 
that supports the Court's application of Ex parte Young to 
State instrumentalities. Hopkins v. Clemson College, 
supra, relied upon so heavily by the Court is 
) 
simply 
irrelevant. In that case suit was brought against a state 
college in state court to recover damages caused by the 
college's construction of a dyke. The state courts held 
16. 
that the college was protected from suit by the state law 
of sovereign immunity. Although the Court discussed the 
Eleventh Amendment in some detail, there was simply no 
Eleventh Amendment question in that case. 13 It was clear 
before Hopkins that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply 
to bar review in this Court of any federal question 
presented in a suit against a State in state court. See 
~kv~~ 
note 5, supra. However the holding in Hopkins is st-a-ted, ) 
no Eleventh Amendment question was presented to the 
Court. 14 It therefore is no surprise that the opinion has 
never been cited by this Court for the proposition that 
the Eleventh Amendment is no bar to suit against a state 
agency in federal court. If the case could be viewed as 
standing for the proposition that state agencies may be 
13The state college recognized that there was no 
Eleventh Amendment question. In its brief it noted: "It 
is difficult to see how either Section 2 of Article III, 
of the Constitution of the United States or the Eleventh 
amendment has any application to the inquiry whether a 
suit by a citizen of a State in its own Courts is a suit 
against that State. That seems to be purely a question of 
local law to be determined by the State Court." Brief at 
20. 
14Hopkins has been viewed primarily as standing 
for a principle of agency law. See Larson v. Domestic & 
Foreign Corp., 337 u.s. 682, 694 (1949} ("agent's l1abiity 
for torts committed by him cannot be avoided by pleading 
the direction or authorization of his principal}; Hamilton 
Mfg. Co. v. Trustees of State Colleges in Colorado, 356 F. 
2d 599, 601 n. 1 (CAlO 1966}. 
17. 
sued as if they w re state officials, the case long since 
has been overruled. See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida 
Nursing Home Assn, u.s. (1981) • Hopkins does not 
deserve the pride of place given to it by the majority. 15 
It is in fact a non-precedent. 
-1-o/i 
The Court a new doctrine, one 
that exposes the instrumentalities of the State itself to 
suit in federal court.l 6 After today's decision, state 
15The irrelevance of Hopkins is further indicated by 
the fact that the College's activities in that case were 
viewed as proprietary in nature: 
"[T]his is not an action against the College for 
a tort committed in the prosecution of any 
governmental function. The fee was in the 
State, but the corporation, as equitable owner, 
was in possession, use and enjoyment of the 
property. For protecting the bottom land the 
College, for its own corporate purposes and 
advantage, constructed the dyke. In so doing it 
was not acting in any governmental capacity. 
The embankment was in law similar to one which 
might have been built for private purposes by 
the plaintiff on the other side of the river. 
221 u.s., at 647. 
Cf. Employees v. Department of Public Health and 
Welfare, 411 u.s. 279 (1973) (distinguishing Parden v. 
Term1nal R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), on the bas1s that 
Parden concerned State proprietary activity). 
16The Court suggests that in prior decisions the 
Court has permitted suit against State Boards of Regents. 
See ante, at 5. Yet in none of these suits was the 
jurisdictional issue posed as it is here. Thus, for 
example, in University of California Board of Regents v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) , the Eleventh Amendment issue 
was not present because the case was here on petition to 
the California Supreme Court. See note 5, supra. And in 
each of the other cases cited by the Court, the plaintiff 
had the good sense to name other defendants in addition to 
the particular state board. See, e. g., Board of Regents 
Footnote continued on next page. ---
18. 
boards and commissions may be sued for injunctive relief. 
The Court also holds that such bodies may be sued for 
damages on the fiction that their segregated assets are 
not the State's. 17 The Court's extension of Ex parte 
Young to the State itself destroys the rationale of that 
decision. It also undermines the careful balance worked 
out in this sensitive area of the law. 
v. Tomanio, 446 u.s. 478 (1978); McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents, 339 u.s. 637 (19SO). 
The Court also argues that the courts of appeals are 
split on the question of whether damages can be awarded 
against state universities. Yet the two cases cited by 
the Court to demonstrate a split on this question do not 
support the Court's assertion. In SON! v. Board of 
Trustees, Sl3 F. 2d 347 (CA6 197S) the court found that 
the Board of Trustees had waived its immunity to suit, 
while in Goss v. Jacinto Junior College, S88 F. 2d 96, 98-
99 (CAS 1979) the court reasoned that the particular 
junior college was similar to a county or municipality, an 
"independent 'political subdivision' as a matter of Texas 
statutory and common law." The Court suggests as well 
that the courts of appeals are agreed that injunctive 
relief may be awarded against state universities and state 
boards of regents. Again the cases cited provide little 
support for the Court's assertion. In New England 
Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colorado, 
S92 F. 2d 1196, 1201 (CAl 1979), the court held that 
individual members of the Board of Regents might be sued 
for prospective injunctive relief. It did not hold, as 
the Court implies, that the University itself might be 
sued. Rather, it accepted "the University's 
identification with the state." And in ~ Student 
Services v. Texas ~ ~ M University, 612 F. 2d 160, 16S 
(CAS 1980), it is unclear that the court held more than 
that officials of the University could be sued for 
injunctive relief. Unlike the situation in those two 
cases, petitioner sued only the Board of Regents. 
Numerous Courts of Appeals have held state board of 
regents to be immune from suit in federal court by reason 
of the Eleventh Amendment. See note ___ , supra. 
17whether a State board, like a State official, 
may claim good faith immunity is not clear but of 




The decision is simply worng. The Court should 
dismiss the suit on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment. 
II Exhaustion of Remedies 
In view of my belief that this case should be 
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, I address the 
exhaustion question only briefly. Seventeen judges joined 
in the Court of Appeal's persuasive opinion adopting a 
rule of "flexible" exhaustion of administrative remedies 
in §1983 suits. Other Courts of Appeals have adopted a 
similar rule. See e. g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F. 2d 560 
{CA2 1969); Secret v. Brierton, 584 F. 2d 823 (CA7 1978). 
The opinion for the en bane court carefully reviewed the 
exhaustion doctrine in general and as applied to §1983 
actions. It found that the prior decisions of this Court 
did not clearly decide the question. 18 See Barry v. 
Barchi, 443 u.s. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill, 
411 u.s. 564, 575 {1973). And it concluded that the 
18 " [I] n all the cases in which the Supreme Court 
has articulated its no-exhaustion rule, the state 
administraive remedies were sufficiently inadequate that 
exhaustion would not have been appropriate in any event." 
Developments in the Law--Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 
Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1274 (1977). 
20. 
exhaustion of adequate and appropriate state 
administrative remedies would promote the achievement of 
the rights protected by §1983. 
I agree with the Court of Appeals' opinion. The 
requirement that a §1983 plaintiff exhaust adequate state 
administrative remedies was the accepted rule of law until 
quite recently. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 
211 U.S. 210, (1908} (opinion of Justice Holmes}. The 
rule rests on sound considerations. It does not defeat 
federal court jurisdiction, it merely defers it.l9 It 
permits the states to correct violations through their own 
procedures, and it encourages the establishment of such 
procedures. It is consistent with the principles of 
comity that apply whenever federal courts are asked to 
review state action or supersede state proceedings. See 
Younger v. Harris, 401 u.s. 37 (1971}. 
~ 
PQ.l"aaps ~ s:i.9-Q.ificant.J..y:, the rule conserves 
1\ 
19cf. Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary, 
u.s. , (Brennan, J., concurring} (exhaustion 
requirement in §1983 cases can be justified by "a somewhat 
lesser showing •.• where .• we are concerned not with the 
displacement of the §1983 remedy, but with the deferral of 
federal court consideration pending exhaustion of the 





and supplements scarce judicial resources. The nee&- £or~ 
1961, the year that Monroe v. Pape, 365 u.s. 167 (1961), 
lfp/ss 05/28/82 Rider A, 
PATSYl SALLY-POW 
David: Perhaps we should add a footnote along these lines: 
~ Of the approximately 30,000 civil rights suits 
filed in fiscal year 1981, 16,000 (use exact figures) were 
filed by state prisoners under §1983. The remainder 
involved a variety of civil rights suits. 
~ ...... 
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u.s. 37 (1971), prescribing abstention when state court 
proceedings are pending. At least where administrative 
proceedings are pending, Younger would seem to suggest the 
appropriateness of exhaustion. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 
411 u.s. 564 (1973). Yet the Court today adopts a flat 
rule without exception. 
The Court seeks to support its no exhaustion 
rule with indications of congressional intent. Finding 
·H.rl/ v~ 
little on point in the history of the Civil Rights Act 
J • 1-~.1 L~ '( . II , 
itself, the Court turns to the more re ent Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 u.s.c. §1997 et seq. 
(1976 ed., Supp. IV). This legislation was designed to 
authorize the Attorney General to begin civil rights 
actions on behalf of institutionalized persons. §1997a. 
The Act also placed certain limits on the existing 
authority of the Attorney General to intervene in suits 
begun by institutionalized persons. See §1997c. In 
addition, in §1997e, the Act sets forth an exhaustion 
requirement for §1983 claims brought by adult prisoners. 
On the basis of the exhaustion provision in 
§1997e, and remarks primarily by Representative 
-
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Justice Powell, dissenting. 
The Court holds that the Board of Regents of the 
State of Florida, a state instrumentality, is subject to 
suit in federal court notwithstanding the bar of the 
Eleventh Amendment. The Court reaches this conclusion 
through an unprecedented--and far reaching--expansion of 
the holding in Ex Parte Young, 209 u.s. 123 (1908). As I 
consider the Court's holding a serious departure from 
established constitutional doctrine, this dissent 






I dissent also from the Court's rejection of the 
rule of "flexible" exhaustion of state administrative 
remedies developed and stated persuasively by the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane. In 
disagreeing with the 17 judges of the Court of Appeals who 
adopted the flexible exhaustion principle, this Court 
places mistaken reliance on the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 u.s.c. §1997 et ~· 
(1976 ed., Supp. IV). I disagree with both portions of the 
Court's holding and therefore dissent. 
I The Eleventh Amendment 
A 
In this "reverse discrimination" action, 
petitioner, an employee of the Florida International 
University, brought suit under 42 u.s.c. §1983 against the 
Board of Regents of the State of Florida . 1 She did not 
1As the Court notes, see ante, at , n. 1, 
petitioner originally named the Florida International 
University as defendant. Because the Florida 
International University lacks the capacity to sue or be 
sued, the District Court found that it was not a proper 
defendant. Petitioner was permitted to amend her 
complaint, and she simply substituted the Board of 
Regents. 
In addition to racial discrimination, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
petitioner 
3. 
name the individual regents as defendants. She sued for 
$500,000 in damages, and for injunctive and other 
equitable relief. 2 The Board filed a motion to dismiss 
arguing that petitioner's suit was premature in light of 
her failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. 
The District Court agreed and granted the motion to 
dismiss. 
On petitioner's appeal, the Board added the bar 
of the Eleventh Amendment to its defense. 3 It argued that 
also claimed that she had been discriminated against on 
the basis of her sex. 
2Petitioner sought a declaratory judgment 
"declaring that the Plaintiff has suffered from acts of 
discrimination." In addition, she asked the court to 
"[r]equire Defendants to remedy the discrimination 
practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the next 
available position consistent with those previously 
applied for and for which she is qualified or in the 
alternative, to require the Defendants to pay to the 
Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary 
damages." She requested such further equitable and 
injunctive relief as the court deems appropriate. App. 
38-40. 
3The Eleventh Amendment provides: 
"The judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, 
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State." 
Footnote continued on next page. 
4. 
as an instrumentality of the State, the Board could not be 
subjected to suit in federal court absent a waiver of 
immunity. 4 And it asserted that there had been no waiver. 
The Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in nature, 
and the defense of the Amendment may be raised for the 
first time on appeal. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s. 
651, 678 (1974) ("Eleventh Amendment defense sufficienty 
partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it 
need not be raised in the trial court.") 
4"As a corporate state agency and component of 
state government, the [Board] operates with state funds, 
directs the [State University System], and is local 
neither in character nor operation. As the 'arm of the 
state' which manages the Division of Universities of the 
Department of Education, it is clearly part of the state 
for Eleventh Amendment purposes." Brief at 18. 
The Board of Regents of the Division of Universities 
of the Department of Education is established by the 
Florida Education Code as a part of the State University 
System. Fla. Stat. 240.2011. The Board consists of the 
Commissioner of Education and twelve citizens appointed by 
the Governor, approved by three members of the Cabinet, 
and confirmed by the Senate. Fla. Stat. 240.207. The 
chief administrative officer of the Board is the 
Chancellor, who serves by appointment of the Board. 
The Board has general supervisory authority over the 
State University System. Fla. Stat. 240.209. Among its 
duties are the appointment of university presidents, the 
review of budget requests of each university in the state 
system, the preparation of an aggregated budget for the 
State University System, the development of a master plan, 
and the establishment of a systemwide personnel 
classification and pay plan. Fla. Stat. §240.209. 
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida. 
Fla. Stat. §216.011. See Relyea v. State, 385 So.2d 1378 
(F'la. App. 198 0) • The Board may claim the defense of 
sovereign immunity in suits under state law. See id. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
5. 
Although the Board of Regents was created as a body 
corporate with power "to sue and be sued .•. to plead and 
be impleaded in all courts of law and equity," Fla. Stat. 
§240.042(1), it is well established that language such as 
thjs does not operate to waive the defense of the Eleventh 
Amendment. 5 In reply, petitioner argued that whether the 
statute creating the Board amounted to a waiver--and 
petitioner believed that it did--the Eleventh Amendment 
simply was irrelevant to the equitable claims she had 
Numerous courts of appeals have held state 
universities or state Boards of Regents immune from suit 
in federal court by reason of the Eleventh Amendment. 
See, e. g., Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F. 
2d 1345, 1349 (CA9 1981): Brennan v. University of 
Kansas, 451 F. 2d 1287 (CAlO 1971): Ronwin v. Shapiro, 
657 F. 2d 1071 (CA9 1981). 
5see Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing 
Home, 450 u.s. 147, lSo--(1981): Petty v. Tennessee-
Missouri Bridge Commn, 359 u.s. 275, 276-277 (1959) ("The 
conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity will 
not be lightly inferred And where a public 
instrumentality is created with the right 'to sue and be 
sued' that waiver of immunity in the particular setting 
may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special 
character in the state, not the federal courts"): Great 
Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47, 54. See 
Bragg v. Board of PU5Iic Instruction, 36 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 
1948) ("The mere fact that the Board of Public Instruction 
is created as a body corporate with power to sue and be 
sued does not affect its immunity from tort"). 
:,o_• 
6. 
lodged against the State. See Reply Brief at 3-4. 
Neither the Court of Appeals panel nor the Court 
of Appeals en bane addressed the Board's Eleventh 
Amendment defense. They directed their attention solely 
to the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
The panel held that there was no exhaustion requirement in 
§1983 suits and remanded to the District Court for 
consideration of the Board's Eleventh Amendment argument. 
612 F. 2d 946 (CAS 1980). The Court of Appeals, sitting 
en bane, reversed holding that §1983 plaintiffs must 
exhaust available and reasonable administrative remedies. 
634 F. 2d 900 (CAS 1981). Again the court did not consider 
the Board's Eleventh Amendment defense. 
The Eleventh Amendment question was first raised 
before this Court in the Board's response to the petition 
for writ of certiorari. The Board argued, as it had on 
appeal, that it was an arm of the State and that it had 
not waived its immunity from suit in federal court. Again 
petitioner argued that at most the Eleventh Amendment 
defense would bar her claim for damages. And, even as to 
this claim, petitioner now argued that the Amendment 
would not bar damages if the Board could meet the claim 




rather than from the State Treasury. These arguments were 
repeated at oral argument. 6 
As the Court acknowledges, the Eleventh 
Amendment question is jurisdictional and must be 
confronted at the outset. See ante, at 
B 
In interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, the 
t:U...~~ 
Court ~ sought to accommodate both the principle of 
sovereign immunity embodied in the Amendment and the 
states' duty to obey--and the federal courts to enforce--
federal law. Thus, it is well established that the State 
is not "divested of its immunity 'on the mere ground that 
the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of 
the United States.'" Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 u.s. 
184, 186 {1964), quoting, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 u.s. 1, 
10 {1890) . 7 It also is settled that when a State itself 
6Tr. of Oral Argument 25-28, 40-41. 
7 In Hans the Court also held that the Amendment 
bars suits brought against an unconsenting State by its 
own citizens, although by its terms the Amendment does not 
apply to this situation. Cf. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 
u.s. 313 {1934) {Eleventh Amendment applies to federal 
suits against an unconsenting state by a foreign nation). 
By contrast, the Amendment has not been applied to suits 







is not named as a party to the suit, the Amendment 
nevertheless applies if the State is the real party in 
interest. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 
323 u.s. 459 (1945) .8 
On the other hand, the Court has not interpreted 
the Amendment to bar federal court jurisdiction when the 
State has consented to suit, 9 or to bar review by this 
Court of an action brought against the State in state 
court. 1° Congress may lift the bar of the Amendment when 
against a State brought by another State or by the United 
States. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); 
United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965). 
8 In Ford Motor the plaintiff sued the Department 
of Treasury of the State of Indiana, and the three 
officials--the Governor, Treasurer, and Auditor--who 
constituted the Board of the Department of Treasury. The 
plaintiff sought a refund of gross income taxes paid to 
the department. Suit was brought in federal District 
Court. The Court held that the suit was barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. The plaintiff was seeking a refund 
from the state not a personal judgment against the 
individual officials: "[W]hen the action is in essence 
one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is 
the real party in interest and is entitled to invoke its 
sovereign immunity from suit even though individual 
officials are nominal defendants." 323 u.s., at 464. See 
Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 663; Great Northern Life 
Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47 (1944). 
9see Clark v. Barnard, 108 u.s. 436, 447 (1883); 
Footnote continued on next page. 





P.xercising powers granted to it by §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 u.s. 445 
(1976). Counties and municipalities may not claim 
immunity under the Amendment. Lincoln County v. Luning, 
133 u.s. 529 (1890) : Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 
429 u.s. 274, 279-281 (1977) And under Ex parte Young, 
209 u.s. 123 (1908), a federal court may order state 
officials to obey federal law in the future.
11 
Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 u.s. 184 (1964). 
10see Smith v. Reeves, 178 u.s. 436, 445 (1900); 
Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47, 57 
(1944); Chandler v. D1x, ~u.s. 590, 592 (1904). The 
Court's assumption of jurisdiction in University of 
California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), 
a case originating in state court, thus provides no 
support for today' s decision. For the same reason, the 
Court's reliance upon HoDkins v. Clemson Agricultural 
College, 221 U.S. 636 (191 , is misplaced. See infra. 
11under the theory, some would say fiction, of Ex 
parte Young, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar su1 ts 
against state officers because when a state officer "comes 
into conflict with the superior authority of [the] 
Constitution, ... he is •.. stripped of his official or 
representative character." Id., at 159. On this 
analysis, a prospective injunction requiring the official 
to conform his future behavior to federal law, does not 
require anything of the State and therefore does not bring 
the Eleventh Amendment to bear. The granting of 
retroactive relief, on the other hand, would require the 
official to take action in his offical capacity. Thus, if 
the official is required to pay damages from state funds, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
10. 
Application of these settled principles to the 
present case is straightforward. This is an action under 
§1983, and Congress has not removed the bar of the 
Eleventh Amendment in such actions. See Quern v. Jordan, 
440 u.s. 332 (1979) • Petitioner seeks relief from the 
Board of Regents of the State of Florida, an 
instrumentality or agency of the State. The Board is not 
a local political body but bears responsibility for the 
State university system as a whole. Cf. Mt. Healthy Bd. 
of Ed. v. Doyle, supra. Petitioner's argument that the 
statute incorporating the Board should be understood to 
waive the Eleventh Amendment is foreclosed by numerous 
decisions of this Court. See, e. g., Florida Dept of 
Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 u.s. 147 
(1981). 12 Similarly, petitioner's suggestion that the 
the State is directly affected. See Edelman v. Jordan, 
supra. Similarly, retroactive injunctive relief may 
require the official to take action in his official 
capacity and also would be barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. Cf. Larson v. Domestic .!_ Foreign Commerce 
Corp., 337 u.s. 682 (1949). Of course, in addition to 
prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff may seek 
damages from the individual officer in his personal 
capacity. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232, 237-238 
(1974). 
Footnote(s) 12 will appear on following pages. 
11. 
Eleventh Amendment does not apply to equitable claims 
against a state is incorrect. See Cory v. White, u.s. 
(1982). 
Thus, unless the rule in Ex parte Young, supra, 
is extended beyond any previous decision of this Court, 
the Eleventh Amendment bars this suit. The theory in Ex 
parte Young, supra, has no application to the State itself 
or to an instrumentality of the State. If petitioner had 
sued the individual members of the Board, her claim for 
damages against them would not have been barred by the 
Eleventh Arnendrnen t. Nor would her claim for equitable 
relief have been barred to the extent it were limited to 
future conduct. But petitioner did not sue the members of 
12 In Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Horne 
Assn, 450 u.S. 14 7 (1981) , the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit found that the Florida Department of Health 
and Rehabilitative Services had consented to suit. The 
court based its finding of waiver, in part, on the fact 
that the Department was a "body corporate" with the 
capacity to "sue and be sued" under state law. Fla. Stat. 
Ann. §402.34. This Court reversed holding that a general 
waiver of sovereign immunity does not amount to a waiver 
of the Eleventh Amendment. See id., at 150. See note 5, 
supra. 
Without distinguishing 
supra, the Court leaves open 
Board has consented to suit. 
Florida Dept of Health, 
the question of whether the 
See ante, at 9 & n. 10. 
12. 
the Board. She sued only the Board itself, an arm of the 
State of Florida. Moreover, the principle relief sought 
by petitioner would impose--in the alternative--an 
affirmative duty on the Board to promote her to the next 
available position of comparable status to those to which 
she had applied, or would "require the [Board] to pay to 
[petitioner] the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary 
damages." App., 39. Seen. 3, ante. 
One would have thought that Ex parte Young was 
simply irrelevant in these circumstances. Although an 
individual official may be viewed as acting on his own and 
without State authority when acting against federal law, 
the State--or an agency of the State--cannot act other 
than in its official State capacity. Similarly, an action 
for damages against the state, or an arm of the state, 
seeks damages that must be paid from the state's own 
coffers. Whether the damages come directly from the 
State's general fund or from some other State fund, the 
money is no less the State's. Indeed, direct application 
of Ex parte Young to the State and its instrumentalities 
would read the Eleventh Amendment out of the Constitution. 
If the bar of the Amendment is lifted merely upon the 
naming of a State board, commission, agency or 
, . 
.. ·.~~·;~tl . 
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corporation--opening the way to damages as well as to 
injunctive relief--then the Amendment no longer would 
afford constitutionally prescribed protection to the 
states. 
c 
Despite the weight of these considerations, the 
Court concludes that this action is not barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. Indeed, the Court undertakes to apply 
Ex parte Young to the Board of Regents itself. Relying 
upon the decision in Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural 
College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911), the Court reasons that the 
Board of Regents, as a body corporate, is no different 
from a state official. The Court attempts to bolster this 
novel conclusion by observing that under Florida law the 
Board of Regents is termed the "director" of the Division 
of Universities. The Court concludes that, just as in Ex 
parte Young, the Board of Regents "may be sued for 
unconstitutional or unauthorized act ions, as long as the 
plaintiff is not seeking monetary relief that must be paid 
out of the state treasury." Ante, at 8. 
The Court's conclusion is supported neither by 
reason nor precedents of this Court. As indicated above, 
the rationale of Ex parte Young does not apply to a State 
<, 
14. 
or State instrumentality. The State cannot be "stripped" 
of its own authority. Moreover, if the Board of Regents 
is a State agency--and it clearly is--then its assets are 
also those of the State's. Yet the Court's decision 
exposes the Board's assets to a damage award on the double 
fiction that the Board is really an "official" and that 
its separate assets somehow belong to this fictitious 
being rather than to the State. On such a theory, a state 
welfare board, highway department or any other agency, 
board or department of a state with any separate funds or 
income could be sued for damages. Such a conclusion is at 
odds with the Court's holding in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. 
Tax Commn, 327 u.s. 573 (1946), that the segregated funds 
of the State Tax Commission were State monies subject to 
the Eleventh Amendment. 
Nor does the Board of Regents' corporate status 
under state law support the Court's holding. State 
governments consist in major part of a variety of boards, 
commissions, agencies, and corporations. These State 
entities are no less instruments of the State because they 
may be vested under state law with the power to contract, 
to sue and be sued. This Court repeatedly has held the 
Eleventh Amendment to bar suit against such state 
15. 
corporate agencies. See Great Northern Insurance Co. v. 
Read, 322 u.s. 47; Ford Motor Co. v. Department of 
Treasury, 323 u.s. 454 (1945); Kennecott Coppper Corp. v. 
State Tax Commn, 327 u.s. 572 (1946). 
Thus, in Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S. 
184 (1964) , the Court assumed that a state owned railroad-
-as an instrumentality of the State--was immune from suit 
in federal court absent a waiver. The railway in Parden 
was authorized to operate "as though it were an ordinary 
common carrier." 377 U.S. 185. It performed services for 
profit and had contracts and agreements with various labor 
organizations. It was "indisputably a common carrier 
engaging in interstate commerce." Id., at 185. No 
suggestion was made that as a State body, with separate 
funds, the railroad was no longer an instrumentality of 
the State but was merely a State official. And just last 
term the Court held that the Florida Department of Health, 
a "body corporate" under State law was immune from suit. 
Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 
u.s. 147 (1981). Cf. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 u.s. 781 (1978) 
("There can be no doubt . • • that suit against the State 
and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment"). The Court's conclusion that corporate status 
16. 
converts a State body into a State official, subject to 
suit, cannot be reconciled with these well established 
precedents. 
D 
I am unaware of any prior decision of this Court 
that supports the Court's application of Ex parte Young to 
State instrumentalities. Hopkins v. Clemson College, 
supra, relied upon so heavily by the Court, is simply 
irrelevant. In that case suit was brought against a state 
college in state court to recover damages caused by the 
college's construction of a dyke. The state courts held 
that the college was protected from suit by the state law 
of sovereign immunity. Although the Court discussed the 
Eleventh Amendment in some detail, there was simply no 
Eleventh Amendment question in that case. 13 It was clear 
before Hopkins that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply 
13The state college recognized that there was no 
Eleventh Amendment question. In its brief it noted: "It 
is difficult to see how either Section 2 of Article III, 
of the Constitution of the United States or the Eleventh 
amendment has any application to the inquiry whether a 
suit by a citizen of a State in its own Courts is a suit 
against that State. That seems to be purely a question of 




to bar review in this Court of any federal question 
presented in a suit against a State in state court. See 
note 10, supra. However the holding in Hopkins may be 
viewed, no Eleventh Amendment question was presented to 
the Court. 14 It therefore is no surprise that the opinion 
has never been cited by this Court for the proposition 
that the Eleventh Amendment is no bar to suit against a 
state agency in federal court. If the case could be 
viewed as standing for the proposition that state agencies 
may be sued as if they were state officials, the case long 
since has been overruled sub silento by subsequent 
decisions. See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing 
Home Assn, supra. Hopkins does not deserve the pride of 
place given to it by the majority. 15 It is in fact a non-
14Hopkins has been viewed primarily as standing 
for a principle of agency law. See Larson v. Domestic & 
Foreign Corp., 337 u.s. 682, 694 (1949) ("agent's liabiity 
for torts committed by him cannot be avoided by pleading 
the direction or authorization of his principal")~ 
Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Trustees of State Colleges in 
Colorado, 356 F. 2d 599, 601 n. 1 (CAlO 1966). 
15The irrelevance of Hopkins is further indicated by 
the fact that the College's activities in that case were 
viewed as proprietary in nature: 
"[T]his is not an action against the College for 
a tort committed in the prosecution of any 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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precedent. 
The announces a new doctrine, 
one that exposes the instrumentalities of the State itself 
to suit in federal court. 16 After today's decision, state 
governmental function. The fee was in the 
State, but the corporation, as equitable owner, 
was in possession, use and enjoyment of the 
property. For protecting the bottom land the 
College, for its own corporate purposes and 
advantage, constructed the dyke. In so doing it 
was not acting in any governmental capacity. 
The embankment was in law similar to one which 
might have been built for private purposes by 
the plaintiff on the other side of the river. 
221 u.s., at 647. 
Cf. Employees v. Department of Public Health and 
Welfare, 411 u.s. 279 (1973} (distinguishing Parden v. 
Terminal R. Co. , 377 U.S. 18 4 (19 64} , on the bas is that 
Parden concerned State proprietary activity}. 
16The Court suggests that in prior decisions the 
Court has permitted suit against State Boards of Regents. 
See ante, at 5. Yet in none of these suits was the 
jurisdictional issue posed as it is here. Thus, for 
example, in University of California Board of Regents v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978} , the Eleventh Amendment issue 
was not present because the case was here on petition to 
the California Supreme Court. See note 5, supra. And in 
each of the other cases cited by the Court, the plaintiff 
had the good sense to name other defendants in addition to 
the particular state board. See, e. g., Board of Regents 
v. Tomanio, 446 u.s. 478 (1978}; McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents, 339 u.s. 637 (1950}. 
The Court also argues that the courts of appeals are 
split on the question of whether damages can be awarded 
against state universities. Yet the two cases cited by 
Footnote continued on next page. 
. . 
' . "· 
19. 
boards and commissions may be sued for injunctive relief. 
The Court also holds that such bodies may be sued for 
damages on the fiction that their segregated assets are 
not the State's. 17 The Court's extension of Ex parte 
the Court to demonstrate a split on this question do not 
support the Court's assertion. In SON! v. Board of 
Trustees, Sl3 F. 2d 347 (CA6 197S) the court found that 
the Board of Trustees had waived its immunity to suit, 
while in Goss v. Jacinto Junior College, S88 F. 2d 96, 98-
99 (CAS 1979) the court reasoned that the particular 
junior college was similar to a county or municipality, an 
"independent 'political subdivision' as a matter of Texas 
statutory and common law." The Court suggests as well that 
the courts of appeals are agreed that injunctive relief 
may be awarded against state universities and state boards 
of regents. Again the cases cited provide little support 
for the Court's assertion. In New England Patriots 
Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colorado, S92 F. 2d 
119 6, 1201 (CAl 1979) , the court held that individual 
members of the Board of Regents might be sued for 
prospective injunctive relief. It did not hold, as the 
Court implies, that the University itself might be sued. 
Rather, it accepted "the University's identification with 
the state." And in ~ Student Services v. Texas Ji ~ !!_ 
University, 612 F. 2d 160, 16S (CAS 1980), it is unclear 
that the court held more than that officials of the 
University could be sued for injunctive relief. Unlike 
the situation in those two cases, petitioner sued only the 
Board of Regents. Numerous courts of appeals have held 
state board of regents to be immune from suit in federal 
court by reason of the Eleventh Amendment. See n. 4, 
supra. 
17whether a State board, like a State official, 
may claim good faith immunity is not clear but of 
substantial significance. See Owen v. City of 
Independence, 44S U.S. 622 (1980) • 
'J 
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Young to the State itself destroys the rationale of that 
decision. It also undermines the careful balance worked 
out in this sensitive area of the law. 
The decision is simply wrong. The Court should 
dismiss the suit on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment. 
II Exhaustion of Remedies 
In view of my belief that this case should be 
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, I address the 
exhaustion question only briefly. Seventeen judges joined 
in the Court of Appeal's persuasive opinion adopting a 
rule of "flexible" exhaustion of administrative remedies 
in §1983 suits. Other Courts of Appeals have adopted a 
similar rule. See e. g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F. 2d 560 
(CA2 1969); Secret v. Brierton, 584 F. 2d 823 (CA7 1978). 
The opinion for the en bane court carefully reviewed the 
exhaustion doctrine in general and as applied to §1983 
actions. It found that the prior decisions of this Court 
did not clearly decide the question. 18 See Barry v. 
18 " [I] n all the cases in which the Supr erne Court 
has articulated its no-exhaustion rule, the state 
administraive remedies were sufficiently inadequate that 
exhaustion would not have been appropriate in any event." 
Developments in the Law--Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 
Footnote continued on next page . 
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Barchi, 443 u.s. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill, 
411 u.s. 564, 575 n. 14 (1973). And it concluded that the 
exhaustion of adequate and appropriate state 
administrative remedies would promote the achievement of 
the rights protected by §1983. 
I agree with the Court of Appeals' opinion. The 
requirement that a §1983 plaintiff exhaust adequate state 
administrative remedies was the accepted rule of law until 
quite recently. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 
211 U.S. 210, (1908) (opinion of Justice Holmes) . The 
rule rests on sound considerations. It does not defeat 
f d 1 t · · d · t · 1' t mere 1 y defer s 1' t . 19 e era cour JUr1s 1c 1on, It 
permits the states to correct violations through their own 
procedures, and it encourages the establishment of such 
procedures. It is consistent with the principles of 
comity that apply whenever federal courts are asked to 
Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1274 (1977). 
19cf. Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary, 
U.S. , (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(exhaustion requirement in §1983 cases can be justified by 
"a somewhat lesser showing ••. where •• we are concerned 
not with the displacement of the §1983 remedy, but with 
the deferral of federal court consideration pending 
exhaustion of the state administrative process"). 
22. 
review state action or supersede state proceedings. See 
Younger v. Harris, 401 u.s. 37 (1971). 
Moreover, and highly relevant to the effective 
functioning of the overburdened federal court system, the 
rule conserves and supplements scarce judicial resources. 
In 1961, the year that Monroe v. Pape, 365 u.s. 167 
(1961), was decided, only 270 civil rights actions were 
begun in thefederal district courts. Annual Report of the 
Director of the Administrative Office of the u.s. Courts 
238 (1961). In 1981, over 30,000 such suits were 
commenced. 20 Annual Report of the Director of The 
Administrative Office of the u.s. Courts 63, 68 (1981). 
Such a dramatic increase in litigation imposes a heavy 
burden on the federal courts to the detriment of all 
federal court litigants, including those whose 
constitutional rights in fact have been infringed. 
The Court argues that past decisions of the 
Court categorically hold that there is no exhaustion 
20of the approximately 30,000 civil rights fuits 
filed in fiscal year 1981, 15,639 were filed by state 
prisoners under §1983. The remainder involved a variety 
of civil rights suits. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 u.s. 





requirement in §198 3 suits. But as the Court of Apeals 
demonstrates, and as the Court recognizes, many of these 
decisions can be explained as applications of traditional 
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. See McNeese v. 
Board of Education, 373 u.s. 668 (1963). Other decisions 
speak to the question in an offhand and conclusory 
fashion. See Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967) 
(unargued per curiam). Moreover, a categorical no-
exhaustion rule would seem inconsistent with the decision 
in Younger v. Harris, 401 u.s. 37 (1971), prescribing 
abstention when state criminal proceedings are pending. 
At least where administrative proceedings are pending, 
Younger would seem to suggest the appropriateness of 
exhaustion. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574-
575 (1973). Yet the Court today adopts a flat rule 
without exception. 
The Court seeks to support its no exhaustion 
rule with indications of congressional intent. Finding 
nothing on point in the history of the Civil Rights Act 
itself, the Court places primary reliance on the recent 
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 u.s.c. 
§1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV). This legislation was 
designed to authorize the Attorney General to begin civil 
''• 
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rights actions on 
§1997a. The Act 
behalf of institutionalized persons. 
also placed certain limits on the 
existing authority of the Attorney General to intervene in 
suits begun by institutionalized persons. See §1997c. In 
addition, in §1997e, the Act sets forth an exhaustion 
requirement for §1983 claims brought by adult prisoners. 
On the basis of the exhaustion provision in 
§1997e, and remarks primarily by Representative 
Kastenmeier, the Court contends that Congress has endorsed 
a general no exhaustion rule. 
should be obvious. The 
The irony in this reasoning 
concern that prompted the 
Department of Justice to support, and the Congress to 
adopt, §1997e was the vast increase in §1983 suits brought 
by state prisoners in federal courts. There has been a 
year-by-year increase in these suits since the mid-1960's. 
The increase in fiscal 1981 over fiscal 1980 was some 26%, 
resulting in a total of 15,639 such suits filed in 1981 as 
compared with 12,397 in 1980. The 1981 total constituted 
over 11% of the total federal district court docket. 
Although most of these cases present frivolous claims, 
many are litigated through the courts of appeals to this 
Court. The burden on the system fairly can be described 
as enormous with few, if any, benefits that would not be 
., 




available in meritorious cases if exhaustion of 
appropriate state administrative remedies were required 
prior to any federal court litigation. It was primarily 
this problem that prompted enactment of §1997e. 
Moreover, it is clear from the legislative 
history that Congress simply was not addressing the 
exhaustion problem in any general fashion. The concern 
focused on the problem of prisoner petitions. The new Act 
had a dual purpose in this respect. In addition to 
requiring prior exhaustion of adequate state remedies, 
Congress wished to authorize the Attorney General to act 
when necessary to protect the constitutional rights of 
prisoners, but at the same time minimize the need for 
federal action of any kind by requiring prior exhaustion. 
Both sponsors of the Act in the Senate made this clear. 
Senator Hatch explained §1997e as follows: 
"In actions relating to alleged violations of 
the constitutional rights of prisoners, such 
persons may be required to exhaust internal 
grievance procedures before the Attorney General 
can become involved pursuant to [the Act]." 
Congrzfsional Record Sl713, February 26, 
1980. 
21senator Hatch offered the same explanation on 
several other occasions in the course of the debate. See 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Senator Bayh, the author of the Act, decribed the 
exhaustion provision in similar terms: 
"[I]n the event of a prison inmate's rights 
being alleged to be violated . • • then before 
the Justice Department could intervene or 
initiate suits, the prison inmate or class of 
inmates would have to pursue all of their 
adiminstrative remedies within the State law 
before the Justice Department could intervene 
under the provisions of [the Act]." 
Congressional Record Sl859, February 27, 1980. 
In short, in enacting the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Act Congress was focussing on the powers 
of the Attorney General, and the particular question of 
prisoners' suits, not on the general question of 
exhaustion in §1983 actions. Also revealing as to the 
limited purpose of §1997e is Congress' consistent refusal 
Congressional Record S4293, April 29, 1980 ("Section 7 
would establish specific procedures that would be 
applicable before the Attorney General could enter into an 
action in behalf of an imprisoned or incarcerated person. 
Such person would first have had to fully exhasut all 
internal grievance mechanisms that existed in the 
institution in which he was confined"); Congressonal 
Record S4626, May 6, 1980 ("Section 7(D) further clarifies 
that the administrative grievance procedures established 
in section 7 are only for the purposes of requiring 
prisoners to exhaust internal grievance mechanisms before 
the Attorney General can litigate on his behalf"). 
27. 
to adopt legislation imposing a general no-exhaustion 
requirement. Thus, for example, in 1979, a bill was 
introduced into the Senate providing: 
"No court of the United States shall stay or 
dismiss any civil action brought under this Act 
on the ground that the party bringing such 
action failed to exhaust the remedies available 
in the courts or the administrative agencies of 
any State." S.l983, 96th Congress, 1st Session. 
The bill was never reported out of committee. 
The requirement that plaintiffs exhaust 
available and adequate administrative remedies--subject to 
well developed exceptions--is firmly established in 
virtually every area of the law. This is dictated in 
§1983 actions by common sense, as well as by comity and 
federalism, where adequate state administrative remedies 
are available. 
If the exhaustion question were properly before 
us, I would affirm the Court of Appeals. 
Ms. Sara Sonet 
Research Librarian 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Ms. Sonet: 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of the Associate Attorney General 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
June 1, 1982 
Thank you for your letter of May 26, 1982, inquiring about 
the status of the program established by 42 U.S.C. Section 1997(e) 
relating to inmate grievance procedures. 
Section 1997(e), enacted in 1980 as part of the Civil Rights 
of Institutionalized Persons Act, requires the Attorney General 
to promulgate minimum standards for inmate grievance procedures 
and to establish a method of certifying such procedures upon the 
application of states and political subdivisions. Pursuant to 
the directive in Section 1997(e), the Department, after thorough 
study and review, promulgated standards for inmate grievance 
procedures and established a certification method on October 1, 
1981. Those standards and the procedure for certification may be 
found at 28 C.F.R. Part 40. 
On October 27, 1981, the State of Wyoming submitted the 
first application for certification under the standards. The 
Department reviewed Wyoming's application and advised the appro-
priate officials of a number of deficiencies in the application 
materials. Wyoming submitted additional materials in support of 
its application in March of 1982 in order to correct these de-
ficiencies. The Department is in the process of reviewing the 
additional submission. 
To date, Colorado and New Mexico are the only other juris-
dictions that have submitted applications for certification of 
their inmate grievance procedures. Colorado's application was 
submitted by letter dated April 1, 1982 and is currently under 
review. New Mexico submitted its application by letter dated 
May 25, 1982; that application has just been received. 
You also ask whether the Attorney General has submitted to 
Congress the report required by 42 U.S.C. Section 1997(f). That 
Section, also a part of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized 
Persons Act, requires the Attorney General to report to Congress 
on the discharge of certain duties imposed on the Department under 
the Act relating to the review of complaints of mistreatment made 
by persons confined in state or local institutions such as prisons 
and jails. In March of 1982, the Attorney General submitted the 
first report required by Section 1997(f) to Congress; a copy is 
enclosed. You will note that nothing in Section 1997(f) requires 
the Attorney General to include in the report a summary of his 
activities related to the processing of applications for certifi-
cation of inmate grievance procedures and, accordingly, no such 
summary is contained in the report. 
I hope this answers your questions. Please do not hesitate 
to contact me if further information is needed. 
Enclosure 
rederick Fr"edman 
Special Assistant to the 
Associate Attorney General 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 4, 1982 
Re: 80-1874 - Patsy v. Florida 
Dear Thurgood: 
Although I was content with your Eleventh 





Copies to the Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
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June 7, 1982 
Re: No. 8 0-1874 - Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida 
Dear Thurgood: 
On the understanding that the two minor changes that I have 
suggested will be made , I am glad to join your recirculation of 
June 3. 
Sincer e ly, 
~~-!· 
Justice Marshall 




TO: David DATE: June 8, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents 
I find your revised draft of June 7 totally 
persuasive until we come to the final section of Part I 
(subpart D, as relettered by me, pp. 14-18, inclusive). 
To this point, you have stated the case, and then 
demonstrated by an impressive array of authorities, well 
presented, that the Eleventh Amendment issue is 
jurisdictional in the most fundamental sense, except only 
that a state may consent to be sued. As I have indicated in 
marginal notes, the quotations from prior decisions seem 
controlling. If the cases themselves- i.e., the issue 
presented and the holding of the Court - are consistent with 
these quotations, I suggest makingthe language in the 
Eleventh Amendment section of the opinion (Part I) more 
positive. I have suggested some language that I am sure you 
can improve. 
Subpart D (commencing at the bottom of p. 14) 
addresses the arguments of petitioner as to why the Eleventh 
Amendment is not a bar. I do not have TM's opinion with me, 
and the truth is I have not read it since the Eleventh 
Amendment issue was relegated to a footnote. I will try to 
read it tomorrow. But if my understanding is correct, the 






are not relied upon in TM's revised opinion. This should be 
made explicit at the outset of Subpart D. You might 
commence along the following lines: 
"As the Court itself offers no answer to 
the reason and force of its prior decisions, 
I turn now to the arguments advanced by 
petitioners. It bears repeating, that both 
parties have addressed this issue and it was 
fully aired at the oral argument. See supra, 
at " (David cite general page 
references to the oral argument) • 
As I read Subpart D, I become less certain as to 
its central thrust. The two specific arguments referred to 
on page 15 are petitioner's claims of waiver and that the 
·-Arne~~ ! oe_: not bar equitable claim~ You dispatch each 
of these arguments in a sentence rather unpersuasively. The 
draft did address the waiver issue on page 4 as a part of 
the statement of the case and position of parties. Is it 
desirable, David, simply to assert, in a brief sentence for 
each, these two grounds on which petitioner relies, and move 
the argument of these issues - including footnotes - to 
Subpart D? And do we make the point explicitly anywhere 
that the requirement of our cases is "consent", and this 
cannot be implied. It can be accomplished only by explicit 
action. There is a great deal of excellent language on 
this, particularly for the immunity of the United States. 
The greater part of Subpart D is devoted to Ex 
parte Young. Did petitioner rely on it? As I dictate this 
memorandum, I see that your reliance on the Eleventh 
Amendment is the principal answer to the equitable relief 
claim, although I do think this is not made as clearly as it 
can be. 
In sum, Subpart D as now written seems a weak 
ending. It is appropriate to conclude an opinion by 
advancing - and knocking down - arguments of the losing 
party. But the principal "knocking" on the waiver or 
consent issue is on p. 4. 









TO: David DATE: June 8, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents 
I find your revised draft of June 7 totally 
persuasive until we come to the final section of Part I 
(subpart D, as relettered by me, pp. 14-18, inclusive). 
To this point, you have stated the case, and then 
demonstrat.ed by an impressive array of authorities, well 
presented, that the Elevent'.h Amendment i.ssue is 
jurisdictional in the most fundament~l sense, except only 
that a state may consent to be sued. As I have indicated in 
marginal notes, the quot..ations fr,.,m prior decisions seem 
controlling. If the cases themselves- i.e., the issue 
presented and the holding of the Court - are consistent with 
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Eleventh .'l!Jnendment section of the opinion (Part I) more 
positive. I have suggested some language that I am sure you 
can improve. 
Subpart D (commencing at the bottom of p. 34) 
addresses the arguments of petitioner as to why the Eleventh 
Amendment i.s not a bar. I do not have 'J'M's opi.nion with me, 
and the truth is I have not read it since the Eleventh 
Amendment issue was relegated to a footnote. J will try to 
read it tomorrow. But if my understanding i.e correct, the 
arguments you address in Subpart D are the petitioner's and 
2. 
are not relied upon in TM's revised opinion. This should be 
made expl i.ci t at the outset of Subpart D. You might 
commence along the Eollowing lines: 
"As the Court itself offers no answer to 
the reason and force of its prior decisions, 
I turn now to the arguments advanced by 
petitioners. It bears repeating, that both 
parties have adoressed this issue and it was 
fully aired at the oral argument. See supra, 
at ." (David cite general page 
references to the oral argument) • 
As I read Subpart o, I become less certain as to 
its central thrust. ~he two specific arguments referred to 
on page 15 are petitioner's claims of waiver and that the 
Amendment does not bar equitahle claims. You dispatch each 
of these arguments in a sent~nce rather unpersuasively. The 
draft did address the waiver issue on page 4 as a part of 
the statement of the case and position of parties. Is it 
desir~ble, David, simply to assert, in a brief sentence for 
each, these two grounds on which petitioner relies, and move 
the argument of these issues - including footnotes - to 
Subpart D? And do we make the point explicitly anywhere 
that the requirement of our cases is "consent", and this 
cannot be implied. It can be accomplished only by explicit 
action. There is a great deal of excellent language on 
this, particularly for the immunity of the United States. 
The greater part of Subpart D is devoted to ~ 
parte Young. Did petitioner rely on it? As I dictate this 







Amendment is the principal answer to the equitable relief 
claim, although I do think this is not made as clearly as it 
can be. 
In sum, Subpart 0 as now written seems a weak 
ending. It is appropriate to conclude an opinion by 
advancinq - and knocking down - arguments of the losing 
party. But the principal "knocking" on the waiver or 
consent issue is on p. 4. 
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.tttpt"tntt C!fourl of tlft ~tb .jtattg 
-M!ringhm. ~. "f. 2llp'l>~ 
June 9, 1982 
Re: No. 80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents of the 
State of Florida 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, .-.., ~ , _. 
' \' v.,. l /;,.' 
' I 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
,ju:.pt"tutt Qfonrl of t4t ~~ ,jtattg 
Jfagfri:nghtn. J. <q. 2llP.,.~ 
June 10, 1982 
Re: No. 80-1874 - Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Florida 
Dear Lewis: 
Please show me as joining Part II of your dissenting 
opinion. You may add at the end something like : 
"I am authorized to state that Chief 
Justice Burger joins in Part II of 





THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
June 17 , 198 2 
RE: 80-1874 - Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State 
of Florida ( ~~~
~) 
Dear Lew is: 
I join Part II of your dissent . Through inadvertence my 
June 10 memo to you did not go to the Con fe renee . 
Regards, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.. 
May 21, 1982 
Re: 80-1874 - Patsy v. Board of Regents 
of Florida 
Dear Thurgood: 
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~=art! 
.Su.pnuu Of~ af ttr~ b ~tatftt 
~a.~ IO. <!f. 2llfi1"~ 
Mr. Fred Friedman 
Special Assistant· to the Associate 
Attorney General 
Department of Justice 
Washington, DC 2053.0 
Dear Mr. Fri~dman, 
May 26, 1982 
I am ~terested in ascertaining the status of the program estab-
lished by 42 u.s.c. 1997 (e). As we have dis.cussed, this section 
provides for review and possible certification by the Attorney General 
of procedures established by state correctional facilities to review 
prisoner grievances. 
Specifically, I would like to know which states have submitted 
procedures for review by the Attorney General. Has the Attorney 
General certified the procedures of any of those state cor rectional 
facilites as submitted? Has the Attorney General submitted a report 
to congres-s describing the status of his activities per 42 u. s.c. 1997 (f) 1 
If so, Inay · I obtain a copy of this report? 
Thank you so much for your patience during our numerous telephone 
conversations. I would deeply appreciate your prompt r esponse to 
this request~ 
Yours s i ncerely, 
Sara Sonet 
Research Librarian 








REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO CONGRESS REGARDING 
ACTIVITIES INITIATED PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT, 42 u.s.c. §1997 











The Civil Right• of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 u.s.c. 
§1997 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), was enacted in May, 
1980. It authorizes· the Attorney General to initiate or to 
intervene in equitable actions against public institutions in 
Which he has reasonable cause to believe there is a systematic 
pattern or practice of flagrant or egregioua violations of the 
affected persona' constitutional or federal statutory rights. 
This report will provide Members of COngress with the criteria 
by Which actions are initiated pursuant to the Act, the details 
surrounding actions initiated under the Act in fiscal year 1981, 
and information concerning the progress made in federal insti-
tutions toward meeting promulgated standards for such institu-
tions or constitutionally guaranteed minima. It is submitted 
in accord with the reporting requirements of 42 u.s.c. §1997(f). 
II. Criteria fOr Review of Complaints and for the Initiation 
of Investigations 
(a) Nature of the Allegations 
Determine the severity and scope of the allegations, 
including the exigency of the circumstances presented, ~· 
are life threatening emergencies or abuses implicated: how 
large a clasa of persons are involved. Make a judgment con-
cerning Whether a claim authorized by Public Law 96-247 is 
presented. 
(b) EValuate the Allegations in Light of Decisional 
Law 
Revi~appropriate decisional law to determine whether 
th~ courts -have addressed the issues presented by the com-
plaint. Deter.mine Whether the Special Litigation Section has 
pursued simLLar claims in the past: Whether the issue is novel 
or canplezr and- whether, although the issues may be well settled 
in the decisional law, enforcement actions are common. 
(c) Potential Alternative Resolutions 
Ascertain. ~f possible, Whether the complainant has private 
resources, orretained private or public interest counsel. 
Determine Whether-, the assistance available to the complainant 
is adequate ta address the issues raised by the complaint. 
Assess Whetherthere are, reasonably available, administrative 





(d) Geographic Location 
Dete~ine Whether the Special Litigation Section has other 
cases or matters pending in the jurisdiction from Which the 
complaint baa coae and assess the likely impact that a new 
investigation may have on those matters or cases. 
(e) Relationship of the Complaint to Section Priorities 
From time to time, the Special Litigation Section staff 
will review, in consultation with the Assistant Attorney 
General's office, ita litigation priorities. In each instance, 
a decision muat be made as to whether a particular complaint 
falls within thea~ priorities. To the extent that it does 
not, it must th~ · be dete~ined whether there are specific, 
unusual factora that nevertheless justify further action. 
(f) Resource Allocation 
Make a preliminary judgment about the time, effort and 
resources the- complaint, if investigated, will likely consume. 
For exampl.•• bow many lawyers and support staff will be required 
to condu~the investigation and for What period? How much 
travel ia required? What need will there be for use of con-
sultants? Bow active are other pending cases and matters in 
the office? 
2. Review"o£ Particular Complaint 
(a) Upon receipt of a complaint, the above-criteria 
shall be appli~to it, and an initial determination shall be 
made with respect to its merits. 
(b) ID. the event that the complaint, on ita face, 
appears meritorious t~ere shall be additional efforts made 
to obtain preliminary verification of the allegation from 
public sourcaa. existing files or other persona known to 
the DiviaiaD or identified in the complaint. 
(c) If the complaint is without merit or otherwise 
fails to satisfy tha Division's criteria, the complainant 
shall be 110 notified an<! the matter closed. 
\ 
.• 
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3. Investigation Memorandum 
(a) If, on the ba•i• of the review and application of 
criteria, there ia a need for a statutory investigation, a 
memorandum shall be prepared. It must, at a minimum, review 
the complaint, applying the criteria specified above, describe 
the independent verification and corroboration obtained, and 
suggest method• and time·f:rames for conducting an investigation. 
(b) The memorm~duDt shall be written to the Section 
Chief, after review by the appropriate Deputy. It shall be 
accompanied by proposed notice letters and, where appro-
priate, by FBI investigation requests. 
4. Section Chief Revi~ 
(a) Upon receipt of the investigation memorandum, the 
Section Chief shall review promptly the recommendation. 
(b) If the Chief agrees with the recommendation, he or 
she shall fo~it to the Assistant Attorney General in 
accordance with the provisions set forth below. The Chief 
may request addi%ional information, require other modification 
of the propoaa1~ or· disapprove the recommendation. 
s. Assistant Attorney General Review 
(a) In the event that the Section Chief recommends 
commencement o£ an investigation, he or she shall forward 
this recommendation, together with the investigation memo-
randum and the· proposa~notice letters, to the Assistant 
Attorney · Ge~era1 for Civil Rights. 
(b) The- .Aaai.atant. Attorney General shall review 
the recommendation and may approve the recommendation by 
signing the proposed notice letters, may disapprove by explana-
tory memorandum stating briefly the reasons therefor, or may 





6. Commencing an Investigation 
When approved, the investigation is begun officially by 
forwarding a notice letter, return-receipt requested, to the 
appropriate state or local officials. No investigation shall 
begin for seven days from the date of receipt of such notice 
by the officials. The:not~ce ~ederal officials required 
by the Act shall also be aeat at this time. 
7. Conduct of the Investigation 
(a) The attorney aaaigned to conduct the investigation 
shall endeavor to enlist the cooperation of state or local 
authorities. The attorney shall make reasonable and timely 
requests for access to the institution(s), for documents and 
for such other information aa may be necessary, and shall 
conduct the investigation genera~ in a professional and 
courteous manner. 
(b) The investigationmay, as necessary, include site 
visits by the attorney, by FBI'. agent&. or by professional 
consultants retained for thia purpose. It may also include a 
review of pertinent documents, interviews with residents of 
the facility or other members· of the public with relevant 
information, and such othe~ •taDdard investigatory techniques 
as may be appropriate. 
(c) Attorneys shalLmake reasonable efforts, in accor-
dance with their case load· and. 'WOrk assignments, to assure 
that the investigation is conducted and completed promptly. 
8. Completion of the Investigation 
Upon the canpletion o~' the investigation, the attorney 
shall review all the informaticnrobtained and apply to it the 
criteria set forth in Standard 1, above. 
(a) If the evidence ia- inauf~icient to justify recom-
mending further action, th• attorney shall so advise the 
Section Chief and shal1 pre~~aa appropriate letter, for 
the Assistant Attorney GeneraL~• aignature, which notifies 
the state or local authoritieEthat the matter has been 
closed. 
(b) If there is evidenet of ~lagrant or egregious 
conditions that appear to result in leq~l violations, the 
attorney shall so advise the section Chief and shall prepare 
( 
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a letter, for the Assistant Attorney General's siqnature, 
Which notifies the state or local authorities of the alleged 
conditiona, the supporting facta and the minimum remedial 
measures necessary. In matters involving jails or prisons, 
the views of the Federal Bureau of Prisons shall be sought 
and considered. 
(c) The notice lettera referred to in (a) and (b) 
above shall be reviewed by the Section Chief, who may modify 
them or request additional information and then forward them . 
to the Assistant Attorney General for signature. 
(d) The Assistant Attorney General shall sign, modify, 
request additional information or take such other action as 
is appropriate. 
9. Discussions with State or Local Oficials 
(a) In the event that a letter is sent notifying state 
or local officials that violations may exist, the attorney 
shall then enter into good-faith discussions concerning the 
institution's response to the allegations and shall consider 
whatever remedial measures are proposed. If state officials 
so desire, the attorney shall endeavor to assist the institu-
tion in obtaining information about potential federal funds 
that may be available to help correct the alleged problems. 
(b) Where such negotiations result in a mutually 
satisfactory resolution of the alleged problems, the attorney 
will propose a consent decree or other enforceable order to 
the state or local official& for their signature. 
(c) · Where such negotiations fail to achieve a satis-
factory resolution, the attorney will proceed with the require-
ments set forth below concerning the filing of a civil action. 
10. Initiation of Civil Action 
(a) Where negotiation• fail to produce a mutually 
satisfactory result, the attorney may submit the standard 
memorandum in justification for initiating a lawsuit, accom-
panied by a proposed complaint and certificate for tne Attorney 
General's signature. 
(b) The justification memorandum shall. in addition to 
the standard required itema. review compliance with this pro-
cedure, discuss the negotiations with state officials and stress 
I , . 
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flagrant and egregioua conditione believed to have gone 
uncorrected. In matters involving prisons or jails the 
view• expressed by the Federal Bureau of Priaons ahall 
be , set forth in the justification memorandum. 
(c) The memorandum muat be reviewed. and approved by 
the Section Chief, Who shall forward approved recommendations 
to the Assistant -Attorney General. Xf the Assistant Attorney 
General approves filing the case, it ahaLL be forwarded to 
the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney Gamtral, as appropriate, 
for review and approval. 
(d) The complaint must bea (1) signed personally by 
the Attorney General: (2r-iecompanied by the statutorily 
required certificate signed peraonally by the Attorney General: 
(3) filed no sooner than 49 days after receipt by state officials 
of the Completion of Investigation Letter required by Section 8, 
above. 
11. COnduct and Resolution of Suits 
Suits filed pursuant to t.he- Act and .. t.'heae operational 
procedures shall proceed in accordanc:e. with .the same standards 
applicable to other suits initiated by the Civil Rights Division. 
In matters involving jails or prison•• positions shall be 
developed in consultation with the· Federa~ Bureau of Prisons. 
12. Intervention Under the Act 
(a) In situations Where th~Division· is requested or 
desires to intervene in an ongoing suit involving the con-
ditions in a pUblic institution, the- sam• review, investigation 
and memoranda required in other case& where the Division 
intervenes are applicable. In addition~, tblh..following con-
ditions must be meta 
(1) In evaluating a · caae-for intervention, the 
criteria set forth in Section 1 above •hall be applied: 
( 2) In matters involving jails·· or prisons, the 
views of the Federal Bureau of Prison• shall be sought 
and considered. 
( 3) The complaint in interventiOJZ- must be signed 
personally by the Attorney General and. muat be accom-
panied by the statutorily required certificate, also 
signed personally by the Attorney Gen~. 
( 
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(4) At least 15 days prior to filing the complaint 
in intervention, a letter must be sent to the appropriate 
state or local officials, advising them of the proposed 
intervention, the legal violations believed to exist, 
the facts supporting these allegations and minimum 
measures believed necessary to correct the violations. 
This letter may be signed by the Assistant Attorney 
General or such other official as the Attorney General 
may designate. The notice to federal officia·ls required 
by the Act shall be sent at this time. 
(b) Once approved and filed, suits in intervention 
shall be conducted and resolved in accordance with the same 
standards applicable to other suita intervened in by the 
Civil Rights Division. 
Since the enforcement of this Act has not ye~reached 
the point Where federal financial and technical assistance 
to the state or other entities has been discussed, */ we are 
unable to provide descriptions of such assistance a. required 
by Section 8(4). 
~/ In the proposed consent decree with Defendant&-in Santana 
v. Collazo (D. P.R.) prior to our intervent·ion·· und~tr 42 u.s.c. 
1997, the federal government offered to provide expert consult-
ation on the appropriate mechanisms which should be used to 
facilitate gradual closing of the isolation unit of the subject 
juvenile facilities: since the consent decre•wa• never entered, 
these services were not utilized. The federal government also 
offered to provide technical assistance to· ev~~t. · the indivi-
dualized needs of each juvenile for placemenroutside of defendant 
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III. Actions Initiated in Fiscal Year 1981 
Section 8 of the statute requires specified information con-
cerning all actions instituted pursuant to the Act. That infor-
mation follows. 
TO date, no case has been initiated under the Act. However, 
the following actions occurred during the fiscal yearz 
1. On October 15, 1980, we notified Mr. Steven R. 
Reid, Olairman of the Dauphin County Board of 
Prisons, and other appropriate officials of our 
intent to investigate allegations of unconstitu-
tional practices and conditions in the Dauphin 
County Prison, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Thi• 
investigation was initiated after receipt of 
allegations of brutality by correctional officer•• 
inadequate medical and psychiatric services, 
inadequate access to courts and legal materials. 
and egregious conditions of confinement. After-
evaluating the data collected during the inves~-­
gation, we concluded that no further action was:;, 
warranted. The Department advised Mr. Reid on 
August 4, 1981 that the investigation was being-
closed. 
2. On November 5, 1980, we formally advised Governor~­
David Treen of our intent to investigate conditions 
and treatment at East Louisiana State Hospital and-
Feliciana Forensic Facility in Jackson, Louisiana~ 
The investigation was based in part on a series of 
. newspaper articles describing seriously substaDdar4- -
living conditions at the two facilities, including 
several recent deaths among patients, lack of care. 
inadequate staffing, brutality and filthy condLtiom.. 
The investigation has thus far included toura ~-
the facilities by Department attorney• and an 




to discuss recent atepa taken to improve 
aervicea and physical conditions, and review 
of institutional recorda. The Department is 
continuing to evaluate the facta gathered in 
thia investigation. 
3. On NOvember 7, 1980, we notified Governor Harry 
Hughes and other state officials of our intent 
to investigate conditions and treatment providea 
to the mentally retarded residents of Rosewood 
center, OWings Mills, Maryland. The Departmewt 
received a written complaint in May, 1980 alleqinq· 
that residents of Rosewood were confined in an 
environment that failed to provide necessary habil.i-
tative services: that residents were needleaaly 
institutionalized: that residents were subjected to 
physical abuse: and that Rosewood was short or 
crucial staff. The investigation has included- . 
meetings with state officials and client advocacy 
groups, tours of the institution on several occasions,,. 
once with an expert consultant, and review of numerou•-
institutional ~nd state documents. We are presently 
evaluating the collected information. 
4. On November 14, 1980, we notified Governor Huqh~ carey:. 
and appropriate corrections officials of our intent -
to investigate Attica Prison, Attica, New York •. 
Previously, a number of inmate complaints alleging ... 
inadequate conditions of confinement, includin~tha 
special housing unit were forwarded to the Departmen~ 
by the HOnorable John T. Curtin, u.s. District 
JUdge for the Western District of New York. W. 
reviewed the complaints and found them to be- a .:· 
_ sufficient basis on Which to initiate an investiq•-
tion under the Act. We are continuing to evalua.t• 
the data already collected by the Federal Bur~ of:-
Investigation on this matter. 
s. On December 3, 1980, we notified Governor Lee-
Sherman Dreyfua and state correctional officia1e 
of our intent ta investigate the Wisconsin priso~ 
system. The Department had previously recei.vecl. a 
number of inmate complaints alleging unconstitu-
tional conditions within the state prison facilitie•-
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on the area• of environmental health an~ saf.ety, 
and medical care delivery. An expert consultant 
bas visite~ the facilities and ia preparinq a 
report based upon hia observations of the prison, 
and review of institutional documents. 
6. On December 3, 19AO, we notified Mayor Kevin H. 
White and other Boston city officials of our 
intent to investigate conditions of .confinement at 
Deer Island House of Corrections, Boston, Massachuaettt. 
This action was baaed upon receipt of citizen corres-
pondence and newspaper articles which alleged 
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the 
facility, including inadequate physical facilities,. 
medical care and overcrowdinq. We are continuing 
to evaluate information on this facility qathered 
by the FBI at our request. 
7. On December 12, 19q~, we notified Governor Richard 
Thornburgh and other state correctional officials 
of our intent to investigate Western State Correc-
tional Institution, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. On 
the basis of prior inma~e correspondence F the F~eral: .­
Bureau of Investigation obtained requested informa-
tion concerning the con~itiona of confinement. on 
August 5, 19131, we advised Governor Thornburqlt that .. 
our investigation indicated deficiencies primarily 
in the areas of medical and mental health care. W• 
recommended a number of correcti,,e measures inclu~in~­
assessment of professional staffing needs, plans for 
training medical personnel, and provision o~ appro--
priate services and housing to mentally ill inmate.-
·We have subsequently received a number of plans 
designed by state correctional officials to correct 
the identified deficiencies. We are reviewing th~ 
plans. 
8. On December 15, 1980, we notified Governor ~ichard L~ 
Thornburgh and state juvenile officials of our int~­
to investigate the Youth Development Center, Co~ 
Heights, Pennsylvania. Our investigation was based 
upon information contained in reports on the faci1~ty 
by public interest groups which documented deficiencie. 
in eervices and conditions of confinement. These 
deficiencies included inadequate educational and 
rehabilitative services as well as substandar~ livin9 
facilities. The investiqation has inclu~ed tours 
of the facility, including one by an expert consultant. 
and a review of documents from the institution. We 
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9. On February 24* 1981* we notified Governor John D. 
Rockefeller IV and other state officials of our 
intent to investigate the West Virginia Industrial 
School for Boys in Pruntytown, West Virginia. We 
had previously received a report prepared by a 
citizens group Which indicated significant defi-
ciencies in services provided to juveniles confined 
in the facility. We had also received information 
that residents had been abused by staff at Prunty-
town. OUr investigation has focused on the physical 
conditions, educational and programmatic services, 
and the degree to which the institution protects 
the juveniles from harm. We have toured the facility* 
and are reviewing documents provided by the state. 
10. On March 23, 1981, we notified Governor Frank White 
and state health officials of our intent to investi-
gate Benton Services Center Nursing Home in Benton, 
Arkansas. The action was initiated on the basis 
of a written complaint which alleged that the physical 
environment at the facility was inadequate~ that 
large groups of residents, especially mentally 
retarded and mentally ill residents , received no 
program services at all7 that there were staff defi-
ciencies: and that patient abuse had occurred. Thus 
far, we have toured the facility with an expert 
consultant and are reviewing other factual data 
concerning the facility. We are awaiting receipt 
of the consultant's report on his findings. 
11. On March 23, 1981, we notified Governor Robert 
· Graham and state health officials of our intent 
to investigate South Florida State Hospital, Hollywood, 
Florida. Our investigation was initiated on the 
basis of a citizen complaint and newspaper articles 
Which suggested serious deprivations of constitu-
tional rights due to alleged staffing shortages, 
lack of treatment programs, inadequate physical 
environment and instances of physical abuse of 
residents. OUr investigation has thus far included 
a tour of the institution, and a review of insti-
tutional records and plans for improvement. On 
August 5* 1981, we ad~ised Governor Graham of our 
finding that Florida officials have prepared extensive 
remedial plans to address deficienc ies in the 


















legislative proposals based upon these plana were 
to be finalized in Fall, 1981 for submission tp 
the State Legislature. Baaed upon the thoughtful 
formulation of these plana and their submission 
to the legislature for action, we propose to delay 
further investigation pending the result of 
legislative action. 
12. on July 13, 1981, we notified Governor James R. 
Thompson and other state officials of our intent 
to investigate Dixon Development Center, Dixon, 
Illinois. we had previously received information 
Which alleged that conditions at the facility 
were substandard: that staffing was deficientr 
that some residents of the facility had been abased: 
that habilitation services were inadequate: and 
that some residents were receiving inappropriate 
medications. Division attorneys have toured the 
facility and consulted with groupe of interested 
citizens. The investigation is continuing. 
Through rather unique circumstances, the Department intervened 
in Santana v. Collazo, Civil Action No. 75-1187 (D. P.R.) under the 
Act on January 27, 1981. The United States previously participated 
as plaintiff-intervenor in this case from December 6, 1976 to 
september 11, 1980 when it waa dismissed by the court. In its 
order of dismissal, however, the Court granted the Attorney General 
the oppOrtunity to subsequently move to intervene pursuant to 
Section 5(c) of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act. 
The pre-filing requirements of the Act were deemed to have been 
met by the facts obtained through discovery and trial evidence, 
and exchanged during lengthy negotiations Which had earlier 
resulted in three proposed consent decrees. Trial concluded in 
July, 1981. Post-trial briefs were aubmi tted in october, 1981. 
IV. Federal Institutions 
Section 8(5) of the Act requires the Attorney General to 
report on the progress made in each Federal institution toward 
meeting existing promulgated standarda fo: auch institutions 
or constitutionally guaranteed minima. 
The federal prison system is operated by the Bureau of 
Prisons (BOP) Which has taken a number of steps to meet such 
standards and protect constitutional rights. TO date, twelve 
federal prisons have been accredited by the Commissioner on 
Accreditation for corrections (CAC)J three other BOP facilities 
are candidates for accreditation and are awaiting final audit 
or full hearing before the Commission. The goal of the federal 
prison system, as set forth in ita current Five Year Plan 











1) accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, 
and 2) meet the Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails, 
issued by the Department of Justice. The Bureau is on schedule 
in meeting this goal. Since 1978, the Bureau has initiated 
the year long accreditation process in 5 to 12 of ita facilities 
each year. Additionally, for those institutions which have 
already been accredited, a year long re-accreditation process 
must be undertaken every third year. 
In 1981, the federal prison system began an internal 
audit, the Standards Compliance Review project, to insure 
that ita program managers incorporate the CAC correctional 
standards into their institution's basic policy directives 
and procedural guidelines. Where the Review indicated that 
such inclusion was not occurring, plana of actions were 
developed to revise policy. The information gathered by 
this internal audit permits the Bureau to identi£y areas 
Where standards are not currently being met. In this way, 
deficiencies in policies, procedures or resources may be 
corrected in order to obtain accreditation for the facility. 
The Bureau baa launched a serious, well planned effort 
to bring its prisons into compliance with professional 
correctional standards. Based upon its efforts aince 1978, 
the Bureau has made considerable ,progess toward meeting 
atandarda and guaranteeing minimal constitutional protections. 
siMilar progress has been made at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, 
washington, o.c., which is operated by the Department of Health 
and Human Services. The hospital, which serves approximately 
3,000 persons w;~h psychiatric disorders, is accredited by 
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) which 
requires compliance with specific standards set forth in the 
JCAH Consolidated Standards for Psychiatric Hospitals and Standards 
for Community Mental Health Care. St. Elizabeth's Hospital has 
taken additional steps to provide for the constitutional rights 
of its patient population by establishing an internal Patient 
Advocate's Office. This office is charged with th~ responsibility 
of operating a complaint system to assist in problea resolution 
and monitoring a variety of hospital reports to assure appropriate 
action on alleged violation of patient rights, ae well aa 
responsibility to educate hospital staff about the rights of patients. 
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The enforcement activities of the Civil Righta Oiviaion 
under the Civil Right• of Inatitutionalized Peraona Act are 
proceeding deliberately in accord with the requirements impoaed 
by Congreaa in the Act. Conciliation with atate and local 
officials ia being atresaed, in an effort to achieve reform 
where necessary without resort to litigation. This conciliatory 
approach, which accords with the intent of Congress in drafting 
the Act, has already begun to bear fruit. The Division will 
continue in the days ahead to aeek out and resolve all violations 




TO: David DATE: May 26, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents 
t have read your draft of 5/25 (immunity issue 
only), and am i.mpressed and convinced. I do have a couple 
of general observations, and then a few questions. 
1. Tt is not easy to follow the organization of 
your argument. My i~pression also is that there is a 
certain amount of repetition. The footnotes reflect 
enormous research and capacity to orqanize and use thP 
product of rese~rch. But, as you reread this, eliminate all 
or parts of notes that are truly marginal. 
2. I suggest that we restructure your draft 
generally along the lines we would write an opinion for the 
Court, as you did when you revised Hydrolevel. This would 
mean, generally, that after identifying the parties, you 
would summarize Patsy's claim; state respondent's answer to 
itJ and state the holding of CAS noting that it did not 
address the Eleventh Amendment issue even though it had been 
argued. This would constitute Part I. Perhaps Part II 
could be a summary of the general principles applicable to 
the Eleventh Amendment cases, and then use some of your 
wonderfully strong and persuasive language to the effect 
that these principlP-s control thta case. Perhaps in a Part 







the immunity issue. Of course the foregoing is merely a 
suggested rough outline. You are better than I am at 
organizing an opinion. 
2. 
3. It is not clear to me what TM did rely on in 
rejecting the Elevent.h Amendment argument. Various points 
appear in your draft, but they seem to be addressed in a 
random fashion. My gueAs i.s that this results from the Tilay 
TM gave the immunity issue the back of his hand. 
4. I identify questions that occurred to me in 
reading your draft: 
(a) What is the basis for the alleqed waiver, 
and what is the Florida Attorney General's anS\>let? My 
recollection is that he denied ernohattcallv that the state 
had waived anythinq. If TM didn't rely on waiver, should we 
address it? Perhaps note his non-reliance and quote the 
Attorney General. 
(b) In view of the overwhelminq authorities -
including statutes - that you cite for the view that the 
Board of Regents is an agency of the state, is this 
conceded? If TM largely ignored it (as I recall}, perhaps 
we should say that although not relied upon, Florida law and 
overwhelming authority, made clear that the Board is a state 
agency. 
(c) tn this connection, does the Court cite any 
of the cases you assemble on page 7? If not, we should 
point this out. You distinguish convincingly the one case 




(d) Is there a need for clarification as to the 
Court's position with respect to funds of the Board of 
Regents thAt do not come from the state treasury? 
• • * * * 
Although this memorandum may sound negative, I am 
in fact very positive about the persuasiveness of the rlraft, 
and the compellinq force of the authori.ties you cite and the 
reasons you qive. 
r ... F.P., Jr. 
ss 
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DAVID GINA-POWMay 27, 1982 
To: David 
From: LFP, Jr. 
Subject: 80-1874 - Patsy 
The revised draft of 5/27 looks great. 
I have suggested a rider for pp. 10-11, that puts into 
somewhat sharper focus what petitioner is really claiming. 
My only other suggestion relates to the discussion of 
Hopkins that commences at the bottom of page 15 and runs 
through 17, with elaborate notes. My impression is that we 
give Hopkins a "place of pride" greater than it deserves. I 
would not change what you have written in the text, with the 
possible exception noted in the margin on page 17. My 
concern is that the elaborate footnotes may be read as 
"protesting too much". I would not say, for example, that 
it is "no easy matter to state the holding in Hopkins" (n. 
15}. This substracts something from our textual statement 
that the case simply is not in point. 
Could we not say in a note that Hopkins has been viewed 
primarily as standing for a principle of agency law, and 
cite Hamilton Manufacturing Co. and perhaps Larson '! I would 
be inclined to omit from note 16 the quote from 
Frankfurter's dissent. Indeed, in light of changes I 
suggest in the text I would omit footnote 16 altogether. 
2. 
When you work these minor changes out, lets move it to 
~ 
a Chamber's draft so we can get it in print. We can deliver 
Part II to the print shop when it also is ready. 
LFP, Jr. 
DAVID GINA-POWMay 27, 1982 
To: David 
From: LFP, Jr. 
Subject: 80-1874 - Patsy 
The revised draft of 5/27 looks great. 
I have suggested a rider for pp. 10-11, that puts into 
somewhat sharper focus what petltione~ is really claiminq. 
My only other suggestion relates to the discussion of 
Hopkins that commences at the bottom of page 15 and runs 
through 17, with elaborate notes. My impression is that we 
give HoPkins a "place of pride" greater than it deserves. I 
~~ould not chanqe what you have written in the text, with the 
possible exception noted in the margin on page 17. My 
concern is that the elaborate footnotes may be read as 
"protesting too much". I would not say, for example, that 
it is "no easy matter to state the holding in Hopkins" (n. 
15). This substracts something from our textual statement 
that the case simply is not in point. 
Could we not say in a note that Hopkins has been viewed 
primarily as standing for a principle of aqency la~, and 
cite Hamilton Manufacturing Co. and Perhaps Larson. I would 
be inclined to omit from note 16 the quote from 
Frankfurter's dissent. Indeed, in light of changes I 
suggest in the text I would omit footnote 16 altogether. 
I • 
' .. ~ . 
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2. 
When you work these minor changes out, lets move it to 
a Chamber's draft so we can get it in print. We can deliver 
Part II to the print shop when it also is reaov. 
LFP, Jr. 
June 1, 1982 
80-1~74 Patsy v. Board of Regents 
Dear l'f'lhurqood: 
As vou have maoe substantial chanqPs in vour 
opinion for the Court, my dissent also will have to be 
revised. 





cc: The Conference 
